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The Japanese–Chinese security relationship is one of the most important vari-
ables in the formation of a new strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region
which has not only regional but also global implications. The book investigates
how and why since the 1990s China has turned in the Japanese perception from
a benign neighbour to an ominous challenge, with implications not only for
Japan’s security, but also its economy, role in Asia and identity as the first devel-
oped Asian nation. Japan’s reaction to this challenge has been a policy of
engagement, which consists of political and economic enmeshment of China,
hedged by political and military power balancing.
The unique approach of this book is the use of an extended security concept
to analyse this policy, which allows a better and more systematic understanding
of its many inherent contradictions and conflicting dynamics, including the
centrifugal forces arising from the Japan–China–US triangular relationship.
Many contradictions of Japan’s engagement policy arise from the overlap of
military and political power-balancing tools which are part of containment as
well as of engagement, a reality which is downplayed by Japan but not ignored
by China. The complex nature of engagement explains the recent reinforcement
of Japan’s security cooperation with the US and Tokyo’s efforts to increase the
security dialogues with countries neighbouring China, such as Vietnam,
Myanmar and the five Central Asian countries.
The book raises the crucial question of whether Japan’s political leadership,
which is still preoccupied with finding a new political constellation and with
overcoming a deep economic crisis, is able to handle such a complex policy in
the face of an increasingly assertive China and a US alliance partner with strong
swings between engaging and containing China’s power.
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The Japanese–Chinese security relationship is one of the most important vari-
ables in the formation of a new strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region
which has not only regional but also global implications. The management of
China’s rise to great-power status by Japan will be of crucial importance for
regional and global stability and for access to the most populous market of the
future. The outcome will have an important bearing on whether and how the
international system can accept a new great power that is advancing and devel-
oping as fast as China, but which is also beset with many domestic and foreign
policy problems.1 Referring to the similar situation of the US in facing China,
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross described this challenge as ‘how to
respond to a rising power in a manner consistent with both their countries’
short-term parochial national interests and their instrumental and/or normative
interest in global order, particularly the absence of great power war’.2
As the second largest economic world power, Japan’s influence on China’s rise
to great-power status and on contributing to an outcome which is benign to the
world system is considerable. Japan’s relevance is emphasized by its geographic
contiguity to China, its willingness to help China with its economic and social
development for economic as well as political reasons, and its position as
America’s major Asian alliance partner. The Japan–US comprehensive relation-
ship is simultaneously exerting influence on Japan’s ability to influence and
mediate China’s rise to great-power status as well as impacting on China’s most
important bilateral relationship, i.e. the Sino-American relationship.
Security in the post-Cold War era
The concept of security has until now mostly been defined by realists for whom
the referent is the state, whereas the content is narrowly related to military secu-
rity. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, this neo-realist understanding
has been increasingly challenged, and security now includes for many the
survival of human collectivities (rather than just the nation-state), but also the
conditions of existence, which are affected by political, economic, societal and
environmental factors in addition to military factors.3 These non-traditional
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conditions may not directly result in a military clash, but they may create an
environment in which such a clash becomes more likely.
In this book the main referent of security is still understood to be the state,
but security is taken as encompassing international and intra-state security. As
we will see, a considerable part of Japanese security perception of China is
formed by the impact of issues related to national identity, political legitimacy
and distributive justice on China’s internal stability. There is concern among
many Japanese observers that the consequences of China’s possible economic
and social failure may constitute a more realistic threat to Japan than the likeli-
hood of military aggression. National independence and territorial integrity are
still core values of security in Japan and China, but so are the acquisition
and/or protection of ‘rank, respect, material possessions, and special privileges’,
and the question is very much, for Japan as well as China, the perception of the
degree to which the other side requires national self-extension for national self-
preservation.4
Economic strength and resilience have been included in the concept of secu-
rity for a much longer time in Asia than in Europe or the US. Since the
beginning of the 1980s Japan has been using the concept of comprehensive
national security, and China has adopted it since its economic opening.5 The
following statements can be made about its relevance to security:
• economic strength is directly related to the power and the security of a state;
• economic well-being is part of the essential values of the state and serves as
a crucial factor for the state’s legitimacy and stability;
• economic means are used to achieve important ends of the state at the
national as well as the international level;
• the means of securing and protecting the material resources for economic
development range from economic ones to diplomatic and military ones;
• the ecological consequences of economic growth impact on the national as
well as the regional/international level.
This author agrees, therefore, with the generic definition of security as provided
by Alagappa: ‘the protection and enhancement of values that the authoritative
decisonmakers deem vital for the survival and well-being of a community’.6
Methodology and questions to be addressed
With this understanding of security, the book analyses the changing Japanese
perception of China’s security since 1989 and how it has been reacting. The year
1989 has been chosen because it is associated with a major shift in international
politics, i.e. the end of the Cold War. The June 1989 Tiananmen repression
provided a further break in the relationship between China and the international
environment. This research includes China’s military policies, but will also touch
on the impact of China’s economic development on issues which are considered
critical for Japan’s security, ranging from China’s military modernization to
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China’s response to territorial issues (oil extraction, protection of sea lanes), the
positioning of the two countries in the East Asian hierarchy (leadership competi-
tion), ecological issues and China’s domestic stability. While the focus is on
Japanese perceptions (and the resulting policies) because of my expertise and
language abilities, I have tried to contrast these perceptions with those held by
their Chinese counterparts.
Japan, like any other concerned state, has to deal with its own perception of
what China is now and may become in the future, as well as with China’s
projection of itself. The formation of these perceptions on both sides is influ-
enced by many variables, including historical experience, tactical considerations
and domestic politics. China’s impact on regional security is still based less on its
comprehensive national power (in terms of actual economic and military capa-
bilities) than on how its leadership manipulates the perception by outside powers
of its size, geographic location, resources and potential economic and military
power, as well as intentions to mobilize these resources. The message which is
coming across indicates that China wants to overcome its military, economic and
social backwardness, maintain its mixture of socialism and free-market economy,
achieve territorial integrity (reunification with Taiwan, realization of territorial
claims), and play a regional and global role commensurate with what it considers
its rightful historical place, from which it was pushed by colonialism and
Western aggression. Some of these revisionist goals and their mode of imple-
mentation are rather vague, and they are backed up by an old-fashioned
Realism, which has led some outside observers to speak of a ‘China threat’. For
Japan, these revisionist goals raise fundamental issues of Japan’s own future role
and position in Asia.
In order to influence China so that it realizes its goals in a peaceful way –
despite the country’s territorial and ideological revisionism, and despite its diffi-
culties in reconciling its rapid economic growth with a stable domestic political
situation and environmental sustainability – Japan has chosen a policy of
engagement which is based on providing China with economic and political
incentives, hedged by military balancing through its own military force and the
military alliance with the US. This author is therefore rejecting structural realism
as an explanation for Japan’s policy towards China, as well as the assertion that
Japan has accepted ‘all the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in
the economic realm’.7 Instead, it is argued that Japan has moved from publicly
downplaying the military component of its China policy and exhibiting an incli-
nation to accommodation and deference to China on many bilateral issues,
towards a position where military as well as economic China policies are increas-
ingly linked to expectations of Chinese policy that are in line with Japanese
national interests and internationally accepted rules.
China’s territorial and ideological revisionism raises the challenge for Japan
(and other involved countries) of how to prevent a situation where many
Chinese policies which seemingly respond positively to engagement are merely a
temporary or tactical accommodation, which aims to extract maximum benefit
from the economic support strategy of powers like Japan, until China feels
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strong enough to secure its objectives in a way which is less compatible with
maintaining a peaceful and stable world. In addition, there is concern that even
successful economic modernization of China may fragment its social fabric
and/or destroy the environment to such an extent that destabilization of this
huge country threatens the security of neighbouring countries by way of refugee
streams, cross-border crime and transboundary pollution.
Engagement is often one-sidedly associated with the Liberal school of inter-
national relations, which does not do justice to the complex nature of what
engagement actually entails. This author proposes a dynamic model of engage-
ment which is based on elements of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism.
While the first and second elements explain Japan’s power balancing (based on
its bilateral military deterrent with the US) and its economic policies (notably
its huge official development assistance (ODA) programme for China), the latter
is helpful in explaining why Japan is not, for example, fully using its military,
political and economic power resources towards China, often showing defer-
ence in its relationship with China. The model is a dynamic one because a
close examination of the policies based on the three theories reveals that there
are inherent constructive as well as destructive dynamics in addition to those
created by the regional/international environment. The fundamental questions
raised in this book are therefore what kind of engagement Japan is pursuing
with China, and how feasible and sustainable it is. Based on this investigation of
a dynamic model of interaction, it is possible to develop several scenarios of
the future of Japanese–Chinese security relations and propose some policy
recommendations.
The book analyses Japan’s engagement policy towards China on the bilat-
eral level (Japan–China), the alliance level (Japan–US), and the multilateral
level (e.g. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum). The
Japanese–American comprehensive alliance is shaping Japan’s security relation-
ship with China, and at the same time this alliance is being shaped by that
relationship. Both Japan and the US profess to pursue an engagement policy
towards China, and they rely on each other to do so to varying degrees. A
central question pursued in this book is the impact of Japan–US asymmetries
in power, interests and policy tools, as well as of differences in their domestic
environment, on their engagement policy. Are these interests and policy tools
compatible, and, if so, are they adequate?
Japan’s regional and multilateral engagement of China has not yet been well
documented in the literature because of its short history. It is, however, impor-
tant to ask to what degree Japan is supplementing its bilateral and alliance
approaches to China’s security challenges with multilateral approaches, and
what the conditions shaping them are. The outcome is not only highly relevant
to the professed goal of making China a shareholder in a peaceful and open
world system, and of providing a mechanism for checks and balances as well as
addressing transnational problems such as environmental degradation, but it will
also be a crucial test for the future of multilateralism since multilateralism may
not survive if China does not embrace it.
4 Introduction
The complex nature of engagement policy
The misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable
confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role
of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to
perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to ‘engagement’, or
even the coinage of new words, have been proposed which make an appropriate
understanding of engagement policy even more difficult. Definitions range from
unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or construc-
tive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to
constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of
engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another
country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their
deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which
stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence
and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules
and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.
The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow
the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance,
but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its
economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the mainte-
nance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain
such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that
multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The
situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as
‘ripe for rivalry’, and as heading for instability.9
The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert
S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: ‘The use of
non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising
power’s behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways
that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order’. The
authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power’s behaviour does not
seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer’s power, nor to prevent the devel-
opment of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four
conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:
1 the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irrec-
oncilable conflicts of interests with the established powers;
2 the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible
threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;
3 engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;
4 the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the
new rising power11
When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the
rising power, ‘coercive means’ must still be considered in its calculation of the
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established powers despite their goal of the non-use of ‘coercive methods’. Not
only is this related to the established powers’ Realist objectives (i.e. balancing
and hedging) vis-à-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in
the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the established powers,
including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in mili-
tary alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The
crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan’s engagement policy (and
this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify
the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals asso-
ciated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used;
one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military
force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty,
transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational prob-
lems or respect for basic human rights.12
Restraint and deference
Theories of Realism and Liberalism are not sufficient to explain human
behaviour, including state actions, which are fundamentally shaped by socially
shared understandings of the world. The Constructivist school of international
relations addresses these understandings, which ‘alternatively can be called
cultures, mentalités or discourses’ and which ‘are not simply reflections of an
objective material reality, but rather emerge out of communicative and social
processes, socialization, debate and sometimes coercion’.13
As we will see in the following chapters, one prominent feature of Japan’s
China policy (but also of policies towards other countries) which is difficult to
explain purely in terms of Realism or Liberalism is Japan’s restraint in exercising
its considerable power in interest conflicts with China. Instead, Japan has often
reacted to China with what may be called deference or restraint, although it has
had the upper hand in terms of power and/or although resisting would not have
involved much political cost. Of course any economically, politically or militarily
strong state encounters limits to its ability to deploy economic, political or mili-
tary power. The amount of power necessary to achieve the intended goal may
surpass the available power resource, or there may be insufficient domestic
support (e.g. competing demands, fear of counterproductive results, a low level
of interest, etc.). However, there are cases in Japan’s China policy which are
beyond obvious or straightforward power calculations and which are better
explained from a Constructivist perspective. While some authors already speak
of a strategic Japanese–Chinese rivalry, Japan often seems to be waging this
rivalry in a very restrained way, whereas China maximizes its relatively inferior
power resources.
To explain this Japanese inclination to deference and restraint in the bilateral
relationship with China, Constructivist approaches seem to be particularly
useful. Constructivist scholars have notably investigated those norms and
behaviours which account for Japan’s post-war pacifism, which is one source of
6 Introduction
Japanese deference and restraint.14 There are, however, other sources as well
which are either China-specific or not (e.g. cultural affinity, war guilt and a
general tendency towards conflict avoidance), and which often reinforce each
other (war guilt, pacifism, the sympathy of the Japanese Left for Chinese
Communism). As a specialist of Chinese history Yokoyama Hiroshi refers to
China’s demand for ‘kowtow diplomacy’ (dogeza gaiko) from Japan, which rein-
forces Japan’s deferential inclinations.15
As the following chapters will show, deferential and restrained behaviour can
be found across the whole spectrum of the Japanese–Chinese relationship,
ranging from even officially avoiding the use of the word ‘engagement’ because
of some negative connotations for the Chinese (e.g. changing the nature of
China’s regime; Japanese–American security alliance) to granting China ODA in
accordance with Beijing’s five-year economic plan rather than Japan’s own regu-
lations, which allow ODA planning only for one year. Deferential behaviour
towards another country occurs in many bilateral relationships, but the point to
be made in this book is that in the case of Japanese–Chinese relations the
frequency of such behaviour is particularly obvious and enduring, despite power
asymmetries in Japan’s favour.
The dynamics of engagement
These approaches to the analysis of engagement inspired by Realism, Liberalism
and Constructivism alone would not explain the shift in Japan’s China policy
towards greater emphasis on Realist principles (in reaction to, for example,
Chinese military modernization or intrusions into Japan’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ)); one must also analyse the dynamics which are set free by the
various engagement policies. These dynamics are created by the interaction
between the engagement policies and China’s perceptions and discourses, as well
as by tensions inherent in the different approaches to engagement.
First, we have to consider the impact of Realist approaches on China. China’s
perceptions and discourses are shaped by its historical experience, political and
economic system, tactical calculations, ideology and national goals. Three
features need particular mention and will be elaborated in greater detail in the
following chapters. One is the deeply engrained foreign-policy Realism of the
political leadership, which inclines to a strong belief in power balancing, foreign
and security policy being a zero-sum game, and a historical determinism that
assumes that economic power leads to military power. A second feature is the
deep distrust of Japan, shared by a majority of Chinese, because of Tokyo’s past
aggression against China and its unwillingness to come to terms with it. A third
feature is the ability of the small and relatively coherent political leadership to
develop and implement foreign policies in a much more consistent way than an
open democratic political system can, allowing the optimum use of even small
tactical advantages or ploys. Against this background, the Realist element of
engagement may ultimately encourage and facilitate the more aggressive
impulses of China, rather than balance or restrain them.16 This could therefore
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enhance the risk of miscalculation leading to military confrontation which is
inherent in military power balancing.
Second, the Liberal element of engagement also has negative dynamics.
China is benefiting hugely from the liberal-institutional element of engagement
(i.e. ODA, trade, technology transfer) because it helps to enhance its national
power. But this element also has the potential to produce negative dynamics
working against the prospect of a stable and peaceful future China.
The liberal-institutional element of engagement has a sting for China’s
leaders because it is regarded ‘as a means for the West to bring about a peaceful
transformation of China’s international and domestic behaviour in accordance
with rules and norms set by the West and endangers Chinese regime stability’
(socialization).17 Chinese leaders particularly dislike Western insistence on values
like human rights and national self-determination (e.g. for Taiwan or Tibet). The
negative reaction of these leaders to this ‘socialization approach’ could poten-
tially reinforce their Realist inclinations towards international relations.
Moreover, China’s economic strengthening is not just creating a dynamic force
which in time may change its political system and make it a peaceful player, but,
at least in the medium term, it is creating one that allows the current leadership
to strengthen the country’s military potential, which may in the long run
construct a less peaceful mentality.18 There is therefore some tension between
the ‘socialization’ approach and the ‘economic interdependence’ approach
(through trade, ODA, foreign direct investment (FDI)), although they have many
complementarities.
Japan is more inclined to follow the ‘economic interdependence’ approach (in
contrast to the US, with a greater emphasis on ‘socialization’ leading to the
acceptance of Western values) because of its economic advantage, its civilian
power mentality and the fact that it shares Chinese feelings about traditional
norms/Western superiority. This can only further complicate alliance relations
with the US. While China prefers the ‘economic interdependence’ approach
because of its pragmatic agenda, it resents Japanese leadership and continuous
economic superiority. At the same time, a successful ‘economic interdependence’
approach may give Japan a considerable future economic competitor, and
perhaps also a strategic one. There is also the risk of political and economic
destabilization, particularly during democratization and economic development,
as a result of fostering economic interdependence. For this reason we will have to
investigate the impact of new security issues like environmental degradation,
transboundary crime and migration on Japanese–Chinese security relations.
Liberal-institutional approaches in the multilateral sphere can give China
unfair advantages. China’s tactical adoption of multilateralism (rather than
normative adoption) would create a ‘time spanner’: China attempts, for example,
to exclude issues from multilateral fora which it dislikes. In the case of the ARF,
membership allows China to influence the agenda and to prevent, for example,
the progress of deliberations on preventive diplomacy and to address its territorial
demands in the South China Sea in a multilateral forum. Although China may in
the end have to compromise on some issues, its initial obstructionist position may
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help it to gain valuable time so as later to be in a more powerful position. One has
also to consider that the growing forces of Liberalism in Asia suffered a certain
setback in 1997 due to the East Asian economic crisis, which has weakened
Japan’s economic role in the region, destabilized several regimes in the region and
shown the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) ineffectiveness in
the face of conflict (e.g. East Timor) and in driving forward political and
economic integration.
Third, Japan’s deference also may set free negative dynamics. These attitudes
may encourage China to push its interests even more strongly. Also, China’s
actions may gradually reduce or even destroy the normative foundations on
which Japanese accommodation and deference stand. This can be argued, for
example, with regard to Japan’s astonishing reconfirmation (the Chinese speak of
expansion) of the Japanese–American security relationship in 1996 and the revi-
sion of the guidelines for Japanese–American security cooperation in 1999 as
regards Japan’s pacifism. Ultimately it may lead to Japan becoming a military
power commensurate with its economic power, including nuclear power, particu-
larly if the country perceives the US security guarantee as no longer reliable. On
the other hand, the difficulty involved in such an extreme change may instead
lead to Japan accepting Chinese hegemony in Asia.
Dynamics arising from the alliance and triangular relations
Other negative dynamics result from the interaction between the Realist
approach, on the one hand, and the Japan–US alliance and Japan–China–US
triangular relations, on the other. The Realist policies of balancing and hedging
are driven as well as checked by what are referred to as the two kinds of fears
inherent in the ‘alliance game’: abandonment and entrapment.19
Whereas until the end of the Cold War Japan’s main fear was entrapment,
with the Korean War and the Vietnam War being the most critical events, Japan
is now facing both entrapment and abandonment. The Revisionists in the US
argue that the end of the Cold War make the Japanese–American security treaty
redundant, while a virtual coalition of leftists and rightists in Japan might
welcome such an outcome. The sudden reversal of US China policy under
President Nixon in 1972 was a minor form of abandonment by an ally and is
still very much on the mind of Japanese decision-makers and analysts. Fears of
abandonment were also raised by certain pro-China actions and statements
during the Clinton administration.
In order to counteract the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era (particularly
in view of the uncertainties about China’s future path) Japan deepened the mili-
tary alliance in 1996 and 1999, as mentioned before. These moves, as well as a
greater assertiveness of American unipolar power, dashed China’s hope of a
more multipolar world, which would have eased its own emergence as a new
rising power. China became particularly upset about the intentional ambiguity in
the 1999 revised guidelines concerning their applicability to Taiwan, which
touches on China’s greatest security interest. If, despite considerable financial,
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technical and political concerns, Japan and the US go ahead on Theatre Missile
Defence (TMD), it will propel Japanese–American military cooperation to a
much higher level in order to deal with the real-time requirements of a missile
defence system. In view of China’s animosity to TMD and closer Japan–US
cooperation in general, the consequences of Japan’s fear of abandonment would
set free even greater dynamics, propelling China to increase its military power
and take an even more hostile attitude towards Japan. On the other hand, given
the deep contradictions between the US and China over Taiwan (but not
between Japan and China!), which may possibly degenerate into ‘irreconcilable
conflicts of interests’ as mentioned in the first condition for engagement, Japan’s
fear of entrapment may cause it to be more accommodating to China, with all
the possible negative consequences for the viability of the Japan–US relationship.
These dynamics arising from the abandonment–entrapment dilemma must
also be linked to those inherent in the complexities of triangular
Japan–US–China relations, i.e. three sets of relations – that is, between Japan
and China, between China and the US and between Japan and the US. In
theory there is always the possibility that two may gang up against the third and
that the third may play the two others against each other.20 Another possibility is
for one power to engage in offshore balancing or to act as a balancer of last
resort; this finds favour not only with some traditional Realists, like Richard
Holbrooke and Christopher Layne21, but also with a Revisionist like Chalmers
Johnson. Looking at the Japanese–Chinese–American triangular relationship, we
have to state that it is most certainly not an equilateral triangle, as it is not a
three-way strategic partnership or a big-power condominium.22 Two of the
countries (Japan and the US) have a relationship with each other which cannot
be rivalled by China’s relationship with either the US or Japan. There is there-
fore an inherent and an a priori two-against-one triangular relationship. The
challenge for China is to find out the degree of shared Japan–US concern about
China and how far Japan and the US can work together on meeting the
perceived challenge from China, and to weaken such a common front. It is
therefore not surprising that China exploits, for example, the US’s difficulty in
‘[sending] consistent and coherent signals’ to China, trying to play one against
the other.23 China has only to play on Japan’s fears of entrapment. Under these
circumstances, it is not, for example, in China’s interest to give the appearance
that it could be convinced that a strengthened Japanese–American security
alliance is not directed against it. As we will see later, however, the dynamics
involved in the three sets of relationship go beyond any single option of the
game-theory approach to triangular relations. The interdependence of all three
actors has gone very deep and is recognized by all.24
Summary of chapters
Chapter 1 is a short historical overview of Japanese–Chinese security relations
from 1945 to the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. It describes the move from contain-
ment of China to the beginning of Japan’s engagement after the normalization of
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diplomatic relations in 1972. After an exploration of Japan’s place in China’s
post-Cold War foreign and security policy, Chapter 2 analyses the changes in
Japanese security perceptions of China against the rise of traditional and non-
traditional security challenges from China, ranging from territorial disputes in the
East China Sea to increasing illegal immigration from China. Chapter 3 details
the various elements of Japan’s engagement, with an emphasis on the strength-
ening of Japanese–US military cooperation since around 1995. It also contains a
description of Japan’s bilateral and multilateral efforts to engage China politically,
at official and non-governmental level. In Chapter 4 I look in more detail at
various dynamics resulting from Japan’s economic enmeshment and its coopera-
tion with the US.
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Introduction
This chapter describes the setting for Japan’s post-war security relationship with
China against the background of its overall security policy, which has been
dominated by the dichotomy between its post-war pacifism and the comprehen-
sive alliance with the US.1 It allowed Japan to engage China through economic
interaction, particularly once China opened itself up to the outside at the end of
the 1970s. This led to a flourishing economic relationship, while Japanese devel-
opment assistance greatly contributed to China’s modernization. China,
however, never lost sight of Japan’s close military relationship with the US and
its growing defence potential, although the impact of these on its policy towards
Japan fluctuated. Moreover, Japan’s past aggression against China and its
inability to come to terms with it in a more convincing way bedevilled the
Japan–China security relationship beyond the confrontation brought on by the
Cold War era.
An overview of Japanese–Chinese history
History plays an important role in the bilateral Japanese–Chinese relationship
and has an enduring impact on the perceptions, policies and future outlook of
both sides. Historical experience shapes identities, but it is also instrumentalized
for pressure on the other side. Depending on the prevailing political situation at
a given time, Japan and China have found reasons for optimism or pessimism
about their relationship.
Geographic contiguity has encouraged links between Japan and China since
ancient times and allowed Japan to benefit from China’s advanced civilization
and culture in order to develop its own. This closeness and China’s geographic
size (it is twenty-five times larger than Japan) have never (except during the failed
Mongol invasion attempts in the thirteenth century) constituted a threat to
Japan. For hundreds of years until the last century the Chinese considered Japan
a tributary state. While the Japanese rulers did not quite accept this claim, they
went along with it because they realised how much they could learn and benefit
from accommodating China, which had no expansionist desires. Relations had
1 Japanese–Chinese relations
under Cold War conditions
phases of lesser intensity, notably during Japan’s period of seclusion between
1600 and 1867, but trade, cultural exchanges and political contacts were never
totally interrupted.
The security aspect of the bilateral relationship changed dramatically after
Japan was forced by Western powers to open up to the outside and to modernize
according to Western models. Japan observed Western aggression against China
and the failure of China’s policy of isolation to provide an adequate response.
The Chinese failure to modernize and to develop what the Western powers
considered to be normal relations with the outside world made it an easy victim
of Western imperialism. The Meiji leaders were concerned that they might be
next if their country did not modernize quickly. Another conclusion from
China’s experience, however, had very negative consequences for Japan’s rela-
tionship with China: China’s weakness was perceived as a threat to Japan’s
security, and its leaders decided to react with their own version of belated impe-
rialism. It is worthwhile remembering this concern about Chinese weakness,
because today some Japanese are more, or at least as much, concerned about the
security implications of a possible failure of China’s economic modernization
programme as they are about China becoming a military threat.
At the end of the nineteenth century China’s perceived weakness led to
Japanese designs over Korea, which was still under Chinese suzerainty and which
the Japanese rulers considered in strategic terms as a ‘dagger pointing at Japan’s
heart’. To forestall any threat to its ‘line of interest’ (as Yamagata Aritomo
formulated it in 1890) on the Asian continent, which included the Korean penin-
sula, Japan clashed with China over Korea in 1894 and achieved its first victory
in its imperialist expansion. Despite Chinese resentment of Japan, after the war
the victor became a role model for China’s adaptation to the modern Western
world, and many Chinese students went to Japan to learn about the West
through Japanese textbooks and Japanese eyes. But Japan’s military expansion
had only just begun and it gradually consolidated its control over the Korean
peninsula after defeating Russia in 1905. China became the main victim, losing
control over not only Korea but also Taiwan. In 1931 the Manchurian incident
led to further Japanese encroachments in China; the following year saw the
establishment of the puppet state Manchukuo; and the Marco Polo Bridge inci-
dent in 1937 opened the way to an all-out war against China, which ended only
in 1945 with Japan’s surrender to the Allied forces.
After Japan’s defeat in 1945, the security issue in Japanese–Chinese relations
stayed in the background until the end of the US–Soviet confrontation because
of Japan’s protection by the Japanese–American security alliance, the weakness
of China and the promising emerging economic relationship with its giant
neighbour, notably since the opening in 1978. In 1945 Japan was occupied by
the Allied forces under American leadership. These forces incidentally included
troops from the Guomindang regime, which was then still ruling China. The
Guomindang had to withdraw to Taiwan and some adjacent islands in 1949
when the Chinese Communists won victory in the civil war. The US forced
Japan to recognize the Guomindang regime, which established the Republic of
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China (ROC) on Taiwan. Yoshida Shigeru, then prime minister of Japan, was no
friend of the Chinese Communists, but he knew that Japan’s larger economic
interest had traditionally always been on the mainland and he would have
preferred not to make any decision at that point on which Chinese government
to recognize. Before the war, trade with China had accounted for more than 25
per cent of total Japanese foreign trade. Following its surrender in 1945, Japan
became totally dependent on the US as a market and source of imports.
Strangely reminiscent of Japan’s contemporary strategy of engagement towards
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is what Yoshida Shigeru told the US, that
Japanese businessmen, as a result of their experience with the Chinese, would be
the ‘best fifth column for the democracies against the Chinese Communists’.2 He
even suggested that the US to act as a mediator through direct
Japanese–Chinese negotiations to dissuade China from accepting ‘domination by
the Soviet Politburo’.3 Moreover, Yoshida held the view that in the long term
Communism in China stood no chance against deeply embedded elements of
Chinese culture.
Against a background of growing anti-Communism in the US and China’s
intervention against the United Nations (UN) in the Korean War, Japan stood no
chance of prevailing and on 28 April 1952 Japan signed a peace treaty with the
Guomindang. The only concession Yoshida was able to extract consisted in
restricting the effectiveness of the treaty to those areas of China actually under
the control of the ROC at the time of its conclusion. In a letter of 24 December
1951 to John Foster Dulles, the special representative of President Truman for
the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, Yoshida Shigeru justified the recog-
nition of the ROC by referring to the UN condemnation of the Chinese
Communists as aggressors in the Korean War, as well as to Japanese obligations
to support UN actions. He also mentioned the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Alliance of January 1950 and Chinese support of the Japan Communist
Party as grounds for rejecting a bilateral peace treaty with Beijing.4
Until 1972 Japan thus recognized only the Guomindang regime on Taiwan
and closely followed the US in its relationship with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Japan was able to revive its economic relationship with the
Chinese mainland, but only under difficult political circumstances, which arose
from its alliance with the US and China’s policy of using economic incentives to
separate Japan from the US and extract political concessions from Japan.
However, before dealing with the more recent post-war history of
Japanese–Chinese security relations we have to assess the impact of two impor-
tant and interlinked factors in this security relationship: the role of the past and
the Japanese–American security relationship.
The role of the past
Japan’s past aggression against China and its inability to deal with it in a way
considered appropriate by China (but also by other Asian countries) has influ-
enced the bilateral security relationship up to the present day. From a
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Constructivist perspective, the discourse of the Japanese on China and that of
the Chinese on Japan is clearly shaped by their shared historical experience. The
brutal Japanese war campaigns, massacres like that of Nanjing in 1937 and
forced Chinese labour left deep scars in China’s historical memory which impact
on Japan.5 There are still many current policy issues which force both countries
to deal concretely with the legacy of this period. These issues include warped
perceptions of past misdeeds held by many Japanese. This is regularly demon-
strated by so-called ‘slips of tongue’ by conservative politicians; newly published
textbooks with biased historical accounts; visits by government ministers to the
Yasukuni war memorial shrine; the disposal of chemical weapon munitions left
by Japan in China, which started only in 1999; and the fate of Japan’s former
colony Taiwan, which is still not settled (on Taiwan, see Chapter 2).6 The past
makes it difficult for many Chinese to recognize the fundamental changes which
have taken place in post-1945 Japan and to trust Japan’s intentions. This distrust
is a logical reflection of the trauma inflicted upon China, but for China it is
often also a convenient tool in the battle of national interests and sustaining the
power of the Communist regime. Without knowing about China’s perception of
the past, it is even more difficult to understand its contemporary suspicion about
Japan’s Taiwan policy or its resistance to Japan’s involvement in the US-
promoted TMD (which is analysed in Chapter 3).
Japan’s inability properly to acknowledge the historical facts (rekishi ninshiki)
and apologize to China in a way recognized by China as convincing is casting a
shadow over the overall relationship, and it particularly affects the security rela-
tionship, which is singularly sensitive to perceptions of intentions and to
manipulations of these perceptions. At the most basic level, many Chinese fear
that an unrepentant Japan is bound to repeat its past aggression, echoing the
widespread historical deterministic idea of many Chinese that a country that
does not acknowledge past misdeeds ‘correctly’ is bound to repeat them. The
Japanese–American security alliance is, depending on China’s mood, considered
a smokescreen, or at least a crumbling wall, behind which Japan may transform
its huge economic power to become a future military superpower with ill inten-
tions towards China.
There are many circumstances on both sides which make reconciliation over
this historical legacy very difficult. At a structural level, reconciliation is complex
between countries with very different political systems (democratic versus author-
itarian regimes), and this inhibits the ability of both to address the issue because
of a failure to grant full legitimacy to the other system (for example an absence
of normal diplomatic relations) and the delay in developing common interests.
This difference also became apparent in the much earlier reconciliation of
Germany with Western countries than was the case with countries under
Communist rule in Eastern Europe.7 The alliance with the US has only rein-
forced this structural problem. The US, as Japan’s former enemy and victim of
aggression, absolved Japan from guilt to a much greater extent than was the case
between Germany and the Allied powers. American anti-Communism and anti-
China deterrence objectives led to Japan’s insulation from China and other
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Asian countries directly after Japan’s defeat in 1945. China’s legitimate
grievances are also undermined by the features of its repressive Communist
regime, which include distortion of historical facts in its own textbooks and the
huge human sacrifices of its domestic policies over the last fifty years. Finally, the
Japanese political system is rather inward-looking and parochial, encountering
deep problems of perception when it comes to foreign views and sensitivities.
Other inhibiting factors are of a more direct psychological character. There
is a Japanese propensity to avoid conflict which is much stronger than we find in
most Western societies and which prevents the Japanese from tackling such a
contentious issue as the recognition of the past, and this goes far beyond the
humiliating or at least hurtful process this would engender. Japanese leaders are
concerned that a critical and honest approach to their country’s history in
school textbooks may alienate children from their country and harm social
cohesion at all societal levels. Only strong political and moral leadership could
overcome these attitudes and inclinations, but Japan’s cultural make-up is also
known for a lack of strong leadership, and the attitudes are too much shared by
these leaders. There is also the general phenomenon that the memory of the
victim is much better than that of the victimizer. The victimizer also has a pref-
erence ‘to look ahead’, which meant, in Japan’s case, concentrating on economic
relations and benefits with its former victims. This was encouraged by China in
1972 when it waved demands for reparations and instead accepted Japan’s
economic development aid because it wanted to rehabilitate its economy and
win sympathy with the Japanese public, in the same way as Taiwan’s president
Jiang Jieshi had done in 1952. Faced with much less developed Asian neigh-
bours, its rapid economic rehabilitation provided Japan with ample means to
insist on such an approach. The growing Japanese self-confidence and nation-
alism which resulted from its economic success, and the failure of the war
generation to pass on knowledge of the past to the younger generation
compound the relationship further, since the younger generation now shows an
astonishing degree of insensitivity and ignorance about the past, and as a result
it is very frustrated and annoyed by China’s insistence on issues of the past.
Unrepentant old diehards in high political office regularly make insensitive
remarks which reopen the issue. All this has made it very difficult for Japan to
utter an acceptable apology to its former victims. When the government tries to
do so the issue tends to become so politically contentious that it almost cancels
out the original good intention.8 The emperor’s apology on his first visit to
China in 1992 said at least as much about Japan’s unwillingness to come to
terms with the past as it did about a new beginning.9
Other circumstances based on Japan’s domestic political system further reinforce
psychological and structural resistances to addressing the past in a more satisfying
way. In addition to the lack of political leadership already mentioned, there is the
Japanese government’s rigid legalistic approach to issues of compensation, which
precludes generosity. For example, the government was reluctant to offer official
compensation to former forced war prostitutes for fear of reopening the reparation
issue. According to the official version, the conclusion of agreements on reparations
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– or, in the case of China, Beijing’s waver of reparation claims in 1972 – had closed
the door to them.
But the Chinese side is just as guilty of making it more difficult for Japan to
cope appropriately with its historical legacy. It has been easy and beneficial for
the authoritarian and economically less developed regime to manipulate Japan’s
guilt to advance its economic interests and enhance its increasingly shaky polit-
ical legitimacy. This explains to a large extent why President Jiang Zemin, apart
from personal reasons, considerably damaged the outcome of his state visit to
Japan in November 1998 by constantly harping on the issue of the past.10 But
playing the ‘history card’ and increasing over time the official number of victims
of Japan’s aggression only further reduces the legitimacy of China’s grievances
in the eyes of an increasingly self-confident Japan.
As we will see in the next chapters, it is often difficult to know whether the
Chinese side raises the past in the context of security problems for reasons of
opportunism (‘historical card’) and in order to keep Japan in an inferior position,
or because it truly believes that the Japanese will repeat their aggression, or at
least that constant reminders are essential to prevent this while China is militarily
still weak.11 It is obvious that Chinese attacks on Japan over historical issues are
also intended to weaken the degree of Japanese–American security cooperation.
Other factors are a feeling of rivalry with Japan and a sour reaction to the fact
that Japan is not only more advanced than the ‘culturally superior China’, but
also economically dominating it. One can assume overlapping policy constituen-
cies which favour either one or several of these opinions-cum-tactics. However,
even Japanese observers favourably inclined towards China question whether
China appreciates the damage the ‘historical card’ is doing to Chinese public
opinion towards Japan.12 Over the years the Japanese have become increasingly
resentful of how the Chinese regime can manipulate public outcry at home over
yet another slip of the tongue by a Japanese politician or yet another alleged
falsification of historical facts in Japanese textbooks.13 While the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution did not have a lasting absolving impact on Japan’s feelings of
war guilt, the repression in Tiananmen Square in 1989 did speed up the process
by reducing the legitimacy of the Chinese regime in Japan’s eyes.14
In the 1990s the Chinese leadership also lost an important ally in the
Japanese political system. The legacy of the past had been kept alive by leftist
forces in Japan, who instrumentalized it to sustain the country’s post-1945 paci-
fism, opposing consecutive Conservative cabinets with their US-oriented foreign
and security policy.15 The irony is that this pacifism would not have lasted so
long without the comfort provided by the US security guarantee, as invoked
during the Korean War when the US intervened to protect Japan. The main
political force for Japan’s pacifism had for a long time been the Japan Socialist
Party, until it lost much of its vigour in the 1990s. The PRC could always rely on
these opposition forces to put pressure on the Japanese government. But China
contributed to their disappearance by increasingly abandoning its revolutionary
appeal in favour of more pragmatic policies, and later in the 1990s it pursued
security policies towards Japan which severely tested their pro-China feelings.
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Deference to China
The social processes associated with the legacy of Japan’s past aggression against
China also partially explain Tokyo’s restraint in exercising its considerable power
in conflicts of interest with China. Put simply, refraining from criticizing China
(at least until China’s security policies became more challenging in the 1990s)
was psychologically easier than facing squarely past misdeeds during the war, but
this kind of behaviour has contributed to the rise of behaviour which ranges on
a continuum from politeness, restraint, procrastination, to deference to China.
Additional sources of this Japanese deference range from systemic to psycholog-
ical ones; they are only partly China-specific and they often reinforce each other.
Individual decision-makers or policy-making constituencies may be affected by
only some of these understandings, feelings and behavioural patterns, but they
may reinforce other motivations which are based more on simple power calcula-
tions and reflect an objective material reality. Often these understandings not
only shape individual policies (which will be examined in Chapter 3), but – in an
ironic twist – have become part of the dynamics facilitating changes in Japan’s
perceptions and policies towards China since the beginning of the 1990s.
The main reason for this deference is the way Japan attempts to deal with its
past aggression against China and with China’s reactions. Japanese leaders
sometimes try to compensate by showing greater deference to Chinese interests.
This has often been easier for Japanese policy-makers than going through the
more long-term, humiliating and painful process of squarely facing up to the
legacy of the past – a process requiring leadership. China has made particular
use of this situation to get concessions from Japan in all areas of the bilateral
relationship, and other Asian countries have done so as well. We will see below
that Japan’s reluctance to join Western sanctions against China in the wake of
the Tiananmen repression was officially partly justified by Japan’s past record in
China.
This ‘historical card’ would not have been so effective without the existence of
a generation of policy-makers, supported by the media and public opinion, who
feel a cultural indebtedness to China, as well as a cultural affinity. This belief
may sometimes be reinforced by Japan longing to find its cultural mooring as an
Asian country, becoming a leader of Asia based on its economic power, and/or
by resistence to US aggressiveness in spreading ‘Western values’. Japanese defer-
ence can also be partially explained by a culturally bound inclination towards
harmony (even if only at a superficial level), which again would be reinforced by
the above motivations. The Chinese tend to be more willing to risk harmony in
order to show their feelings and promote their interests, particularly in a situa-
tion where they feel the other side to be historically wrong, as well as in need of
remorse and ‘preventive reminding’. Japanese reluctance, until recently, to chal-
lenge these behavioural patterns and perceptions has been bound to reinforce
them.
The above feelings and behavioural patterns may also occasionally reinforce
or rally other policy constituencies, resulting, for example, in Japan’s abstention
from certain criticism of China, although the main reason may lie more with
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genuine differences, even if of a tactical or strategic nature. Criticism of China’s
non-democratic system and forceful representation of its own interests vis-à-vis
Japan has been muted by doubts in Japan about the appropriateness of Western
democracy for a country with such huge potential for instability.16 Japanese
political and economic leaders believe in China becoming more agreeable to the
Western world as a result of economic development, but not necessarily in a
short time or thanks to the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank or
as a result of the West pressuring China to adopt Western concepts of democ-
racy. On the former, Sato Hideo points out:
[T]he more leaders are inclined to believe in the ultimately salutary effect of
economic development on political stability and international convergence,
the more they are willing to take a long-term perspective and gradualist
approach on different Chinese behaviours and violations of international
norms and be more accommodative. This seems to be the case with Japan
and less so with the US’.17
Deference has also found some institutional footholds in Japan. The
Gaimusho (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was, until the 1990s, mainly in
charge of Japan’s China policy. Only on rare occasions, like the highly politicized
decision in 1972 to recognise China, have politicians been in the driver’s seat.
Within the Gaimusho, the China Division has been responsible for the day-to-
day relationship. Led by the ‘China School’ diplomats (i.e. diplomats who were
trained in the Chinese language), there has been a tendency for it to be particu-
larly understanding of China, in contrast to the Soviet School, which
distinguished itself by its anti-Soviet views.18 There are about 100 diplomats who
have received training in the Chinese language. Whereas the first post-war
generation received such training in Taiwan, the second received it initially in
Taiwan and then in the PRC; and since the third generation Chinese-language
training has taken place in the PRC.19 Another institutional feature which may
sometimes have encouraged deference to Chinese interests is the fact that Japan’s
policies towards China are often not well coordinated, running often on separate
economic, political and security tracks, which deprives individual policies of
leverage and coherence.
The impact of the alliance with the US
The outcome of the Chinese civil war and Japan’s total integration into the US
anti-Communist strategy created a very difficult relationship between Japan and
China. In 1950 China had felt forced to ally with the Soviet Union, which was
perceived by the US and its allies as the greatest danger to Western security.
Differences between China and the Soviet Union were noticed by Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, but he had to abandon his cautious policy of trying to
separate the Chinese Communists from Moscow in favour of political self-
preservation after the start of the Korean War in 1950.20 As a result, the first
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official meeting between representatives of Japan and the PRC took place only
in April 1955, on the occasion of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, when
Zhou Enlai met with Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who represented Japan as Secretary
of the Economic Planning Agency because the foreign minister, Shigemitsu
Mamoru, did not want to attend.21
But, as Iriye Akira points out, although Japan and China were fully incorpo-
rated into their respective alliance system, their respective military power may
have played a lesser role than other factors, notably economic interests on both
sides.22 Japan aligned itself with the US and its policy of containing the new
Chinese Communist rulers, but took pains not to become militarily too directly
involved. From a Chinese perspective, however, Japan supported the US policy of
thwarting China’s drive to complete the liberation of the whole country when it
recognised Taiwan, whatever Yoshida’s preference had been.23 In addition, Japan
allowed the continued stationing of American troops on its territory (at consider-
able cost to its sovereignty and domestic security consensus), which was an
important condition for US forward deployment in Asia, notably against China.
The Japanese–American security treaty created a deep rift between Japan and
China, and extended China’s perception of Japan as an adversary. It is also true,
however, that the US security umbrella allowed Japan to nurture its pacifism, and
inhibited the country from seeing China as a threat despite security policies
aimed at reuniting with Taiwan, expelling the US from Asia and supporting
liberation struggles in the Third World. When China tested its first nuclear
device in October 1964, in public the Japanese government reacted very calmly
and played it down, hinting at the protection given by the US nuclear umbrella.24
Feeling secure under the American conventional and nuclear umbrella, Japan
was not overly concerned about China becoming a nuclear power in 1964.25
This was also helped by the strong political polarization in Japan between conser-
vatives and ‘progressives’, the latter having considerable sympathies with
Communist China because of shared anti-American feeling. The conservative
political leaders did not want to aggravate this polarization further, particularly
after China’s break with the Soviet Union, which gave some credence to
Yoshida’s thinking and to hopes about economic opportunities. Moreover,
China’s weakness – notably in comparison with that of the Soviet Union, the
main focus of the East–West confrontation – and positive feelings towards China,
nurtured by cultural links and war guilt, had a positive impact on Japan’s percep-
tion of China and offset fears about security.
The Japan–US security treaty fostered an emphasis in Japanese post-war
diplomacy on ‘economics first’, the so-called Yoshida line. When Prime Minister
Yoshida travelled to Europe in 1955 he indirectly criticised the USA’s confronta-
tional approach to Asian Communism by stating in a policy paper that ‘in
fighting communism, political and economic strength was as important as mili-
tary might, if not more so’.26 He still believed in a long-term policy of detaching
China from dependence on the Soviet Union, relying on trade relations.
Naturally this position was nurtured by concrete Japanese business interests, but
Yoshida also knew that without ‘economics first’ Japan would continue to be
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heavily dependent on the US. The Yoshida line, Japan’s emphasis on stability
and economic interests in China, would later prove to be the conceptual as well
as material backbone of the strategy of engagement, once Japan had normalized
relations with the PRC.
Against this background, Japan tried gradually to improve at least its
commercial relations with the PRC through various kinds of agreements.
Although trade resumed with China in August 1950, it was restricted by the
imposition of controls by the Coordinating Committee on export controls
(COCOM) which were intended to deprive China’s developing economy of the
benefits of Western advanced products. China cleverly exploited Japan’s interest
in increasing the trade flow by linking allegedly ‘private’ trade agreements with
political demands, whereas the Japanese government hoped to insist on the sepa-
ration of politics from economics (seikei bunri). These political demands aimed at
playing the pro-China forces in Japan off against the conservative government,
with the ultimate aim of making Japan switch diplomatic recognition from
Taibei to Beijing. In 1962 these trade agreements moved from ‘Friendly Trade’
to a semi-official, long-term agreement (five years) referred to as L-T Trade,
which made Japan the only country in the world to trade with both Taiwan and
the PRC with considerable freedom.27
These negotiations for trade agreements allowed Beijing’s leaders to put
considerable pressure on the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and coun-
terbalance to some extent Japan’s allegiance to the strict US line on the PRC.
In the Sato–Nixon Joint Communiqué in 1969, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku
went as far as declaring that the security of both Taiwan and South Korea was
essential to that of Japan and that Japan would ‘fulfill its obligations in regard
to “the peace and security of the Far East” ’.28 This statement still haunts
Japanese–Chinese relations today. On the one hand, it is natural that war over
Taiwan would affect Japan’s security since its lines of communication pass over
the island, it has considerable commercial interest in Taiwan, and as an
alliance partner it is under some obligation to support US military counter-
measures. On the other hand, the question arises of to what extent Japan’s
normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972 and its ‘under-
standing’ of the PRC’s view that there is only one China have changed the
foundations for the 1969 Communiqué.
Normalization of relations, 1972
Until 1972 Japan withstood Chinese pressure to switch its diplomatic recognition
from Taibei to Beijing. Its close alliance with the US did not give it much choice
but to pursue a policy of military containment of China and to thwart the reuni-
fication of China on the conditions of the Beijing regime.29 Every year in the
autumn, until 1971, Japan continued to support US efforts to forestall the PRC
taking over the ROC’s seat in the UN General Assembly and in the UN Security
Council. It was the change in Sino-American relations in 1971 that finally led to
the normalization of diplomatic relations.
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The switch of recognition did not occur without its ambiguities, which today
still cast a shadow over Japanese–Chinese relations. Soeya Yoshihide calls it a
‘de facto “two Chinas” policy’.30 The move was made after a long drawn-out
confrontation between the pro-Taiwan and the pro-PRC lobbies in the ruling
LDP, but domestic opinion and trade interests had been so well nurtured by the
PRC that it speeded up the change and helped to overcome resistance within
the LDP.31 In the document finalizing the normalization of diplomatic relations
in 1972 Japan merely ‘understands and respects’ China’s position that Taiwan is
a part of the PRC. Officially, Japan maintains that it surrendered Taiwan under
Article VIII of the Potsdam Declaration and it can therefore not pronounce on
the legal status of the island.32 However, Japan’s obstinacy in sticking to this
legal ambiguity about Taiwan’s status also owes much to the strength of the
pro-Taiwan forces in Japan. US pronouncements relevant to the legal status of
Taiwan during the Clinton administration (see Chapter 4 for the three ‘Nos’)
have made Japan’s legal stance appear more hardline.
With this ambiguous Japanese stance on the legal status of the island, the
Taiwan issue was bound to become a bone of contention again in the
Japanese–Chinese security relationship when China started to witness closer
relations developing between Tokyo and Taibei . It has only reinforced Chinese
perceptions that Japan, as a former colonial power, is even more committed to
an independent Taiwan than the US, or even that it is intent on regaining
control over it.33 Deng Xiaoping is quoted as saying that if China does not get
hold of Taiwan, than someone else (meaning Japan!) will do so in the future.34
Direct, official, intergovernmental contact became impossible after 1972, but
Tokyo as well as Taibei devised institutions and means with varying degrees of
governmental support to substitute for the pre-1972 official channels.35 Japan
and Taiwan continued to maintain offices in each other’s capitals for unofficial
links, and until the 1990s economic links surpassed those between Japan and the
PRC. Still, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been very assiduous in main-
taining a very consistent stance on excluding official links in order to keep the
Taiwan issue out of domestic politics and to avoid arousing further Chinese
suspicion. Officially, Tokyo pursues only ‘non-governmental regional or working
exchanges’ which are below the rank of ministers.36 But Taibei does not seem to
have given up using every means available to notch up relations and to maintain
as high a profile in Japan as possible. The very fact that the Japanese occupation
of 1895–1945 did not create anything similar to the hatred found on the
Chinese mainland after Japan’s brutal occupation during a much shorter period
is not only incomprehensible to mainlanders but fuels their suspicions that Japan
harbours new colonial intentions towards Taiwan. Taiwanese textbooks today
even appreciate that the infrastructure developed during Japan’s occupation
contributed to the rapid modernization of Taiwan after 1945.37 We will see in
Chapter 4 how the closer relationship between Japan and Taiwan in the 1990s
became a major source of conflict between Japan and the PRC.
In 1972 Beijing accepted Japan’s reluctance to be more explicit about Taiwan
because it needed allies for strategic and economic reasons, and because it put
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greater weight on relations with the US and on its ability to keep the Japanese at
bay in Asia. Recently released records of US–Chinese talks in 1972 reveal how
much the PRC was concerned that a reduction of American influence in Taiwan
and South Korea might lead to greater Japanese influence there, or that after
withdrawal from Taiwan the US troops might be replaced by Japanese troops.38
We will see in Chapter 4 that such concerns have not yet totally disappeared
from the minds of China’s leaders.
Those interested in an increase in economic interactions on both sides were
not disappointed by the change in 1972. Trade expanded dramatically and
became the most positive foundation for the Japanese–Chinese relationship. This
was facilitated by Chinese politics, which shifted from an ideological focus to
economic modernization and pragmatism. From 1977 to 1981 two-way trade
tripled, reaching more than US$10 billion. In 1975 Japan became China’s prin-
cipal trading partner. During much of the 1980s Japan was China’s
second-largest trading partner, beaten only by Hong Kong. Even more beneficial
for China was Japan’s development aid in the form of loans and grants. Japanese
investment was encouraged by the high complementarity of the two economies,
between Chinese raw materials and Japan’s ability to supply capital goods and
technology. In 1983 Japanese investment in China amounted to only US$3
million, but it reached US$100 million in 1985, US$1.2 billion in 1987 and
US$2.8 billion in 1990.39 The investment climate improved with the conclusion
of a bilateral tax treaty in 1983 and the provision of trade insurance by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) in November 1985.40 The real turning
point was the need to replace exports by manufacturing abroad in the wake of
the 1985 revaluation of the yen against the dollar. An investment protection
treaty was finally signed in August 1988. However, despite the increase in
Japanese investment in China the Chinese government always pointed to Japan’s
relative low share of FDI in China compared with the US, as well as to Japan’s
reluctance to transfer technology.
The anti-hegemony phase of the 1970s
The security relationship during the 1970s was characterized by an unprece-
dented convergence of strategic interests which stood in marked contrast to the
situation before and afterwards. Due to China’s fear about Soviet military inten-
tions, Japan and China shared with the US an important security concern which
dominated the relationship in the first decade after the normalization of rela-
tions. In addition, the normalization of diplomatic relations seemed to have
unblocked an unnatural barrier between two culturally close countries, and the
catch-up effect sustained a very strong Japanese euphoria towards China. Finally,
China still looked weak and non-threatening.
China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, called 1972–4 a period where both sides
could trust each other, although the circumstances of the normalization of diplo-
matic relations may be interpreted differently.41 It was a period of unusually
strong political leadership in Japan, which overcame bureaucratic bickering, thus
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facilitating communication with a Chinese regime in which a small group of key
people ran the country’s external relations. By 1978 Japan and China shared a
concern about the Soviet Union which found its expression in the anti-hege-
mony clause of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, concluded the same year.
The intensity of this interest was much smaller on the Japanese side, but it was
accepted as the price of improved relations with China. Moreover, Japan was
concerned that agreement with the Chinese position on the Soviet Union might
damage its chances of recovering the Northern Territories and make its relations
with Southeast Asia more difficult. As a consequence, the negotiations on the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship had started in 1974 but were concluded only in
1978, when stronger political leadership in Japan was confident enough to live
with the outside perception, fanned by China, that the proposed so-called ‘anti-
hegemony clause’ was directed against the Soviet Union. In a sign of what was
to come later, the Chinese leadership instigated a conflict over the Senkaku
Islands, sending Chinese fishing boats into Japan’s territorial waters around the
islands in order to speed up a compromise over the treaty (for the territorial
dispute, see Chapter 2). The territorial problem over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands was then shelved, but intrusions by Chinese boats into the surrounding
waters kept the issue alive and reminded the Japanese of China’s territorial
claim, which it could bring up at any time it judged convenient and useful.
China’s anti-hegemonic posture against the Soviet Union, its economic
success since the opening of the country in 1978 and the growing importance of
the economic relationship for China’s economic modernization eased Chinese
concerns about Japan’s military and security policy and the security alliance with
the US. In September 1972 Zhou Enlai declared that China no longer opposed
Japan’s security treaty with the US.42 China even expressed support for Japan’s
territorial claim to the Northern Territories since it allowed Beijing to express its
anti-Soviet feelings.43 China moved to a neutral position only after the demise of
the Soviet Union in 1991. Japan’s leadership reciprocated China’s support by
expressing confidence in China’s security policy. For example, in 1973 Prime
Minister Tanaka publicly refuted the possibility of Japan being attacked by
China with nuclear arms, and this was repeated by his successor in 1975.44
On various occasions, meeting with the Japanese, Chinese leaders also
expressed acceptance of Japan’s defence efforts and the Japanese–American
security alliance. In September 1978 Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese delegation
that he was in favour of the build-up in Self-Defence Forces (SDF).45 In May
1980 Hua Guofeng became the first head of the Chinese government to visit
Japan. At a press conference he stated that ‘[a]n independent and sovereign state
should have the right to maintain its own defense so as to safeguard its indepen-
dence and sovereignty. As to what Japan will do, we do not interfere in its
internal affairs’.46 He was even quoted as saying to Prime Minister Nakasone
that the Japanese air force should be expanded to protect shipping routes. In
1980 the deputy general chief of staff, Wu Xiuquan, recommended to
Nakasone, before he became prime minister , that he should raise the percentage
of the gross national product (GNP) allotted to defence from 1 to 2 per cent.47 In
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November 1982 Deng Xiaoping, then chairman of the Central Military
Commission, made a similar statement.48 He also declared that ‘[w]e appreciate
Japan’s efforts to strengthen its alliance with the US’.49 In private conversations
China’s leaders expressed the opinion that it was for the Japanese and American
people to define their own security relationships.50 In July 1984 the visiting
defence minister, Zhang Aiping (on an unofficial visit), told his Japanese counter-
part, Kurihara Yuko, that China agreed as a matter of policy with Japanese–US
defence cooperation. ‘Each country has the right to protect itself. For this
purpose strong defence power is necessary’.51 But when Japan’s military
spending increased rapidly during the Nakasone era, the Chinese foreign
minister, Wu Xueqian, after repeating the Hua statement, added in a meeting
with Japanese special envoy Nikaido Susumu that ‘such an armed force should
be defense-oriented and of appropriate size so it does not constitute a threat to
its friendly neighbours’.52 While they were willing to accept greater autonomy in
Japanese diplomacy – which, after all, in China’s view provided a welcome
balance against Japan–US relations becoming too close – Beijing’s leaders
warned against ‘a handful of Japanese’ promoting Japan’s militarism. In 1983,
for the first time, Chinese commentators referred to Japan as moving from the
status of economic big power to that of political big power and wanting to
expand its influence on the global economy and global politics to become ‘one
pole of the world’.53
A high point in the relationship and in trust between the two countries was
reached with the visit of Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), to Japan in 1983. He admired Japan for its post-war
economic performance and expressed his confidence that Japan would never
again invade China, even if Japanese military power were to expand.54 Earlier,
in May 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang had visited Japan and announced three
principles for the bilateral relationship: peace and friendship, equality and
mutual benefit, and long-term stability. During Hu’s visit in November 1983
‘mutual trust’ was added to the three principles and both sides agreed to estab-
lish the Twenty-First Century Committee.55 At this time the economic
relationship blossomed and measures were taken to improve relations at all
levels. The 1983–4 period was therefore referred to as the best in the 2000-year
history of Japanese–Chinese relations.56
At the same time, Japan’s leaders became concerned about some security
aspects of improved Sino-American relations. While Japan shared America’s anti-
Soviet line, there were differences. Japan had never considered the Soviet threat
as menacing as had the US since it was much more aware than the US of the
Soviet Union’s intrinsic economic weakness. American arms deliveries to China
might increase the military power of China too much. Japan had much greater
understanding of the wish of Southeast Asia not to burn all its bridges with
Vietnam because they saw it as a future barrier against China.57 Still, China tried
very hard to win Japan over to some military cooperation, in terms of exchange
of military officers and other defence officials, to reinforce the anti-hegemony
policy against the Soviet Union.58 Military attaches were posted by each country
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in the other’s embassy in 1974 at the urging of Japan.59 But in 1979 Prime
Minister Ohira ruled out the extension of military assistance to China. Later,
reluctance to expand military personnel exchanges grew on both sides, particu-
larly when compared to the much wider scope of exchanges at various levels
between the US and China. The Japanese government was concerned about
China’s emphasis on anti-hegemony and placed limits on further military
exchanges. Not until May 1987 did a director-general of the Defence Agency
(Kurihara Yuko) visit China – after his Chinese counterpart, the defence minister,
Zhang Aiping – had visited him in July 1984. This reluctance was reinforced
when China once again reverted to criticism of Japan’s military efforts.60 In 1987
the Defence Agency was reported to be reluctant to accept informal requests by
Beijing for officer candidates to attend the Defense Academy.61
The resurgence of Chinese security concerns
It is clear today that China’s anti-Soviet stance of joining up with Western coun-
tries was only a transient phase in Beijing’s diplomacy and security policy. When
China realised the diplomatic costs of this policy – in terms of vulnerability to
being used as a card by the US, jeopardizing other important security interests
(notably national reunification) – and when the immediate danger of a Soviet
attack had disappeared, China’s leaders reverted to a more aloof and indepen-
dent line. The shift in the Chinese international ‘united-front’ policy against the
Soviet Union to the line of ‘independence and autonomy’ was publicized at the
Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982. In 1985 Hu Yaobang declared that
China would ‘never attach itself to, nor foster strategic relations nor an alliance
with, any big power or bloc of power’.62 China’s relationship with the US soured
over Taiwan and Reagan’s military build-up. As a result, China’s strategic
entente with Japan and the US weakened, and Beijing pursued again an inde-
pendent and non-aligned stance. But the manifestations of this change were not
consistent during the 1980s and still allowed positive developments like the visit
of the director-general of the Defence Agency in 1987.
However, old fears about Japan’s future direction were once again voiced
publicly more often. Concern was expressed about Japan becoming a ‘political
big power’ as the preceding stage to being a ‘military big power’.63 The most
important problems that shaped the Chinese perception of Japan in the 1980s
were, once again, the fear of a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism, which
was fanned by closer defence cooperation with the US and Japan’s inability to
come to terms with the past, growing imbalances in the bilateral economic rela-
tionship, Japan’s ambiguity about the status of Taiwan, and the dispute about
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.64
China voiced its concerns about what it saw as rising nationalism in Japan,
and the revival of militarist tendencies as allegedly expressed by the sanitizing of
Japanese history books on items related to Japan’s past militarist expansion and
to government officials visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. In 1985 the prime
minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the war dead on the
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fortieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender, which led to Chinese government
protests, but also to student protests that Japan’s economic ‘invasion’ of China
was linked to the issues of the past.
In summer 1982 China launched a strong attack against Japan’s alleged move
to whitewash Japan’s past aggression against China in textbooks screened by the
Ministry of Education by replacing the word ‘invade’ (shinryaku) with ‘advance’
(shinshutsu). Later it turned out that the alleged changes in Japan’s textbooks were
based on an incorrect report.65 While the official campaign against Japan was
certainly supported by a latent distrust towards Japan, the delayed start and the
sudden end of the campaign (before Prime Minister Suzuki’s visit to China) also
demonstrated the manipulation of the issue by the Chinese leadership for
domestic as well as bilateral purposes. Before 1982 China had never shown any
interest in the long-running disputes in Japan over the presentation of the
country’s aggressions before 1945 in its history textbooks. The start of China’s
textbook campaign coincided with a Japanese trade mission to Taiwan, which
was headed by Esaki Masumi, chairman of the LDP’s International Economic
Policy Special Research Committee. Its purpose was to find ways of reducing the
high Taiwanese trade deficit with Japan, but Beijing was concerned about the
high-level political and economic character of the delegation. In the agreement
of the Esaki mission, the word ‘country’ was used in reference to Taiwan, which
raised fears about Japan’s two-China policy.66 The Taiwan issue was also raised
later, in 1986, when a Japanese court ruled in favour of the ROC in the case of
the disputed ownership of a student dormitory in Kyoto (kokaryo), betraying
China’s ongoing concern about Japan’s true intentions towards Taiwan.67
In response to changes in the international environment in the 1970s, Japan
conceptualized its foreign and security policy on the basis of the Report on
Comprehensive National Security.68 Recognizing the ‘termination of clear
American supremacy in both military and economic spheres’, the report
proposed diplomatic, military and economic efforts. The Ohira government,
which had commissioned the report, abandoned the omnidirectional diplomacy
which previous cabinets had unconvincingly proclaimed. It laid the foundation
for increased Japanese defence expenditures and closer security links with the
US, which, as we have seen, were initially accepted by China, but then criticized
when it abandoned its anti-Soviet campaign. Prime Minister Nakasone became
the main promoter of increased defence efforts. The discussion of roles and
missions led to a tightening of the Japanese–US security alliance and an
announcement in early 1987 that Japan’s defence expenditures could break
through the ceiling of 1 per cent of Japan’s GNP. Under Nakasone’s premiership
Japan assumed a much more nationalistic posture, helped by the booming
‘bubble economy’. These developments led to Chinese warnings, which
increased in tone over the next few years. In August 1985 Vice-Premier Yao Yilin
said that Japanese defence preparations that went beyond the requirements of
self-defence would ‘arouse and upset Japan’s neighbours’.69 Japanese–Chinese
relations suffered a further setback in January 1987 when Hu Yaobang suddenly
resigned. He was considered in Japan as the Chinese leader most sympathetic
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towards Japan, and it worried many that Hu’s favourable attitude might even
have played some role in his fall from power.70
Japan as a civilian power engaging China
By the end of the 1980s Japan had become an economic superpower. This was
the successful outcome of Yoshida’s focus on economic rehabilitation, followed
by economic expansion. What may have been an expedient after the crushing
defeat in 1945 had become the main focus of Japan’s domestic and foreign
policy. The 1973 and 1979 oil crises only reinforced the emphasis on economic
diplomacy. Economic power had also become an important diplomatic tool to
achieve economic and diplomatic goals. It was the security assurances accompa-
nying the Japanese–American security alliance and the gradual increase in the
military responsibilities of the SDF against the background of growing US
requests for burden sharing that had made such a policy feasible.
As a result of its successful economic and political development, Japan has
been called a ‘civilian power’ (minsei taikoku) or ‘global civilian power’, to charac-
terize its (as well as Germany’s) power position in the post-war period.71 Richard
Rosecrance has coined the term ‘trading state’ to define this new paradigm of
the civilian state.72 Comparing Japan and Germany, Hanns Maull speaks of the
two countries as prototypes of ‘civilian powers’ and defines ‘civilian power’ thus:
1 acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of
international objectives;
2 concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means of international
interaction;
3 a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of
international management.73
In the 1980s it became apparent that Japan was increasingly translating its
economic power into political power.74 This strategy has been particularly
emphasized in Japan’s relations with developing countries, which are especially
susceptible to what Japan has to offer in terms of market, development aid,
capital and technology. Political and strategic aims were originally rarely
involved, but since the 1980s the US has pressured Japan to make its aid more
politically conditional and to increase aid to ‘strategically important countries’ in
Indochina and the Middle East, including also the Philippines from 1989
onwards.
It is not surprising that Japan has tried to maximize its relative advantage as
a global civilian power and seized the opportunities of China’s opening since
1978 to benefit economically from the complementarity of both economies. At
the same time, Japanese political leaders soon became aware of the political
and strategic implications of economic interactions and, notably, development
aid. Official support for Japan’s trade and investment with China became moti-
vated by the desire to stabilize China through economic development, while the
28 Japanese–Chinese relations under Cold War conditions
military aspects of Japan’s China policy were entrusted to the
Japanese–American security alliance. Moreover, in the 1980s economic aid
became a convenient policy tool to overcome the various political disputes
centring mostly around China’s criticism of how Japan approached the legacy
of its past aggression in China.75 Japan’s China policy has therefore always
contained the two basic ingredients of engagement – that is, on the one hand,
political and economic diplomacy and, on the other, military power for the
purposes of power balancing and hedging.
Engagement, as understood here, seemed the ideal mix of policy tools to
enhance the chances of China’s modernization policy; not only did it stabilize
China’s economy and enable it to feed its people, but it also induced a peaceful
change from a Communist regime to a more democratic system, without giving
up the tools of military balancing. China’s focus on opening the country and
relying on foreign input to improve its weak economic basis thus blended
perfectly.
Tiananmen 1989 as a test of engagement
While since 1978 China had embraced the economic opportunities offered by
the West’s policy of engagement, it was at the same time aware of the ‘subver-
sive’ aspects of this policy and their threat to the stability of the Communist
regime. This realization could not fail to have the contradictory effect (from a
Western perspective) of reinforcing the Realist frame of mind of China’s
Communist leaders, while an ideological softening was going on as a result of
dramatic economic changes. The brutal repression of the demonstration in
Tiananmen Square in June 1989 showed that China’s leaders were willing to use
force and to withstand the resulting international opprobrium to maintain their
rule. The incident may be called a first test of the viability of Japan’s engage-
ment at the close of the Cold War era, not so much for the negative reaction in
Japan against China, but for the difference of Japan’s official reaction in compar-
ison to that of other Western countries, which affected the emphasis of policy
tools.
While the Tiananmen massacre of 3–4 June 1989 ended the dreams of many
Western leaders about China’s unstoppable move towards democracy and
economic stability, Japan’s policy-makers had much fewer expectations and less
hope to lose. Japan was relying more on the quiet forces of greater economic
exchanges and transformation, while notably its American alliance partner was
more verbal about its hopes of transforming China’s political and economic
system through the policy of engagement.76 True, China fell in its poll rating in
Japan as a liked country from 17.3 per cent in May 1989 to 4.9 per cent in June,
while those who expressed a dislike for China rose from 5.4 per cent to 27.1 per
cent during the same short period.77 But Japan’s leaders had never shared the
USA’s often expressed wish for a strong China; they were more interested in a
‘stable and slowly modernizing China’.78 Japan’s leaders had much more
sympathy with the Chinese leaders’ concern about internal tumult, which would
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not only result in a loss of business for Japan and endanger the 8,300 nationals
in China, but would also mean streams of refugees coming to Japan’s shores.
Punishing China with economic and political sanctions might push China over
the edge and invite greater disaster than the killing of a few hundred
protesters.79 However, Japan’s muted reaction to the Tiananmen massacre did
not just come from a cool strategic calculus and commercial interests.
Immediately after the event officials explained Japan’s reluctance to take stronger
measures of protest: the burden of Japan’s past would not allow it to take a
strong moral position.80 Prime Minister Uno declared that, because of the past,
Japanese–Chinese relations are different from US–Chinese relations.81 In the
end the Japanese government avoided straightforward reference to human rights
and instead pointed to the practical difficulties of conducting ODA negotiations
under the ‘confused conditions’ following the Tiananmen killings.82
Western indignation was particularly high in the US, and economic and polit-
ical sanctions were imposed. Significant were the ending of military exchanges
and the sale of American military hardware to China.83 However, Japan’s initial
official reaction was not to impose sanctions.84 It finally relented under the pres-
sure of the other major Western countries and suspended a US$5.2 billion loan
package announced a year earlier, warned Japanese tourists, halted high-level
visits and discouraged Japanese businessmen from ‘undue haste’.85
At the same time, Japan’s government actively tried to reduce international
criticism of China and to end international sanctions.86 Yasutomo even speaks of
Japan exhibiting ‘a rare aggressiveness in distinguishing its views from those of
other G-7 nations’.87 Although it joined the G-7’s statement condemning China
in Paris in July 1989, it also argued for the inclusion of a passage on the impor-
tance of not isolating China (supported by President Bush) and for limiting the
sanctions mentioned in it to the ones already in place.88 The Japanese govern-
ment was instrumental in avoiding any mention of ‘joint sanctions against
China’ in the Paris Summit declaration.89 At the summit it used the issue of
environmental aid (also within the framework of the World Bank) to soften the
support for sanctions against China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident.
Since environmental degradation was an issue for many countries, notably
China, it appeared as a logical target of green funds.90 After the Paris Summit
the Japanese government lifted its ban on business travel in China and the freeze
on the Second Yen Loan of ¥470 billion. By the end of 1989 Japan had ended
all its restrictions except the Third Yen Loan and the ban on minister-level
contact.91 At the G-7 Summit in Houston in August 1990 Japan took the lead
among the G-7 countries in ending sanctions and resuming its full loan and
other development programmes. Before the summit some Chinese leaders had
warned Japan about the damage to Chinese–Japanese relations if the yen loans
were not resumed.92 In 1991 Japanese–Chinese ties were fully restored and
Prime Minister Kaifu visited China in August. This was followed in October
1992 by the first visit of a Japanese Emperor to China, an event very much
desired by China but which faced some difficulties in Japan from rightists, who
were concerned about an inimical reception and about the government’s plan
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for a war apology.93 Although trade relations immediately after the momentous
events in Tiananmen Square suffered, overall trade reached US$29 billion in
1992. Investment showed dramatic increases after 1992. As Whiting and Xin
point out, Japan’s decline in FDI to China from US$515 million in 1988 to
US$356 million in 1989 (making Taiwan’s investment of US$400 million on the
mainland surpass that of Japan in 1989!) had more to do with the deteriorating
investment climate than with sanctions.94 In 1992 Japan’s ODA constituted 46
per cent of China’s total bilateral ODA, and 29 per cent of its entire ODA.95
While Japan was attacked for being too willing to resume contacts with
China, the administration of George Bush Snr tried to do the same with more
circumspection in the face of a very strong domestic reaction to China’s human
rights violations. The rationale was very similar to that of Japan, but in addition
the administration wanted to soften the impact of rising anti-China feelings in
the US. Bush sent Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, on two missions
to China in 1989 and personally met the foreign minister, Qian Qichen, in early
1991; this was followed by the visit of Secretary of State James Baker to Beijing
in November of the same year.96 Between 1990 and 1994 the debate over
according China another year of most-favoured nation (MFN) status became
very acrimonious between the administration and Congress, and in 1990, 1991
and 1992 President Bush vetoed legislation that would have linked MFN status
with an improvement of Chinese human rights policies. As presidential candi-
date, Bill Clinton attacked the Bush administration’s ‘coddling of dictators’, but
when he got into power he also unlinked human rights from MFN status because
of the interests of US business in China and the overriding concern of Chinese
leaders about domestic stability.97 China was no longer the indispensable
bulwark against the Soviet Union, but its rising power and growing role in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, apart from strong sectoral business
interests, had become the new motivation of successive US administrations for
maintaining goods links with China. Still, it took the new Clinton administration
until September 1993 to lift all economic sanctions and to reach the same level
which Japan had reached in August 1991.98
Japan managed to walk the fine line between isolation among its Western
allies and angering China. Japanese writers point out that Japan’s post-
Tiananmen countermeasures were not much different from those of other
Western countries, and the chronology of sanction relief offers some proof.99
However, in public Japan’s position looked different and it was more vocal
about the need to end sanctions and to avoid China’s isolation. Whiting and
Xin called unprecedented the ‘degree of sophistication and sensitivity’ with
which Japan and China handled the fallout from the massacre.100 As a result
of Japan’s active anti-sanction policy, relations with China improved rather
than deteriorated and briefly enjoyed another rise. The Chinese government
appreciated Japan’s restraint and some leaders revealed ‘privately their under-
standing of the Japanese situation and expressed remorse’.101 China did not
directly attack Japan for the sanctions it had joined in, but it did so with other
countries, notably the US.102 After the Tiananmen incident China found itself
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in a difficult diplomatic position. Not only did it have to overcome economic
and political isolation as a result of Western indignation over the events in
Tiananmen Square, but the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, the move towards US unipolarity in the wake of the Soviet
demise and US leadership during the Gulf War, as well as Russia’s initial
policy of leaning to the West, reinforced this Chinese perception. Reacting to
international isolation, China decided once again to devote more attention to
the Third World, and to Asia in particular.103 Japan, as an Asian nation and a
country trying to prevent China’s international isolation, therefore became
particularly important for China’s post-Tiananmen foreign policy.104
Conclusions
At the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the post-Cold War era the
Japanese government had established a consistent policy of engagement towards
China which aimed at integrating China into a rules-based international
community because of Beijing’s regional power and its potential to cause insta-
bility, while at the same time relying on its own military deterrent and the
Japanese–American security alliance for power balancing and hedging. Many
economic and political problems appeared in the Japanese–Chinese relationship
between 1972 and 1989, but the framework of shared concerns about the Soviet
Union, US support of a positive Japanese–Chinese relationship and the exis-
tence of influential mediators in the political establishment on both sides did not
allow problems to seriously hurt the Japanese–Chinese relationship. Japan’s reac-
tions to the Tiananmen killings, which were, at least at the public government
level, significantly different from those of its allies, notably the US, showed how
Tokyo managed to equilibrate the diverse dynamics of engagement, notably
differences with the US. The changed situation in the latter part of the 1990s –
that is, the end of the Cold War and greater Chinese military assertiveness – was
to demonstrate that this would not be so easy in the future.
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When a young American visitor to the premier Zhou Enlai expressed his belief that
China will never become a ‘hegemonic power’, Zhou replied: ‘Do not count on it.
China could embark on a hegemonic path. But if it does, you should oppose it. And
you must inform that generation of Chinese that Zhou Enlai told you to do so.’1
We still don’t stand for anything. We are not a democracy, we’re not communist.
We’re just big.’2
Introduction
The 1990s led to a profound change in Japanese perceptions of China’s security
policies. This change is explained, in this chapter, as the result of the rise of
traditional as well as non-traditional security concerns relating to China, and
shifts in Japan’s international and domestic environment as well as China’s
economic and political development. The end of the Cold War refocused Japan’s
security concerns from the Soviet Union to other concerns, and created strategic
uncertainties about China’s development and US security commitments to Asia.
China has been considerably increasing its defence expenditures since 1989 and
had become more assertive in its desire to promote a multipolar world. At the
same time, China has again become deeply ambivalent about the security poli-
cies formulated by Japan in response to the above. Domestically, generational
changes in Japan’s political and bureaucratic leadership and Japanese self-
assertiveness have eroded the previous cautious approach to China, which had
been prevalent since the end of the 1970s.
PART 1: THE BACKGROUND TO CHINA’S SECURITY
POLICIES
China and the post-Cold War environment
The end of the Cold War initially led in China to the hope of a world where
American influence would be diminished thanks to the emergence of a multipolar
2 The rise of traditional 
and non-traditional 
security concerns
power structure, which would give China greater autonomy. Immediately after
1989 the breakdown of the Yalta regime and the relative weakening of US power
seemed to herald the emergence of such a structure, in which the American pole
would be weakened by greater Japanese and European autonomy.3 Reflecting the
Realist balance-of-power approach to international relations of Chinese strate-
gists, Yan Xuetong, director of the Centre for China’s Foreign Policy Studies of
Contemporary International Relations, wrote that China’s leaders considered
that the trend toward a multipolar world could help prevent a new world war.4
The idea that a more multipolar world would be more stable than a world system
based on multilateralism and cooperative security is, of course, strongly
contested.5 Moreover, the world was and still is very far from multipolarity if one
differentiates between multipolarity in terms of the distribution of economic and
military power (actual capabilities) and in terms of potential.
To speed up the advent of a multipolar world Chinese leaders and foreign-
policy experts highlighted the conflicts between Japan and the US, either
because of growing dependence by the US on support from Japan to maintain
its hegemonic position or because of sharpening economic conflicts between the
two countries. A secret CCP document is alleged to have encouraged the
Chinese media in 1992 to enhance its coverage of conflicts and compromises
among the US, Western Europe and Japan.6 The Chinese noted that after the
end of the Cold War Japan’s economic rise and greater political assertion
replaced the ‘Soviet threat’ for many Americans.7 In 1992 Zhou Jihua, a leading
Japan specialist in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, detected two main
features of the immediate post-Cold War period: one being that competition in
economic and national strength would replace military and ideological
confrontation; the other being the growing tendency of economic and political
pluralism. He named Japan and Germany, with their strong economies, as the
main winners of the Cold War.8
Up to the summer of 1995 China believed that because of the escalation in
the Japanese–American trade conflict, which was then focusing on Japan’s
opening of its automobile market, Japanese–US relations would not survive in
the post-Cold War era, and felt encouraged in its belief that multipolarity was
around the corner. It made many Chinese believe that China might hold the
pivotal position in a new US–Japan–China triangle which replaced the
Russia–China–US triangle.9 From around 1995, however, Chinese observers
became concerned that the security alliance was giving Japan a regional security
role and was directed against China (see Chapter 3 on the Nye Report and the
Hashimoto–Clinton Japan–US Joint Declaration in April 1996).
It soon became obvious that the American position after the Gulf War in
1991 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1992 signified that the advent of a
multipolar world in the Chinese sense would be delayed and the predominance
of the US would still last for some time. Some Chinese scholars recognised,
therefore, that the world-power configuration after the Gulf War was still more
‘one superpower and four big powers’, the latter including Japan.10 At the same
time the Chinese took comfort in a gradual weakening of the US hegemon and
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in the ‘development of various world forces experiencing new splits and realign-
ments’.11
Once China’s leaders realized this delay and even observed a strengthening of
the Western camp – for which, implicitly or explicitly, the challenge emanating
from a rising China was often used as an incentive (‘China threat’) – they started
to promote a foreign policy which openly opposes military alliances, selectively
supports multilateralism and creates various versions of ‘partnerships’. In its offi-
cial declarations, China’s leaders have been warning against the ‘containment’
and ‘interference’ elements of the West’s engagement policy. Military alliances
are declared confrontational and out of date in the post-Cold War era. Seen from
China’s own historical experience, it is argued, US alliances have always been
directed against China. As a Chinese academic put it, ‘[f]or Chinese strategists,
the traditional concept of alliances is always threat based, or interpreted as a
hedging strategy’.12 As we will see later, this is one of the reasons why China vehe-
mently opposes the redefinition of the Japan–US military alliances, as it occurred
after the Nye initiative in 1995 and the April 1996 Japan–US Joint Declaration.
Although a multipolar power structure has not yet materialized, there is
agreement among Chinese experts that the post-Cold War strategic environment
is more benign than before. But due to their combination of realism, nationalism
and a desire for regime maintenance, this has not stopped them perceiving the
international environment as inimical to China’s security concerns. As David
Armstrong explains, the Chinese discussion of the ‘new world order’ in the post-
Cold War era still ‘rests upon a theoretical/conceptual framework that combines
Marxist analytical categories, Western realist thought and traditional Chinese
wisdom’.13 In view of China’s historical experience and Marxist background, a
balance of power is therefore seen as the most appropriate approach to interna-
tional relations, and the assumption is that this will provide the space to develop
China economically.14 The negative historical experience has become a source of
nationalism, which in the post-Mao period is in turn also instrumentalized by the
Chinese leadership to cover a growing ideological void and to maintain regime
stability. This kind of ‘defensive nationalism’, with its urge to regain China’s
‘rightful’ place in the world, strengthens the perception abroad that China is a
revisionist power, leading some to argue that, now or in the future, China consti-
tutes a threat.15 With China’s Realist approach to international relations, its
revisionist goals, its historical experience of weakness since the nineteenth
century, the majority of Chinese analysts and decision-makers still feel that inter-
national relations is a zero-sum game and that China is more secure if other
states are weaker.16
Michael Pillsbury broadly divides the thinking of China’s military specialists
into three schools of thought. One school views the US as a major threat and
proposes developing weapons to confront it. Another sees the US as a
declining power and looks towards Japan as a future threat to China. The
third believes the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has enough time to engage
in high-technology weapons development over the long term and is engaged
extensively in using advanced technology to radically change future warfare.17
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China’s security concerns are diverse. The West’s engagement policy is seen
as supportive of China’s economic modernization and strengthening, but at the
same time also as intent on undermining and transforming the Chinese political
system under the banner of ‘peaceful evolution’.18 The insistence by the West on
a peaceful solution to China’s division is considered an interference in the
country’s domestic affairs that leads to a perpetuation of that division. Western
endeavours to make China a responsible power which adheres to Western
concepts like human rights or nuclear non-proliferation, either by positive or
negative incentives, are seen as offensive. The continued existence of conflicts,
even near China’s borders, are a potential threat. Finally, China has several terri-
torial disputes, notably those related to its claims to the whole South China Sea.
In a Chinese paper submitted in 1996 to an ARF workshop in Tokyo, these secu-
rity concerns were summarized in the following way:
• external imposition of values and ideologies;
• ‘splitting’ China;
• indiscriminate sanctions v. China on international issues;
• conflicts and wars in some regional countries;
• China’s sovereignty, maritime rights and interest are still being en-
croached;19
Against this background of threat perception and a combination of realism,
nationalism and regime maintenance, Muthiah Alagappa distilled the following
elements from Beijing’s foreign and security policies:
1 pursuit of balance among the major powers in Asia;
2 good-neighbour policy with all Asian neighbours;
3 build-up of military strength;
4 mobilization of international support for economic modernization;
5 projection of China as an indispensable and responsible regional player.20
Japan’s place in China’s ‘multipolar world’
Japan does not fit easily into this complex set of perceptions and policies because
it presents China’s Realists with a dilemma. As a result, China finds it difficult to
develop a consistent policy which is less US-fixated and does not invite the very
response it fears most by threatening Japanese security concerns.
For China, security cannot be discussed in a Japan–China framework because
of the close Japan–US links and China’s overriding concerns with the US in its
security evaluation. Since China opposes US preponderance in Asia, and there-
fore also the alliances on which this preponderance is based (but at the same
time is ideologically against the dependence for security of one country on
another), China will have to encourage Japan to become more independent from
the US and to have a security policy commensurate with its economic power.
Moreover, since Japan is, after the US, China’s most important economic
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partner, and since it relies on Japan to regain its due status as a great power, good
relations with a prosperous Japan should be important.
However, as Realists they also are convinced that big economic powers
inevitably become big military powers, although this historical determinism is
called into question by Japan’s rise as a global civilian power because of the gap
between, on the one hand, Japan’s economic might and performance and, on
the other, its military might and willingness to use it. Moreover, potential is
equated with intention, and many Chinese experts just think it inevitable that
having the potential will sooner or later result in the willingness to exploit it.21
Even the Japanese economic crisis which started in 1990s does not reassure but is
interpreted by some as water on the mills of the hawkish Japanese who fan
nationalism, harming Japan–US relations as a dam against an independent
Japanese military power. While Chinese observers concede the damage done to
Japan’s economy by the crisis, they point out that the high-technology industry is
not affected.22
Obviously China does not want to follow its own Realist prescriptions in
Japan’s case and encourage Tokyo’s independent military growth (the period of
anti-hegemonic struggle in the 1980s was somewhat an exception); nor does it
want to hasten the realization of its historical determinism about Japan’s future
path because of its own national ambitions, its concern about strong
Japanese–American links inhibiting the advent of a multipolar world and its
deep distrust of Japan because of the past.
But by working towards the end of the Japanese–American security alliance
and/or threatening Japan with a rapid and non-transparent build-up of conven-
tional and nuclear military forces, as well as with destabilizing acts to assert its
territorial claims, China risks the unwanted scenario of either a stronger
Japanese–American military alliance or a stronger independent Japanese mili-
tary power.
Even if China’s political and strategic leaders abandoned their historical
determinism, as some have done, ending the Japan–US alliance would force
Japan to overcome its hesitancy towards military force and nuclear armament, at
least from the Realist point of view which is so entrenched with Chinese strate-
gists.
Reflecting this dilemma and ambivalence, Chinese writing on Japan ranges
from the more pessimistic assumptions about Japan’s future path to the opti-
mistic view that Japan will need China’s support to become an Asian power. Chu
Shulong concludes that ‘[d]ifficulties and problems in Sino-Japanese relations
always tend to be exaggerated. In fact, there are few problems between Japan
and China and most of them are conceptual or symbolic problems rather than
real policy differences’.23 The defence minister, Chi Haojian, was quoted as
saying during the defence officials talks in Beijing in November 1999 that as a
result of his visit to Japan he was able to confirm for himself that contemporary
Japan was not militaristic.24
But incidents like Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in
July 1996, textbook crises, Japanese reassertion of its sovereignty over the
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Senkaku Islands, Japanese moves which in Beijing’s view complicate reunifica-
tion and the strengthening of Japanese–US defence cooperation lead
immediately to the predominance of statements and writings which are closer to
the pessimistic view of Japan, although in most cases they may only have a
tactical or warning intention or may just reflect the bluster of China’s increas-
ingly commercial mass media. The latent suspicion towards Japan in Chinese
public opinion is so strong and can be so easily mobilized by official propaganda
that the government has to take care lest public opinion may eventually turn
against the regime itself.
Chinese public opinion regarding Japan has traditionally been negative
because of the past, Japan’s political and economic ascendance, the lack of
knowledge about contemporary Japan and a constant stream of bilateral polit-
ical and economic frictions.25 It is particularly worrying that generational change
does not seem to make much difference. According to the results of a 1997 PRC
survey on young people’s attitudes towards Japan, only 14.5 per cent had a
favourable impression of Japan, with 41.5 per cent claiming an unfavourable
impression.26 Polls by the Yomiuri Shimbun confirmed a deterioration of percep-
tions between 1995 and 1999. Even among those in their thirties, who are most
positive toward Japan, 43 per cent of respondents had negative opinions.27
The more academic literature reflects the dilemma of China’s thinking and
policies in a more sophisticated way. One of the key problems for Chinese inter-
national relations specialists is the strong focus on the inter-state level. As a
consequence they overestimate the role of the Japanese state (as well of their
own central government).28 Although the Chinese academic literature in general
no longer supports the thesis of the historical inevitability of Japan’s future mili-
tarism or that Japan now is once again a militaristic nation, suspicions of Japan
are strong and still evoke considerable emotion. There is concern that any
further move towards a more ‘normal’ defence posture (which these scholars
would have to advocate if they consistently applied their Realist approach) or a
particular new advanced-weapon system (for example air tankers or TMD)
would break the dam which holds Japan back from becoming a militarist
country again.29 At the very least it would keep the balance of power in Japan’s
favour. Thus, while these scholars from a Realist/nationalist point of view would
not agree with the constitutional restraints on Japan’s defence posture and their
leftist advocates in Japan, they watch with concern any further erosion of these
constraints by ever more expansive interpretations of the constitution by the
Japanese government. An example of this suspicion is an article published in
1994 in a Chinese military journal, Xiandai Jianchuan, which asserts that Japan’s
naval strategy has evolved from the defence of home waters in the 1960s and
1970s to active defence of distant waters since the early 1980s. It gives as exam-
ples Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), sending
minesweepers to the Gulf in 1991 and participation in RimPac (Rim of the
Pacific) exercises with the US and its allies.30 On the other hand, China and
Japan both participated in PKO for the first time when they sent troops to the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Japan’s deploy-
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ment was initially criticized by the Chinese government, and in 1992 Jiang
Zemin called it a ‘delicate problem’ (bimyo na mondai), but then in 1993 Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen spoke positively about it.31 The outdated Chinese percep-
tion of some PLA members in UNTAC was also symbolized by the expectation
after one Japanese UNTAC policeman was killed that the SDF soldiers would
now burn villages in retaliation.32 The slogan of the revival of Japanese mili-
tarism is still used by many academics, at least in the context of trends to be
watched or in order to caution Japan.33
China’s central focus is on the Japanese–US relationship, but still as a depen-
dent variable of the China–US relationship. In China’s perception, Japan
supports a world order, together with the US, which is not considered as
congruent with China’s interests. This world order is
one in which international regimes and institutions, often reflecting US
interests and values, limit the proliferation of certain conventional weapons
and weapons of mass destruction, constrain mercantilist economic policies
that interfere with free trade, and limit sovereignty by promoting universal
norms of human rights.34
While there is some tolerance for US forces in Japan because of their
constraining influence on Japan’s alleged military ambitions, feelings are very
mixed because the constraints go with US encouragement of greater Japanese
military efforts which in the end may lead to a decoupling from the US, while
Chinese security specialists are in any case opposed to the US military presence
in Asia and to alliances in particular.35 After enumerating all the developments in
Japan’s security policy which worry China, Wu Xinbo concluded, in an article in
2000, that most policy and academic elites in China do not embrace the idea
that Japan will become militarized and aggressive, but rather that their concern is
that the increase in Japan’s military capabilities will shift the balance of
power in Japan’s favor. A militarily powerful Japan is more likely to invoke
its alliance with the US to intervene should a military conflict arise in the
Taiwan Strait.36
Michael Pillsbury summarizes the thinking of Chinese authors on Japan’s
future policies in the following way:
• will achieve CNP (Comprehensive National Power) equal to the United
States by 2010;
• wants to restrain China’s rising influence;
• seeks to foment conflict between the United States and China;
• will continue to have a militaristic, strategic culture;
• will struggle for resources in Central Asia and Siberia against the United
States and Russia;
• will have ever-increasing conflicts with both Europe and the United States;
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• will develop nuclear weapons eventually, earlier if Korea obtains them;
• will face a dangerous environment of potential conflict with Russia, Europe,
and the United States;
• seeks (covertly) to become the military equivalent of the United States.37
Even if only half of these future possibilities are considered likely, China finds
itself in a strategic rivalry with what it now considers the US hegemony
supported by Japan, which may possibly lead to a direct rivalry with Japan. In
view of China’s historical experience with Japan, Thomas Christensen wrote
that ‘Chinese elites and the Chinese public view Japanese power as more threat-
ening than any other nation’s power’.38 In another context he clarified that
Chinese analysts recognize the military superiority of the US, although the nega-
tive feelings towards Japan are stronger: ‘Although Chinese analysts presently
fear US power much more than Japanese power, in terms of national intentions,
Chinese analysts view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a
loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the US’.39 Allen S. Whiting and
Xin Jianfei showed that Chinese writing about Japan’s military equipment and
defence developments tends to exclude countervailing arguments, preferring
instead to quote foreign publications that express concern about Japan’s rising
military and political might.40
With all these emotional, strategic and tactical elements sometimes fused into
each other and sometimes separately guiding individual decision-makers and
analysts, it is difficult to make any definite generalizations about China’s evalua-
tion of Japan’s position in the ‘new world order’. Moreover, Chinese projections
of Japan’s future path depend on assumptions about the national strength of
China, Japan and the US, and on whether they look at the regional or global
level. If Chinese analysts assume that sooner or later the US will go into decline
and Japan will lose its will to support US hegemony, then Japan certainly looms
as the longer-term threat. This understanding was moderated in the 1990s by
the ups and downs in the perception of US strength and of Japan’s deepening
economic crisis. Depending on whether one focuses on the regional or global
level, Japan looms larger on the former. But, for the time being, China’s goal of
parity in national comprehensive strength aims at a US exercising hegemony in
Asia and supported by Japan.
China’s military modernization
Against this background of perceptions of the post-Cold War world, China’s
leaders reviewed the country’s strategy, defence doctrine and force structure in
the 1990s. At the 14th National Party Congress in October 1992 China’s leaders
emphasized the importance of military strength and the defence of territorial
sovereignty. Shambaugh mentions that China has expanded its strategic frontiers
from continental to regional definitions. He comments that since about 1991
Chinese strategists have been referring to the strategic value of Southeast Asian
shipping lanes and the Straits of Malacca for China’s foreign trade, in addition
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to their claims to the South China Sea. India should not become the dominant
power of South Asia or the Indian Ocean.41 Bitzinger and Gill mention, in
particular, the role of Taiwan in China’s new emphasis on projecting naval and
air power.42
The success of the Allied powers in the Gulf War led the Chinese to empha-
size high-technology warfare.43 Accordingly, the 15th National Party Congress in
1997 basically reaffirmed the strategy of ‘Qualitative Army against Limited and
High-Tech Warfare’ which had been adopted by Deng and other party and mili-
tary leaders since the late 1980s.44 In line with Deng’s policy China has been
devoting considerable funds to the modernization of its military forces, but it has
also reduced their size to achieve a more professional armed force.45 Weapon
systems and technologies of particular interest to the Chinese include C3I
systems, cruise missiles, satellite-based navigation systems, advanced radar, lasers,
precision-guidance and thermal imaging and guidance.46
The Chinese stress the need for ‘comprehensive security’ (zonghe anquan) or
‘comprehensive national strength’ (zonghe guoli), concepts which China has copied
from Japan’s comprehensive security policy. This became China’s official
approach to security after Deng Xiaoping advocated the concept of ‘compre-
hensive national power’ at the beginning of the 1980s.47 Accordingly, Jiang
Zemin confirmed in 1992 that the pace of military modernization was to be
raised to a level commensurate with the country’s economic growth.48
In 1988–9 China’s military budget started to increase above 10 per cent
annually. Official defence spending increased from Yuan91 billion (US$11
billion) in 1998 to Yuan105 billion (US$12.6 billion) in 1999. In March 2001 the
Chinese government announced a 17.7 per cent increase for the fiscal year 2001,
the largest expansion in real terms in the last twenty years, which brings the
defence budget to US$17,195 billion.49 While this was slightly less than the 19.8
per cent increase in overall spending, it was noted with concern in Japan.50
Official defence-budget figures, however, do not include many other allocations
and benefits accruing to China’s armed forces.51 The real level of military
expenditure was estimated by Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies in
1998 at more than US$37 billion.52 Kokubun Ryosei, a China expert at Keio
University, points out, however, that the share of military expenditures in
China’s overall budget was actually much higher in the 1980s, at one point
reaching 15 per cent, compared with around 9 per cent in the 1990s. However,
not only was China’s military was less powerful in the 1980s, but the West and
China were facing the Soviet Union as a common enemy.53
Attention on China’s efforts to modernize its armament have particularly
focused on the expansion of weapons imports from Russia. In 1992 China
imported from Russia twenty-six SU-27 fighter aircraft and four sets of S-300
surface-to-air missiles, followed by ten IL-76 transporters in 1993, four Kilo-class
submarines between 1995 and 1999, and twenty-two SU-27 in 1996. Since 1997
licensed production of the SU-27 has started in China, which is to total 200
aircraft. In July 2001 it was reported that China had signed an agreement to
import thirty-eight SU-30.54 In December 1999 China received delivery of the
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first of two Sovremenniy class destroyers; the second followed in November
2000. Included in the destroyer deal are anti-ship 3M-80E ‘Moskit’ missiles,
which are particularly feared for their capabilities by the US navy. Other arms
deals are currently negotiated and executed. Since 1992 Chinese weapons
imports from Russia amount to about US$1 billion per year.55
In conclusion, one can say that China’s military modernization has made
significant progress since the beginning of the 1990s and, with the help of
weapon imports from Russia, has created some pockets of excellence. However,
the general technical level of hardware is still about ten to fifteen years behind
the standard of the most advanced Western weapons systems, military education
and training have suffered from the PLA’s involvement in economic activities,
and the cooperation between the various forces is underdeveloped.56 These defi-
ciencies are addressed with various degrees of success. Future prospects of this
modernization are unsettling and China knows how to maximize limited
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Table 2.1 Official figures for China’s defence spending 1985–2002 
Year  Amount (millions of 
yuan)  
Share in Gross 
Expenditures (%)  
Growth rate (%) 
1985  19,153  10.4   6.0 
1986  20,075   8.6   4.8 
1987  20,962   8.6   4.5 
1988  21,800   8.1   3.9 
1989  25,146   8.3  15.4 
1990  29,031   8.4  15.5 
1991  33,031   8.7  13.8 
1992  37,786   8.6  14.4 
1993  42,580   8.1  12.7 
1994  55,071   9.5  29.3 
1995  63,672   9.3  15.6 
1996  72,006   9.1  13.1 
1997  81,257   8.8  12.8 
1998  92,857   8.6  14.3 
1999  104,650   8.5  12.7 
2000  120,500    12.7 
2001  141,000    17.7 
2002  166,000    17.6 
Source: East Asian Strategic Review 2000, Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2000, p. 217; 
for 2000: China Daily, 8 March 2000; for 2001, 2002: Reuters, 4 March 2002 
resources politically. This is particularly obvious in the case of China’s strategic
nuclear forces, which by their nuclear nature evoke terrorizing perceptions. In
addition, China wants to offset its backwardness in conventional weaponry by
developing information-technology warfare. As a result the maintenance of US
military predominance in Asia has become more difficult and costly.57
PART 2: JAPAN’S EMERGING TRADITIONAL SECURITY
CONCERNS ABOUT CHINA
China’s military modernization
The traditional security concern most consistently raised by Japan in the 1990s
was the steep rises in China’s military expenditures and their non-transparency.58
Japanese academic writing did not fail to point out that while the modernization
of the military had taken a back seat to economic development, this changed at
the beginning of the 1990s. Without China’s startling economic growth and the
explicit link to ‘comprehensive national power’, Japanese concerns about China’s
rapid and non-transparent military build-up and security policies would have
been much less pronounced.59 The insertion of an article in China’s
Constitution about aiming for ‘wealth and strength’ has further enhanced this
link between economic development and military build-up in particular.60 Nakai
Yoshifumi, China expert at the Institute of Developing Economies, a semi-
governmental body, commented that the higher priority assigned to military
modernization was ‘an important change’.61 Japanese observers were particu-
larly concerned about the link between the build-up of the navy and China’s
assertion of its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China
Sea.62
Even before the LDP lost its power in 1993, for the first time since 1955, the
consistency and speed of China’s budgetary increases for military expenditures
had led to the first public critical statements by leading government figures.
Moreover, Japanese complaints established a link between China’s willingness to
increase defence expenditures and the role of Japan’s ODA to China which
touched on the very foundation of Japan’s engagement policy and its political
support base (see Chapter 3). In March 1991 the chief cabinet secretary,
Sakamoto Misoji, declared that Japan was undecided on whether to curb
economic aid to China following Beijing’s announcement of a sharp increase in
defence expenditures.63 Nothing further happened in this regard, partly also
because the government had just successfully extracted itself from the Western
sanctions against China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. But the
unease about China’s military budget continued to find public expression and
was also taken up in bilateral talks. Japanese comments have particularly noted
the non-transparent character of China’s military spending, which is made even
more ominous against the background of uncertain political conditions in
China.64 In 1992 the vice-foreign minister, Kakizawa Koji, warned China about
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buying a Ukrainian-built aircraft carrier.65 In 1993 a leading member of the
ruling LDP, Mitsuzaka, expressed concern about the modernization of China’s
military and the increase in China’s defence spending.66 In August 1994 a special
non-governmental advisory panel on defence, which had been set up under
Prime Minister Hosokawa, published a report (the Higuchi Report) which
obliquely referred at several points to China’s military challenge.67
The White Paper on Defence originally took a very cautious approach to
China’s rising defence expenditures, but this changed towards the end of the
1990s. A senior civilian official of the Defence Agency explained this initial
cautious approach by pressure from the cabinet, but he noted that in 1996 a
change occurred in the wording of the White Paper.68 Since 1996 Russia has
been portrayed as a diminished threat and the PRC as, at least potentially, an
increasing one. While noting the drastic increases in the Chinese military budget
since 1988–9, it always qualified this information by pointing at the high infla-
tion, budgetary constraints and the priority of economic reconstruction.69 From
1995 the White Paper added, however, that items like research and development
are not included in the official defence budget, and that there were indications
that China used revenue from arms exports for its military modernization which
are not included in the official Chinese figures.70 In the 1998 edition reference is
made to the bilateral security dialogue in December 1997, during which China
explained that its defence spending is set at around 1 per cent of GNP.71 The
editions from 1996 onwards contain an increasing number of tables about
China’s military and warn that Japan would have to watch Chinese actions
(chumoku shite iku hitsuyo ga aru) such as modernization of its nuclear forces, naval
and air forces; expanding its scope of activities in the high seas; and growing
tension in the Taiwan Strait caused by its military exercises.72 In the 2000
Japanese edition the White Paper increased the coverage on China to eight
pages (compared with eight pages on North Korea and three on South Korea),
and for the first time the White Paper mentioned that Japan was within striking
distance of Beijing’s medium-range ballistic missiles.73 In the 2001 Japanese
edition twelve pages were devoted to China (compared with ten pages to North
Korea) and it said that ‘[t]he objective of modernization needs to be carefully
determined to check it does not exceed the needs for the defense of China’, an
interesting echo of the wording of China’s warning against Japanese defence
efforts. Moreover, for the first time the paper compared the military capability of
China and Taiwan.74
China’s nuclear deterrent and testing
China’s resumption of nuclear tests in the middle of the 1990s touched a very
emotional point in Japan, in addition to highlighting the existence of a weapon
system which Japan cannot directly counter.
Between May and September 1992 and in October 1993 China conducted a
series of nuclear tests, bringing their total number to thirty-nine. Another series
of tests took place in June and October 1994. While these tests were criticised in
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Japan and also in the US, this criticism did not go beyond official expressions of
regret.75 But with the beginning of a new Chinese nuclear test series in May
1995 the situation had reached a critical stage. The tests occurred at a sensitive
moment in global efforts to enhance the nuclear non-proliferation regime; they
further added to the negative impact of China’s rising military budget and they
drew attention to China’s growing nuclear deterrent and missile exports. Nuclear
weapons have always been a very emotional issue in Japanese domestic politics
because of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the
Second World War. However, because of the official policy of putting Japan
under the USA’s nuclear umbrella as part of the Japan–US security alliance, a
dichotomy developed between the public’s wish for a more active anti-nuclear
weapon policy and the government’s actual nuclear-deterrent-based defence
policy.76 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, publicly the Japanese government had not
voiced too much concern about the emergence of a Chinese nuclear deterrent in
the 1960s, although behind the scenes this was used to extract a nuclear guar-
antee from the US. In addition to the comforting feeling of the security provided
by the US nuclear umbrella, the Chinese nuclear-weapon programme weakened
the left-wing forces in Japan which were militating against nuclear weapons.
Many of them viewed a nuclear deterrent by Communist China opposing
American hegemony as qualitatively different and more acceptable. This even
led to a split in the anti-nuclear movement.
China’s leaders have always considered a ‘limited nuclear deterrent’ as a way
of standing up, militarily as well as politically, to the two superpowers (the US
and the USSR), of offsetting in a cost-efficient way its weakness in conventional
weaponry and of ensuring its ranking in the world. China plays down its nuclear
deterrent in the public discourse by emphasizing its purely defensive purpose
and renouncing its use against non-nuclear countries.77 Part of the rationale for
its nuclear forces is Japan’s military potential, the presence of US troops in
Japan, and the future possibility of a Japan without the security treaty.78 The
US–Japan missile-defence plans have become an additional motivation for the
expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent. The Chinese pledge of no use against
non-nuclear weapon states does not seem to apply to Japan.79 When in the
summer of 1998 the US and China reached an agreement to stop targeting each
other’s countries with nuclear missiles, a senior US official involved in the negoti-
ation was quoted as saying that it did not cover US bases in Japan but only
long-range missiles. This implies that China’s medium-range DF21 ballistic
missiles (180 km range) will continue targeting US bases in Japan.80
Rather than any immediate perception of threat, it was the delicate moment
in global nuclear arms control, China’s insensitivity towards Japan’s anti-nuclear
feelings, the growing realization of China’s rise as a economic as well as a mili-
tary power and the bickering over Japan’s past in 1995 which led to a clash with
China over its new series of tests. This occurred against the background of a
nuclear moratorium by the other declared nuclear powers at the beginning of
the 1990s, thus inviting criticism of China for going against the tide of banning
nuclear testing altogether. In 1995 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
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was extended indefinitely and in September 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) was accepted by the UN General Assembly. Despite these move-
ments, China was seen to be improving its nuclear arsenal, miniaturizing its
nuclear warheads, testing its medium-range missiles (M-9) in the sea around
Taiwan and, according to US information, exporting nuclear weapon tech-
nology to Pakistan and Iran. The tests could therefore only reinforce the latent
concern about a future ‘Chinese threat’.
The timing of the resumption of nuclear testing on 15 May 1995 was partic-
ularly annoying for the Japanese. First of all, the tests were in contradiction to
the new ODA guidelines of 1992, which call for the reconsideration of ODA in
the case of production of weapons of mass destruction. But since then Japan
had only expressed its regret when China tested its nuclear arsenal. This time,
more importantly, the new series of tests occurred just as the NPT Extension
Conference took place, in April/May 1995, to decide on the indefinite extension
of the treaty. Japan therefore also protested against French nuclear tests and, in a
rare diplomatic move, on July 20 1995 summoned the French ambassador to the
prime minister’s residence. In China’s case it was particularly shocking for Japan
that the Socialist prime minister, Murayama Tomoichi, had just visited China,
from 2–5 May, and urged Beijing to refrain from testing.81 Beijing continued
with testing and on 17 August exploded another device. The date of this test was
only two days after the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War and
shortly after the annual remembrance on 6 and 9 August 1945. As a result of
mounting pressure from public opinion and politicians, on 29 August the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs froze the major part of the grant aid for the fiscal
year 1995 (except for ¥500 million for emergency humanitarian assistance and
grassroots projects) and thereafter.82 As Soeya Yoshihide points out, it was
symbolic for the change in Japanese perception of China that this decision was
made by a Socialist prime minister, because traditionally the so-called progres-
sive forces and opinion leaders had been sympathetic to China’s nuclear
programme.83 At the same time, however, the government declared that it
continued to support China’s economic modernization efforts.84
The suspension of grant aid for the fiscal year 1995 until March 1997 (¥7
billion) only affected a very small part of Japan’s ODA to China, and there were
therefore calls to freeze all loans.85 Grant aid makes up a very small part of
Japan’s total aid to China – US$78 million, compared with US$1.4 billion of
concessional loans for the fiscal year 1994.86 Public opinion widely supported the
suspension of ODA. In an opinion poll in 1995 only 7 per cent found it too
harsh, whereas 69 per cent found it adequate and 18 per cent even found it too
lenient.87 Even the Asahi Shimbun supported some ODA-related retaliation after
the first test and asked for the suspension of yen loans after the second test on 17
August.88 The government felt, however, that the suspension of all yen loans,
with its impact on China’s five-year plan, would have been too strong a political
signal and China would still go ahead with the testing.89 This compares with a
total suspension of aid to India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in May
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1998, although in both countries Japan is the biggest ODA donor, far ahead of
the second-biggest donor.90
China conducted one more test in July 1996 and in the same month
announced the decision to freeze nuclear testing, followed in September 1996 by
an announcement that it would sign the CTBT. The Chinese side questioned
Japan’s moral right to protest because of the American nuclear umbrella and
questioned whether Japan was not simply putting up a smokescreen for its own
nuclear ambitions, calling it a ‘quasi nuclear power’.91 The PRC’s Foreign
Ministry spokesman, Chen Jian, used the ‘history card’ and suggested that ‘the
Japanese side ought to deeply self-examine its war crimes and conscientiously
draw lessons from history’ rather than make ‘a big issue of China’s nuclear
testing.’92 Japan resumed grant aid in March 1997 because in the meantime fric-
tions had arisen again over Beijing’s claim to the Senkaku Islands and China’s
opposition to Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in August
1996.93 In addition, the Hashimoto–Clinton Statement in April 1996 demanded
some soothing of Beijing. One good outcome of the dispute was China agreeing
to the first senior-level consultations on disarmament and non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, which took place on 25 July 1995.94 Still, apart from the
different context of the G-7 Summit decision to suspend ODA to China, this
was the first time Japan had taken such retaliatory measures since 1972.95 The
US only temporarily suspended export credits to China as a result of China’s
test, and there was no concerted Western action.96 Moreover, China’s nuclear
tests not only contributed to a less benign Japanese view of China, but also
prepared the political ground in Japan for greater political support for strength-
ening the security alliance with the US and exploring TMD, both of which later
became very contentious issues for Japan’s relationship with China.
The Chinese nuclear tests led to greater attention being paid by the public
and government to China’s nuclear deterrent and its exports of nuclear tech-
nology and missiles.97 Its strategic nuclear forces are still small, but they include
between fifteen to twenty DF-4 (CSS-3), more than thirty-eight DF-3 (CSS-2)
and around eight DF-21 (CSS-5), which can reach Japan.98 Other missiles which
could reach Japan are twelve CSS-N-3 (JL-1) missiles on China’s one nuclear
submarine (Xia SSBN) and about 150 short-range ballistic missiles DF-15 (CSS-
6/M-9), with a range of 600 km.99 China’s strategic capability is composed of
less than 200 nuclear warheads, of which only twenty to thirty may be opera-
tional at any given time.100 The medium-range missiles would be those most
likely used against Japan and the Japan-based US forces. According to Ogawa
Shinichi, senior research fellow and deputy director of the Second Research
Department at the National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS), both China
and North Korea can utilize their ballistic missiles as weapons of terror or as a
means of intimidating US allies in East Asia to keep them from assisting US
military operations in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula.101 Reports
about the development of North Korean short- and medium-range missiles, as
well as Chinese missile tests in 1995/6 in the Taiwan Strait, have been crucial in
creating an atmosphere which allowed the government to point to China’s
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missile development, particularly after the North Korean side tested a missile on
31 August 1998 (Taepodong-1, with a range of about 2,000 km) which flew over
Japan before plunging into the Pacific. In August 1999 the Gaimusho expressed
its concern about the test launch of a new long-range missile to the Chinese
embassy in Tokyo. The chief cabinet secretary, Nonaka Hiromu, voiced his
regret about the test in view of global efforts towards non-proliferation and
reduction of weapons of mass destruction.102 The White Paper on defence in
2000 mentioned for the first time the capacity of China’s medium-range missiles
to reach Japan, and stated that the CSS-2 (Dongfeng 3A) was being gradually
replaced by the more advanced CSS-5 (Dongfeng 21). It also mentioned that
new short-range missiles were being deployed along the Taiwan Strait.103
Japan has also grown concerned about China’s exports of equipment and
technology related to weapons of mass destruction to North Korea and other
sensitive countries in South Asia (Pakistan) and the Middle East (Iran, Libya,
Syria).104 The most direct concern is North Korea, which has been helped in the
development of its missile force by China and which is exporting missile tech-
nologies directly as well as in cooperation with China.105 The strongest reminder,
apart from American efforts to rope Japan into stronger anti-proliferation poli-
cies, were the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998. Many
commentators in Japan linked Pakistan’s ability to immediately follow up the
Indian tests with their own to assistance from China.106
Territorial disputes
As if to impress on the Japanese the possible purpose of increasing defence
expenditures and strengthening its nuclear arms, from the beginning of the
1990s China started to assert more strongly its territorial claims in the South
China Sea and the East China Sea. This raised Japanese security concerns
related to the safety of its sea lanes to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the
territorial dispute with China about the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and its oil and
fishing interests in the East China Sea.107 Moreover, much of the focus of
China’s force modernization has been on the navy, which is still very underdevel-
oped except for its nuclear component.108 According to an internal Chinese
assessment, the Chinese navy will achieve parity with the Japanese navy by the
year 2050.109
The protection of territorial integrity is at the heart of every national security
policy, and territorial disputes therefore have the most far-reaching consequences
for security relations. Also involved is national pride, which can play a decisive
role in democratic as well as autocratic regimes. Due to the partial dependence
of the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) on US military forces and their
larger role in the protection of the Asia-Pacific sea lanes, the reliability of the
Japan–US alliance also plays a considerable role. Finally, in the case of the terri-
torial issues between Japan and China, given their proximity to as yet
unquantifiable seabed-based energy reserves, raw material reserves and fishing
interests, economic interests have gained increasing importance. In the case of
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oil and gas reserves, these interests are highlighted by the fact that major
contemporary oil suppliers (mostly in the Middle East) are said to reach peak
production by 2010–20, while Chinese energy needs are mounting.110 In
November 1993 China became a net oil importer, and, with its rapidly growing
economy still mostly based on highly polluting coal, it is desperate to develop oil
and gas fields.111 From China being dependent on foreign supplies for just over 5
per cent of its oil needs in 1995, the corresponding figure in 2010 has been esti-
mated to reach around 40 per cent.112 According to Kent Calder, by 2010
Chinese oil imports could reach 3 million barrels per day, rising close to the
current Japanese import levels, of around 4.5 million barrels per day, by 2015.113
In 2001 China was said to be spending US$1.6 billion per month on oil imports,
up to 8 per cent of its imports bill.114 Oil made up 20 per cent of China’s
commercial energy consumption in 1996, and the International Energy Agency
in Paris estimates that it will increase to 26 per cent by 2020, equalling a total of
8 million barrels a day. This amounts to about 400 million metric tons a year,
more than the projected net imports in 2020 of Japan, South Korea, Australia
and New Zealand combined.115
Senkaku Islands
The territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyudao by the PRC
and Diaoyutai by the Republic of China, Taiwan) concerns eight uninhabited
islands and barren rocks which have a land area of only 6.3 square km.116 The
islands are approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical
miles east of the Chinese mainland and 200 nautical miles southeast of
Okinawa.117 In terms of the earliest historical records, the Chinese claims to the
islands are very strong, but from 1884 until 1941 the Japanese side was the only
one actively using and occupying them. Thereafter, the Chinese government
under the Guomindang made no efforts to specifically claim the islands in the
Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, and no protests were made
against the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, which gave the US full adminis-
trative power over the area. Also, the government of the PRC did not protest or
claim the islands until a UN survey was published in 1968. However, even
Japanese publications were not consistent in including the Senkaku Islands.118
Still, most non-Japanese and non-Chinese specialists give more credence to
Japan’s claim than to China’s.119
The dispute surfaced with the publication of a seismic survey report under
the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) in 1968, which mentioned the possibility of huge oil and gas reserves
in the area; this was confirmed by a Japanese report in 1969. Greg Austin
mentions that Beijing stated its claim to the Senkaku Islands for the first time in
1970, after the Japanese government had protested to the government in Taiwan
about its allocation of oil concessions in the East China Sea, including the area
of the Senkaku Islands.120 It is from 1970 onwards that the territorial dispute
between Japan, on the one hand, and the PRC and ROC, on the other, became
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active. The dispute also affects decisions between Japan, China and Korea on
the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ of the whole area of the
East China Sea.
Due to the improvement in relations between China and both Japan and the
US since 1971, the territorial dispute was soon put to rest for most of the 1970s
and 1980s. It flared up again with the promulgation of China’s territorial law in
1992 and with the increase in Chinese survey ships around the Senkaku Islands
in the 1990s. Both governments started to take a more assertive stance and inci-
dents were triggered by nationalists on the Japanese as well as the Chinese side
(mainly Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan).
In February 1992 the Chinese legislature passed the ‘Law of the People’s
Republic of China on its Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas’, which
included not only the South China Sea, but also explicitly the Senkaku Islands.
According to reports, it was the PLA which insisted, over the objections of the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on explicitly referring to the Senkaku
Islands.121 The territorial law raised great concern with all China’s maritime
neighbours, including Japan, which protested against it officially.122 In April of
the same year a Chinese navy deputy commander was quoted in the Chinese
press as saying that it was high time that China readjusted its maritime strategy
and made more efforts to recover the oil and gas resources in the South China
Sea, thus reinforcing the seriousness of Chinese motives and highlighting its
energy problems.123 But the Chinese top leadership was not interested in
pushing the issue any further: when Jiang Zemin, then secretary-general of the
CCP, visited Japan in April 1992 Prime Minister Miyazawa raised the issue of
China’s new territorial law, but Jiang referred back to a statement made in 1978
by Deng Xiaoping about leaving the issue for the future.124 The 1992 Law
complicated the preparation for the first Tenno visit to China, an event which
both Japan and China hoped would pass off without incident. For this reason, as
well as to calm the concerns of countries disputing territory with China in the
South China Sea, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the law did not repre-
sent a change in Chinese foreign policy and would not affect the joint
development of contested territories.125 Hashimoto Hiroshi, the head of the
Gaimusho’s Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau, demonstrated the
Japanese side’s interest in not letting the new law interfere with the
Japanese–Chinese relationship when he explained that the Chinese legislation
was ‘merely a matter of China’s tidying up its domestic legislation institutions’
and ‘the dispute would remain shelved as previously agreed’.126
Since then, however, the territorial dispute has attracted greater attention,
fuelled by nationalistic zealots on both sides, by episodic reaffirmation of official
territorial claims by the Japanese and Chinese governments, and by the rise of
incursions of so-called Chinese ‘research ships’ as well as warships into the EEZ
waters around the Senkaku Islands and Japan’s EEZ in the East China Sea in
general. Of the thirty-three Chinese intrusions into Japan’s EEZ between 1996
and 1998, five were into the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.127 In
May 1999 the Defence White Paper stated that the presence of a fleet of
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Chinese warships had been confirmed for the first time in waters around the
Senkaku islands.128 In 1999 the Japanese coastguard reported illegal activities by
1,548 fishing vessels from the PRC (1998: 1,547) and 197 (1998: 326) such vessels
from Taiwan in the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.129
One of the flashpoints for conflict has been activities by right-wing organiza-
tions. In 1988 the Japanese government allowed one such organization to
improve a non-governmental lighthouse facility on one of the Senkaku Islands,
and in 1990 developments on this issue erupted in demonstrations in Taiwan
and Hong Kong and led to attempts from these two places to enter the Senkaku
Islands.130 China was restrained in its reaction because of ongoing loan negotia-
tions and its need to seek international rehabilitation in the aftermath of
Tiananmen.131
Japan’s declaration of an EEZ (a zone of 200 miles or circa 370 km around
its territories) around the islands in June 1996 (taking effect on 20 July 1996)
became another flashpoint for the dispute. Both countries differ on the entitle-
ment of the Senkaku Islands to a continental shelf and EEZ.132 The total area
for the EEZ which may be claimed from the Senkaku Islands is about 20,500
square nautical miles. China claims that the islands are not entitled to a conti-
nental shelf or EEZ, whereas Japan asserts the opposite. Under article 121 of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ‘rocks’ are not entitled
to an EEZ.133 In June 1996 China and Taiwan protested Japan’s declaration of a
200m EEZ around the Senkaku Islands.134
The declaration of an EEZ which surrounds the Senkaku Islands not only led
to Chinese and Taiwanese protests, but Japanese rightists landed on one of the
disputed islands to erect a lighthouse tower. These developments caused activists
from Hong Kong and Taiwan to demonstrate and to attempt to land.135
Japanese landings by right-wingers (e.g. members of Seinensha, and Nishimura
Shingo, a Jiyuto member of the Lower House) to demonstrate for Japan’s owner-
ship have taken place sporadically since then.136 In 1999 Futami Nobuaki, a
member of Shinshinto and chairman of the Diet’s Committee on National
Security, supported an official visit by committee members to the islands, but the
visit failed to materialize in the face of strong opposition from more moderate
government leaders and the Gaimusho.137 These developments reflected not
only a greater Japanese assertiveness and coolness towards China in some
Japanese quarters, but also the emphases of domestic politics in Hong Kong,
China and Taiwan. The Japanese authorities could probably have prevented the
rightists from landing on one of the privately owned islands (Kitakojima)
because the owners had not given their consent to the landing.138
For the Chinese government, the encouragement of incidents involving
Chinese activists in 1996 was also a means of protesting indirectly against the
Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Declaration of April 1996 and the resulting
Guidelines, as well as the Taiwan issue.139 However, as in 1990, China carefully
controlled the outburst in order not to jeopardize Japanese ODA. In return,
Chinese officials even came under domestic attack for ‘kowtowing to Japan’.140 It
has become known that the PLA was very dissatisfied with the Chinese Ministry
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of Foreign Affairs for downplaying the crisis in late 1996 and early 1997, and for
vetoing the PLA’s intention to protect activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan.141
Walking a tightrope
As we have seen, both countries are trying to keep the territorial dispute from
further poisoning the bilateral relationship, but various circumstances on both
sides keep it alive and occasionally enflame it. Both governments want to main-
tain their opposing claims and to accommodate the activities of
non-governmental actors who are not totally under their control. In China’s
case, the differing interests of the PLA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have
to be balanced. The Japanese government has to take into consideration public
opinion at home as well as the implications of China’s other territorial claims in
the South China Sea, which are along Japan’s sea and air lanes. China’s govern-
ment finds playing the nationalistic card at home useful, and sometimes
necessary, to enhance its legitimacy.142 The Chinese leadership sometimes uses
the conflict to indicate its displeasure with American or Japanese policies. In
addition to the above-mentioned use of the incidents in 1996 and 1997, media
reports in May 1999 explained the sending of Chinese vessels into the vicinity of
the disputed islands as sign of protest against the Japan–US guidelines and the
accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.143 But the
ruling LDP also does not shy away from playing the nationalistic card to win
elections, as it did at the end of September 1996 when it gave the campaign
promise that the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima (under South Korean control
and called Dokto in Korean) are Japanese territory.144 From a Constructivist
perspective, beyond aspects of international law and resources, the territorial
conflict is, for Japan, part of an understanding of China which sees the giant
neighbour threatening its identity in an increasing number of areas, whereas for
China it is part of the historical discourse of regaining what should rightfully be
returned to China in order to restore its former national status.
Japan’s balancing act between reminding China of its position on the territo-
rial issue (and this also applies to the yet to be agreed median line as the
maritime border in the East China Sea, as discussed below) and keeping the
bilateral temperature down is visible, for example, in the treatment of the issue
in the Defence White Paper. While it has mentioned China’s new territorial law
and its inclusion of the Senkaku Islands since the 1992 edition, it is only since
the 1997 edition that there is a mention of China conducting ‘oceanological
research’ in the East China Sea beyond the median line between the two coun-
tries.145 It was reported in 1994 that the Japanese Defence Agency seemed to be
understating the number of Chinese aircraft violating Japanese airspace.146
However, in 1995 it was reported that in autumn Air Self-Defence Forces
(ASDF) fighter jets scrambled for the first time ever in response to Chinese jets
intruding into Japanese airspace, and another report quoted the ASDF’s inten-
tion to upgrade its F-4EJ fighters in the area with the more capable F-15.147 In
1999, 15 per cent of the ASDF’s sorties were due to Chinese aircraft, compared
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with 70 per cent to Russian aircraft. But there were far fewer scramble sorties
altogether because of the declining activities of both countries (China and
Russia).148 The Chinese air force is also not yet able to deploy so far away from
home bases. The only aircraft of concern to Japanese defence officials is China’s
Sukhov-27 bomber.149 Asserting ownership without appearing provocative also
partly explains the fact that the coastguard, rather than the MSDF, continues to
be in charge of patrolling the area, despite the territorial dispute.150 Japan has
also not fortified the islands. At the same time, this ‘business-as-usual’ approach
reinforces the government’s claim that there is no territorial issue. On the other
hand, in a conciliatory move the Japanese side informed Beijing that it would not
allow any oil exploration in the territorial waters of the islands until an agree-
ment had been achieved.151
Since 1972 the Chinese government has tried to avoid solving the problem in
order to maintain its territorial claim without causing confrontation. When the
Japanese government wanted to raise the Senkaku Islands issue in the 1970s the
Chinese government refused to do so. When Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei
tried to raise the issue in 1972, Zhou Enlai declined to discuss it, dismissing the
importance of the islands.152 In 1975 the Chinese side made it known that the
issue of Taiwan as well as of territorial ownership of the Senkaku islands was
not to be discussed for the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty.153 In
1978, when the treaty was finally concluded, both sides seemed to have accepted
that solving the issue should be left to ‘future generations’. That year Deng
Xiaoping declared that the two sides had agreed to shelve the issue and leave it
for future generations to solve, but there was no official Japanese confirmation of
that alleged agreement. Deng repeated in 1983 that he wanted the issue to be
decided ‘at another time’.154 When Prime Minister Uno Sosuke claimed in May
1989 that the territorial dispute had been settled because Japan enjoyed de facto
control over the islands, the Chinese government rejected the statement, saying
that the dispute was only shelved.155 In 1992 Secretary-General Jiang Zemin
referred back to Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 statement when Prime Minister
Miyazawa raised the issue of the 1992 National People’s Congress Law, as we
saw earlier. The Japanese government is now publicly denying that it ever tacitly
agreed to shelve the issue and even denies the existence of a territorial issue,
which is rather ingenious since it did not contradict the Deng 1978 and 1983
statements at the time.156 Moreover, the above-mentioned statement by Press
Secretary Hashimoto Hiroshi playing down the issue in 1992 showed that Japan
had indeed agreed to shelve the issue. In 1990 the chief cabinet secretary,
Sakamoto Misuji, also declared his agreement with Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 state-
ment to calm Chinese protests against Japanese right-wing activities on the
Senkaku Islands.157
While postponing the solution of the territorial problem to the indefinite
future by reiterating Deng’s stance, the Chinese government also tried to insin-
uate that it holds the title to the islands. After yet another incident in April 1997,
the Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai stated that ‘the Diaoyu Islands
issue should be settled by negotiation on the basis of respecting facts when the
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time is ripe’.158 Although this statement partly reflects Deng Xiaoping’s 1978
remark, for many Japanese it assumes a rather ominous tone in the light of
China’s ongoing efforts to modernize its naval and air force. It is clearly a tempo-
rizing device since it is not logical to insist on negotiation if China’s title to the
islands is so clear. Moreover, some Chinese scholars predict that these islands will
increase in importance in the long-term strategic competition between the two
countries because of their potential natural resources and their strategic
geographical location.159
US context
The territorial conflict over the Senkaku Islands has also given an insight into the
vagaries of the Japan–US–China triangular relationship and the US’s difficulty
in simultaneously catering to the needs of the US–Japan alliance and main-
taining a workable relationship with China. After the Second World War the US
occupied Okinawa, and the Senkaku Islands were considered part of it, being
used by the US military as a firing range. Funabashi asserts that during its occu-
pation of Okinawa the US ‘consistently maintained’ that the territorial rights
were Japan’s and that the occupation meant only administrative rights.160 The
US position may not ultimately have a legal effect on the territorial claims of
either side, but politically it reinforced the Japanese claim. This is particularly
relevant for the period up to 1969, during which the PRC did not make any
efforts to claim the islands. In a communiqué of 21 October 1971, however, the
Department of State tried to facilitate the rapprochement with China by stating
that the reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan did not
signify a bias towards any of the territorial claims of the parties involved, while
at the same time confirming the applicability of the Japan–US security treaty to
the islands.161 This suddenly introduced separation between the administrative
rights and sovereignty is therefore not very convincing. That the US wants to
have it both ways is also demonstrated by the fact that its military continued to
use some parts of the islands as a firing range and paid rent for this activity until
1979; that is, even after their reversion of Okinawa to Japan. The relevant rent
agreement is still in force.162
Questions about the US position were also raised in 1996. When the Senkaku
Islands dispute flared up again in October 1996, the spokesman of the US
Department of State made a statement to the press which suddenly cast doubt
on the applicability of the security treaty to the islands. These doubts were rein-
forced by a statement made by Ambassador Mondale in Tokyo. Later the US
administration reverted to its contradictory position on separating administrative
rights from sovereignty, which it has maintained since 1971.163 This position of
recognizing Japan’s administrative but not its sovereignty rights is, incidentally,
shared by Republicans and Democrats.164
It has been speculated that this contradictory US position emerged in 1971
against the background of the Cold War and the beginning of resumption of
relations with China.165 The initial Department of State statement in October
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1996 is explained by Funabashi by the conflicting US aim at that time of simulta-
neously supporting the military alliance with Japan and improving US–Chinese
relations. In 1996 the US administration was trying to repair American–Chinese
relations in the aftermath of the 1995 visit of Taiwan’s president Li Denghui to
the US.166 As we will see later in Chapter 4, this was yet another incident which
gave many Japanese the impression that the Clinton administration was
favouring China over Japan. Looking at the triangular dynamics involved, it indi-
cates that the bilateral security treaty will for the foreseeable future most likely
prevent any military confrontation over the Senkaku Islands, but in the meantime
US political support for a solution in Japan’s favour will stay very limited.167 The
US hopes that its military superiority will serve as a sufficient deterrent without
risking more important interests towards China. Therefore, any new flare-up of
tensions will highlight the rivalry between US–Chinese relations and
US–Japanese relations. The Chinese side has warned the US not to intervene in
the dispute since it considers it a bilateral issue between China and Japan only.
East China Sea
As we have seen, the Senkaku Islands issue is closely linked to the disputed conti-
nental shelf in the wider area of the East China Sea and one dispute blocks the
solution of the other. The continental shelf in the East China Sea is 300,000
square km. China claims the whole shelf to the Okinawa Trough, including an
unspecified portion of the Japan/South Korea Joint Development Zone. Japan
claims the same shelf to a median line between its undisputed territory and that
of China.168
Japan and South Korea had attempted to draft an area of joint development
where their claims completely overlapped, but China objected to this in 1974. As
a result, Japan deferred ratification of an agreement on the continental shelf
demarcation with South Korea until June 1977.169 A solution is made difficult
since all East China Sea claimants (Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan) cite
different principles of international law to support their claims. Whereas Japan
insists on the principle of an equidistant (median) line, China adheres to the
natural prolongation theory. In 1996 Japan, South Korea and China declared a
200m EEZ. All three countries ratified the 1982 UNCLOS, but the convention
does not help in all cases since it does not address historical claims, and its lack of
clear definitions makes it difficult to judge how to apply its provisions on the
EEZ and the continental shelf.170 As Hiramatsu Shigeo states, there is no other
way to clarify the continental shelf than by political negotiation.171 However, in
view of the fishing and mining interests involved, the stakes for Japan are consid-
erable since its land territory is 380,000 square km (the sixty-first largest land
area in the world), but the area of the EEZ amounts to 4.51 million square km
(sixth largest EEZ area).172
Again, the Chinese side has been rather reluctant to engage in negotiations
with Japan (but also with South Korea) on delimiting the sea borders under the
new 1982 UNCLOS. The main reason is the fundamental difference between
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China and its neighbours on the application of the Law of Sea. This situation
led to tensions about rising incursions by Chinese vessels into disputed as well as
undisputed areas of Japan’s EEZ. Moreover, in the meantime China started
actively to explore and even to produce oil and gas in the area adjacent to the
median line. Hiramatsu Shigeo claims that the Japanese government, for its part,
has also avoided a clarification of the territorial issue in order to protect the
friendly relationship with China.173 Under the 1982 UNCLOS, Japan has until
2006 (ten years after the convention took effect in 1996) to submit to the UN
scientific research data including submarine landform and geology, geomag-
netism and gravity in order to claim the continental shelf. China is pursuing this
research much more actively than Japan, including within Japan’s EEZ.174
The stalemate over the delimitation of the EEZ also negatively influenced the
conclusion of a bilateral fishing agreement to replace the old one of August
1975.175 The negotiations for the fishing agreement started in 1996 after both
countries had ratified the UNCLOS, which raised the necessity of renewing the
1978 fishing agreement.176 In November 1997 Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro and Premier Li Peng signed a new fishing agreement, which came into
effect only in June 2000.177 The Senkaku Islands dispute was circumvented by
excluding the area around the islands and leaving the existing fishing regime in
place.178 The agreement was held up by a disagreement over zoning, fishing
operations and quota. Japan demanded that a more limited number of fishing
vessels be admitted than China was willing to accept.179 South Korea – which
also encountered great difficulties in concluding a fishing agreement with China,
let alone agreement on the EEZ – protested against this agreement and
demanded trilateral talks because the designated area allegedly overlaps the EEZ
that the ROC claims around its shores.180 Under the pact, Japan and China
agreed to establish a free fishing zone between 127 degrees 30 minutes east and
124 degrees 45 minutes east longitude, where boats from the two countries may
catch fish without prior approval from their respective governments.
Incursions raising tensions
In the absence of an agreed sea border, incursions by Chinese oil exploration-
related vessels, war ships and ocean research vessels into Japan’s claimed EEZ
around the Senkaku as well as inside Japan’s EEZ elsewhere in the East China
Sea have increased since 1995. It was the Japanese protest against China’s
resumption of nuclear testing in May 1995 which resulted in greater publicity
being given to such incursions. During May–June 1995 Chinese survey ships
cruised for eighteen days in the waters around the Senkaku Islands without
respecting Japan’s EEZ.181 According to Japan’s official interpretation of the
UNCLOS, foreign research vessels can enter the EEZ of another country but
they have to ask permission. Chinese ships refuse to do so, claiming that the sea
area is Chinese territory, that it belongs to China’s EEZ, or that the ship is
engaged in legal activities.182 The Chinese government thus used the absence of
an agreed naval border to refute Japan’s protests about the incursion of
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Chinese ships into Japan’s EEZ and territorial waters.183 During the 7th
Japan–China Security Dialogue meeting in June 2000, after the issue had
aroused Japanese public opinion to a considerable extent, the Chinese side still
dismissed Japanese complaints about the increasing movements of its warships
as ‘normal activities’, but on the subject of its research vessels commented that
it would pay attention to Japan’s representations (moshiire o jushi).184 However,
Chinese incursions now even take place into Japan’s EEZ, whose borders have
never been an issue between the two countries. In 2000 the foreign minister,
Kono Yohei, protested against the fact that the Chinese demanded that Japan
should not raise the issue of incursions until the disputed borders were mutually
agreed while reserving the right to continue these incursions.185
Whereas reports on Chinese incursions were initially prominently featured
only by the more nationalistic media outlets such as the Sankei Shimbun, they are
now also reported in the other media and have become the subject of Diet inter-
pellations. Most of the incursions are by Chinese fishing vessels. The cases of
so-called Chinese research vessels and lately also Chinese warships have
attracted the greatest attention and raised bilateral tensions considerably.
The number of incursions into Japan’s EEZ (including the territorial waters
around the Senkaku) by Chinese research vessels increased from seven in 1995 to
thirty-three in 1999 (see Table 2.2).186 In summer 2000 the Maritime Safety
Agency (MSA) reported that the activities of Chinese vessels had increased in the
area between the median line and Japan’s territorial waters, as well as in areas
where the maritime borders between Japan and China are not disputed (e.g.
south of Ishigaki Island or south of Danjo Island).187 Since May 1999 Chinese
warships have operated in the vicinity of Japanese territorial waters for the first
time. The number of MSDF sightings of Chinese warships in waters around
Japan (including passage through Japanese straits like the Tsuruga Strait)
increased from two ships in 1998 to twenty-seven in 1999.188 But since the
Chinese ships operated in the Open Sea or in Japan’s EEZ and passage there is
in principle free, the MSA admitted that it was difficult to conclude that it was a
problem relevant to international law. Moreover, there are no domestic Japanese
laws on how to enforce the requirement of prior approval of foreign research
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Table 2.2 Incursions of Chinese ‘research vessels’ into Japan’s EEZ 
1996  15 
1997   4 
1998  16 
1999  33 a 
2000  24  
Source: Chugoku kaiyo chosasen oyobi kaigun kantei no ugoki, 8 August 2000 (paper 
submitted to the LDP by the MSA); and East Asian Strategic Review 2001, Tokyo: 
National Institute of Defense Studies 2001, 199–203 
Note  a 30 according to NIDS 
 
vessels in Japan’s EEZ, and the Japanese authorities have so far left it to warnings
and protests through diplomatic channels. However, it argued that it was ‘inap-
propriate for Japanese–Chinese trust and friendship’. The government simply
insisted that it wanted to use diplomatic channels to address the problem and
that it wanted to continue to study what more could be done within the existing
legal framework.189 The Chinese navy has now acquired tanker aircraft, which
will enhance the operational radius of their air force. The distance of around
500km between China and the Senkaku Islands is about the same as the distance
from Naha base, where ASDF fighters are deployed.190
The situation reached a climax in summer 2000 when the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the LDP postponed a ¥17.2 billion loan package to China,
making a release of the loan contingent on a satisfying clarification from the
Chinese side during the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Minister Kono Yohei
with his Chinese counterpart in Beijing at the end of August.191 In the talks
Foreign Minister Tang stated that the ‘problem no longer existed’ and that
discussions should begin to establish a system of notification without prejudice to
territorial claims.192 As a result the LDP released the loan in September 2000
and the incursions and close movements of Chinese warships stopped for some
time. In February 2001 both sides agreed on a system of prior notification for
ships of both countries, but without a clear definition of the area to which it
should apply.193 Detailed maritime research by the Chinese navy in Japan’s EEZ
resumed in summer 2001, with and without prior notification, and the Japanese
government was becoming more public in stating that these activities included
exploration of natural resources, in violation of international treaties, and anti-
submarine manoeuvres.194
The Kono–Tang talks in the wake of rising tensions also gave a new impetus
to negotiations for the delimitation of naval borders. Japan and China had only
started consultations on the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelves
in August 1998, on the basis of an agreement made on the occasion of President
Jiang’s visit to Japan in November 1998. While one round took place in 1998,
the next consultation, planned for 1999, did not materialize. Japan pressed
China on this matter in 1999, without success for some time, but similar discus-
sions took place in other fora.195 During Prime Minister Obuchi’s visit to China
in July 1999, the Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, only expressed agree-
ment that the planned talks for the EEZ should be realised soon. Finally, two
rounds took place in 2000.196 It is obvious that China is still not keen on finding
a solution, in order to avoid the inevitable confrontation over the territorial
claims of both sides, but the cost of this avoidance strategy is high in terms of
Japan’s growing perception of China as a long-term security threat and because
it gives rise to new incidents.
Chinese oil and gas production
Apart from fishing and military interests, China’s developing offshore oil
industry accounts for a growing number of research vessel incursions. The simul-
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taneous sharp rise in naval vessels has also been attributed to patrolling of the
vicinity of these Chinese oil facilities.197
Probably in order to win time and circumvent the fundamental issue of terri-
torial delimitation while still trying to benefit from Japan’s technology, in 1978,
1990 and 1996 China proposed joint exploration of the continental shelf, but
Japan demanded a settlement of the sea border first.198 There is information
that in 1980 the Japanese government proposed joint exploration to China
provided that it would not prejudice territorial claims.199 In the specific case of
the Senkaku Islands, in October 1980 Deputy Premier Yao Yilin proposed joint
oil development around the islands, which might also include the US.200 In the
same year Japanese–Chinese negotiations on joint development of the area,
including the area around the islands, foundered after a series of meetings.201 In
October 1990 China suggested ‘joint development’ of the islands, but the report
is not clear what exactly was meant by this.202
However, today not only is Japan refusing joint exploration as a solution to
the conflict, but one can also assume that China no longer has an urgent techno-
logical need to rely on any kind of foreign involvement. China has been drilling
for oil and gas in the East China Sea since the beginning of the 1980s, and has
thus proved its willingness to go ahead on its own as well as its technological
ability to do so.203 In 1995 China launched test drilling in Japan’s claimed EEZ
about 570m away from the equidistant line; this was met by a protest from the
Japanese government.204 Hiramatsu Shigeo therefore warns that it will not be
long before China crosses Japan’s unilaterally established median line.205 China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Sinopec Star Petroleum
Corporation (SSPC) operate several oil fields in the East China Sea. In June
2000 CNOOC announced that it wants to discover 600 billion cubic metres of
natural gas reserves in the East China Sea between 2001 and 2005.206 SSPC
announced at the same time that it wants to spend US$2.9 billion in the East
China Sea on oil and gas production and to have more than ninety wells by
2010. It wants to boost proven natural gas reserves in the region, from 40–50
billion cubic metres now to 150–300 billion cubic metres by 2003.207 It is not
clear whether these announcements have been followed up, since they also coin-
cided with the flotation of these companies on the stock market. But they
certainly reflected a continued strong Chinese interest in the oil and gas reserves
of the area.
The major gas reserves are in the Chunxiao field and in the Xihu depression.
The Pinghu oil and gas field in the Xihu depression (365km off the shore of
China) is near the median line, the Chunxiao field only 5km from it. Pinghu is
linked by one oil and one gas pipeline to Shanghai; the gas pipeline started to
deliver 400,000 cubic metres of gas daily to Shanghai in 2000.208 Another
pipeline is planned from Chunxiao to the coastal city of Wenzhou.209 In the past
foreign oil companies drilled a total of fourteen dry holes in the East China Sea,
but today only Chinese companies are involved in the area – except for the small
Primeline Petroleum Corporation, which is a Canada-listed company with a
Chinese majority shareholder.210
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In contrast to Chinese energy activities, the Japanese government has refused
to give permission for any activities by Japanese energy companies in the East
China Sea in order to avoid confrontation with China. Four Japanese companies
were refused licenses in the 1960s.211 In 1981 Teikoku Oil sank a wildcat well off
Miyakojima, an island about 120 miles southeast of the Senkaku Islands, but the
results were not made public.212 Most of the Chinese fields discovered in the
East China Sea have, to date, been predominantly gas bearing and of medium
size. Given the relatively limited gas reserve base of East China Sea fields, the
distance from markets on the Japanese mainland and the current excess of liqui-
fied natural gas (LNG) supply capacity available in Asia, the incentive for
Japanese investment in the East China Sea is currently not high.213
Hiramatsu Shigeo, however, argues that the Gaimusho has been rather
lenient, to the detriment of Japan’s interests.214 This policy of Japanese restraint
to protect Japanese–Chinese relations seems to go back to at least October 1980,
when Japan’s MITI minister declared that Japan would not develop oil fields
around the Senkaku Islands if China did not participate.215 Moreover, Japan’s
Export–Import Bank provided a substantial loan for the pipeline from the
Pinghu field to Shanghai, as did the Asian Development Bank (ADB), where
Japan’s influence is very strong.216
As in the case of the Senkaku Islands, Japan cannot expect much US support
in its conflict with China about the EEZ or territorial waters in the East China
Sea. According to Foreign Minister Kono’s Diet statement in May 2000, the
intrusions into Japan’s EEZ fall within the framework of the Japanese–American
security treaty’s Far Eastern clause, and this interpretation was shared by the US.
In a later clarification he explained that the Senkaku Islands, as Japan’s territory,
fall within the framework of the security treaty’s application, not just within the
Far Eastern clause.217 However, according to Article 4 of the security treaty, such
a distinction is only made concerning ‘consultations’ for the implementation of
the treaty. Article 5 speaks of meeting the common danger in case of armed
attack against ‘territories under the administration of Japan’. According to the
Law of the Sea there is no specific difference between the type of administration
a country exerts over its EEZ and its territories. In any case, the US does not
pronounce itself on any territorial claims.
The South China Sea
The South China Sea is related to Japan’s security because the safety of the
country’s major sea lanes of communication and air corridors are involved. The
area is also important for natural resources and fishing. For China, the South
China Sea is related not only to its territorial claim to the whole area, backed by
strong nationalistic feelings, but also to securing its sea lanes, which are so far
controlled by the US navy. The primary source of its oil imports is the Middle
East, amounting to a share of 52.9 per cent in 1996, with the next biggest share
coming from the Asia-Pacific, with 36.3 per cent.218 In addition, the area is
important for fishing and seabed resources.
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Any conflict between China, on the one hand, and claimants and beneficia-
ries of the South China Sea, on the other, would have a negative impact on
Japan’s security environment and make compromise in the East China Sea even
more difficult. In addition, China’s handling of its claims to the South China Sea
is an indicator of its willingness to use military force.219 One of the more
outspoken Japanese commentators, Professor Nishihara Masashi of the Defence
Academy, addressed this linkage when he was quoted as saying that ‘The way
they [the Chinese] have behaved in the South China Sea may one day be
applied to the Senkaku Islands. It’s a creeping expansionism’.220 The South
China Sea is also relevant to Japan’s security as it has been linked to piracy and,
more recently, to illegal immigration.
Annually, over 40,000 ships pass through the South China Sea, which is
considerably more than through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal.221 Also,
around 70 per cent of Japan’s oil imports, mostly from the Middle East, pass
through the area. Other sea-bound imports of raw materials and exports of
finished goods are also dependent on safe shipping through this maritime area,
which directly links Japan with Southeast Asia, where Japan has established a
network economy. Forty-two per cent of Japan’s exports (by value) took the route
through the South China Sea in the 1990s, as did 42 per cent of Japan’s imports
(by value).222 The Chinese analyst Ji Guoxing estimates that Japan’s and China’s
total trade via Southeast Asian sea lanes was US$260.4 billion and US$65.6
billion, 39 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, of their total trade.223 In 1994,
1,555 oil tankers used the South China Sea to reach Japan; 39 per cent of
Japan’s total trade and the equivalent of 6 per cent of Japan’s total gross
domestic product (GDP) passed through the South China Sea.224 The develop-
ment of the Chinese navy towards a blue-ocean navy is therefore of great
importance to Japan. However, it has been pointed out that the Spratly Islands,
in contrast to the also disputed Paracel Islands, do not straddle major shipping
routes.225
Five nations (the PRC, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and
Indonesia) have claims to islands or maritime zones in some parts of the Paracel
and/or Spratly Island chains, and outside powers like the US, South Korea and
India are concerned as well. The claims do not just involve China, but also
ASEAN countries among themselves. Japan does not support the territorial
claims of any particular country.226 Japan’s official position is that in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty it gave up its title to any of its previously occupied islands
in the South China Sea but that the treaty did not stipulate to what country the
islands should revert.
Since 1992, when China promulgated its new territorial law, the Japanese
government has paid more attention to events in the South China Sea. The 1992
Defence Yearbook mentions that the delivery of SU-27 from Russia will expand
the radius of activity of the Chinese Navy.227 From the issue of 1993 the
Yearbooks also mention political statements by Chinese leaders on the PLA’s
mission to defend China’s territorial integrity. From 1993 on the Yearbook
mentions China’s construction of an airfield on Yongxing Island, the main island
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of the Paracel Islands.228 Tensions rose in 1995 when the Philippines discovered
that in 1994 China had constructed permanent structures on the Mischief Reef,
claimed by the Philippines to be in its continental shelf, an action which also met
with considerable criticism from ASEAN. Thereafter China’s conversion of
additional small buildings into concrete facilities in 1999 further raised tensions.
These Chinese encroachments went hand in hand with promises to the ASEAN
member states that it would abide by the Law of the Sea and abstain from the
use of force. China’s stance has therefore been characterized in the region as a
‘talk and grab’ strategy, which avoids open confrontation while pursuing a
creeping invasion. China refuses to discuss the South China Sea with Japan
because it is opposed to the involvement of all non-claimant countries.229 For
this reason Tokyo has not been invited to the annual Indonesian-initiated work-
shops on the South China Sea conflict. As a result it can only call for peaceful
resolution of the territorial conflict and urge the maintenance of safe navigation.
Japan’s minor participation in some energy developments in the South China
Sea which are within the area claimed by China may have the potential to
involve Japan directly in territorial disputes. One exploration is off the
Vietnamese coast, operated by Japan–Vietnam Petroleum, in which Japanese
companies have a share of 46.5 percent (involving the state-owned Japan
National Oil Company, Nippon Mitsubishi Oil Corporation and Mitsubishi
Corporation). It was set up to develop the Rang Dong field (Block 15–2), about
100km off the Vietnamese coast, within the Vietnamese EEZ but also just about
within the zone claimed by China. The Company produced around 55,000
barrels of oil per day from the field in 1999.230 Reserves were reported as 325
million barrels of oil and 300 billion cubic feet of gas. Clearly within the
China–claimed zone is the major part of the Indonesian and Malaysian EEZs,
which contain significant hydrocarbon reserves. Japanese companies are under-
stood to have discussed participation in the huge Natuna D-Alpha gas field with
the Indonesian state oil company, Pertamina. However, the technical problems of
developing this field are likely to preclude gas production and no agreement with
Japanese companies has been signed. In Malaysia, four areas that have been
licensed by the Malaysian state oil company, Petronas, include Japanese partici-
pants, including Nippon Mitsubishi (operator of the SK-10 area in the South
China Sea), Japan National Oil Company and Teikoku Oil. Fields included in
the SK-8 and SK-10 areas in the South China Sea are currently under develop-
ment to supply gas to the LNG plant at Bintuku, Sarawak, which produces LNG
for shipment to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. However, as far as is known
China has not objected to any of the Japanese energy companies involved in
South China Sea exploration and production.231
China’s military modernization indicates that one of its goals is better control
over the South China Sea. There are plans to establish rapid reaction forces, to
reinforce the marine corps on Hainan and to deploy for this purpose ten heavy
Russian transport aircraft (IL-76). China’s main disadvantage is the lack of air
cover for military engagements over 200km away from its coasts. So far China
does not possess the military capability for long-term effective control of the
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whole South China Sea, but the continuous build-up of its blue-ocean navy
capability, incidents due to territorial disputes and the confrontation over US
observation flights in 2001 send alarming signals to all countries concerned.232
The purpose of China’s navy modernization programme seems to be less to
achieve parity with the US than to raise the damage threshold for any country
considering the use of force against China.
The US limits itself to declarations expressing the desire for a peaceful resolu-
tion of the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea and to demands
for freedom of navigation in the region, while being militarily present with the
7th Fleet.233 The former US navy colonel Evan A. Feigenbaum argues that US
interest of military balancing would not be hurt by any recognition of China’s
legal claims.234 The Chinese side realizes that the US has slightly changed its
standoffish position since the Mischief incident in 1995, when it moved from
‘passive neutrality’ to ‘active neutrality’. It has increased its access to ports in
Southeast Asia and enhanced its military exercises with regional countries, which
is perceived by China as building a ‘united front’ against China.235
Piracy
Japan’s security interests in safe sea lanes of communications in the South China
Sea are also threatened by piracy, which became a major issue there in the
1990s.236 While the overwhelming majority of cases implicate citizens of other
Southeast Asian states, notably Indonesia and Thailand, there was a stream of
reports on cases in the mid-1990s, at times involving not only Chinese citizens and
criminal syndicates based in China, but even Chinese military, coastguard or
customs authorities.237 Sometimes it was not clear whether these were simply
criminal activities beyond the control of China’s weakening central control or
whether shootings and the impounding of vessels were intended to send a message
to Japan and other claimants to territories in the South China Sea and East China
Sea. The Sankei Shimbun reported in 1993 that since March 1991 Japanese fishing
vessels sailing in international waters of the South China Sea frequently reported
incidents in which unidentified but presumably Chinese ships fired warning shots
at them, boarded them for inspections and tracked their movements.238
Initially, Chinese officials were not inclined to discuss the matter whenever
Japanese diplomats brought this up, but in 1993 they changed their attitude.
After seventeen of twenty piracy cases involved Russian ships in the East China
Sea, Russia deployed naval ships to the areas in mid-1993 with orders to deal
with any piracy.239 In late June Japan and China began for the first time to
discuss safe navigation in the South China Sea, and they agreed to cooperate in
such areas as the handling of vessels found to be carrying contraband. The
Chinese side also promised that official Chinese ships would exercise restraint
before firing warning shots.240
However, after a decline in these incidents, piracy and robbery has increased
again since 1997, partly reflecting the erosion of central and even regional
power in China.241 For the first time in 1994 the Japanese White Paper on
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Defence mentioned the piracy issue in the section on Southeast Asia, but
without indicating the nationality of the pirates.242 The International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) pointed out, however, that a network of a criminal syndicate
headquartered in China was behind a spate of hijackings of ships at the end of
the 1990s and that this network has expanded to each country in Southeast
Asia. In the case of the hijack of the Japanese ship ‘Tenyu’ in 1998, the ship
was found later on the Yangtze River, and Chinese authorities released the
Indonesian pirates despite incriminating information from the IMB.243 A new
problem in this context is the rise of illegal Chinese emigration via the sea (see
below).
The 1995–6 crisis in the Taiwan Strait
Arguably the greatest impact on Japan’s shifting security perception of China
derived from the latter’s military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan in
1995–6.244 These events were very close to Japan’s own territory, they raised
concern about China’s willingness to use military force (and the US’s willingness
to reciprocate), they drew attention to China’s missile force and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and they highlighted the role of the unresolved
Taiwan issue in Japanese–Chinese relations. Since the resolution of reunification
has become of the utmost importance to China’s security policy and the leader-
ship has staked a considerable part of its legitimacy on it, the issue will continue
to demand great attention from Japan. According to several observers, the
Taiwan Strait is the location where China is most likely to get involved in war.245
Moreover, there are strong indications that China may use force despite US mili-
tary superiority.246 Finally, the Taiwan crisis of 1995–6 and developments since
then have become a major motivation for the reinforcement of Japan’s security
arrangements with the US, but at the same time they have the potential to
become a severe test of the Japanese–American alliance.
The military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan in 1995–6 have to be
understood against the background of a deterioration in US–Chinese relations
in the wake of the US allowing the Taiwanese president, Li Denghui, to attend a
Cornell University alumni reunion in June 1995, followed later by Chinese pres-
sure on Taiwan to influence the island’s first presidential elections in March
1996.247 The Clinton administration first resisted giving a visa to Li, but relented
when faced with strong Congressional pressure and a positive attitude by
President Clinton himself.248 This American move touched a most sensitive issue
in China’s security policy at a time when the leadership feared that developments
surrounding Taiwan would render the chances of reunification increasingly
remote. The high point of the crisis was therefore reached around the time of
the first direct presidential election in Taiwan, on 23 March 1996.
In order to show displeasure over the US move and to fend off accusations of
not looking after China’s desire for reunification, on 18 July 1995 the Chinese
leadership announced a week-long series of military exercises, followed by a
second round in August. These exercises saw the involvement of naval warships
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and warplanes, live firing, including the launching of missiles into the waters off
Taiwan’s coast. The Chinese military fired M-9 (Dongfeng-15) missiles into the
East China Sea north of Taiwan. The US did not react to the missile tests.
China held a third round of military exercises in November 1995, just before the
Taiwanese parliamentary election. In December the US let the aircraft carrier
Nimitz sail through the Taiwan Strait, ostensibly because of rerouting due to
bad weather.
This did not deter the Chinese, and in February 1996 the PLA massed
150,000 troops along China’s southeastern border for exercises and from 8 to 15
March fired DF-15 missiles even closer to Taiwan than the year before (30 miles
off Gaoxiong in the south and Jilong in the north).249 The third stage of the
exercises was a landing exercise 30km from the Taiwan-controlled Matsu Islands,
involving almost 400,000 troops.250 In reaction the US deployed the largest
group of ships in Southeast Asia since the end of the Vietnam War, including
two aircraft carriers. It was decided, however, not to send the two carriers into
the Taiwan Strait, and US Navy admiral Archie Clemins, commander-in-chief
of the US Pacific Fleet, stated in 1999 that neither the USS Independence nor
any other aircraft carrier were within 120 miles of Taiwan.251 Tensions became
very high and both sides tried to impress on the other their determination and
resolve.252 Secretary of Defence Perry was keen on sending a strong message to
Beijing, with the dispatch to the area of two, rather than one, aircraft carriers in
order to ‘educate’ the Chinese side about the US intention of staying a power in
Asia.253
Japanese reactions
The culmination of the crisis with the missile tests in March 1996 attracted wide
media attention in Japan, while officially the government tried to stay aloof and
merely expressed their hope for a peaceful resolution of the confrontation. The
missile tests drove home to the Japanese public how close the Taiwan conflict is
to Japan and how any widening of it could affect the country’s own security. The
missile tests increased freight insurance and drove up air transport costs due to
rerouting. Flights between Okinawa and Taibei were forced to make a detour.254
One of the four missiles in March 1996 landed in the sea off the Taiwanese city
of Hualian, about 60km from Japan’s southern most island, Yonaguni
(Prefecture of Okinawa), affecting its fishing industry. However, when the resi-
dents of Yonaguni asked for naval protection, Prime Minister Hashimoto ruled
out sending the MSDF in order not to provoke China.255 Moreover, the rising
tensions in the Taiwan Strait motivated the Taiwanese navy to conduct more
exercises in the same area.256
During the crisis, the Japanese government was concerned about the various
implications, although on the outside it appeared calm.257 Questions were raised
within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) about how to repatriate the 10,000
permanent Japanese residents and 10,000 Japanese tourists in Taiwan, what
would happen to Japanese oil tankers passing through the Strait of Taiwan and
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how to react to possible US demands for military support. The Cabinet
Research and Information Office and the Defence Agency did not exclude occu-
pation by the PRC of at least one of the smaller Taiwan-held islands off the
Chinese coast in order to force the Taiwanese government to hold its first demo-
cratic presidential elections under martial law. Around the March 1996 Taiwan
elections, with the crisis at its high point, the SDF were continuously flying early-
warning aircraft. On 6 March, when China announced its missiles tests, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed the opinion that heightening tensions in
the Taiwan Strait was not conducive to peace and stability in East Asia. It
showed concern for sea traffic near the test area and asked for a peaceful resolu-
tion of the conflict.258
The crisis demonstrated again how much the Japanese government had to
rely on US information. Whereas the Defence Agency received information
about the deployment of the aircraft carrier Nimitz relatively early before the
deployment, neither the Gaimusho nor the US embassy in Tokyo did. This
prompted the Japanese government to launch a complaint with the US.259 Later
a hotline was set up between the secretary of state and Ambassador Mondale in
Tokyo.260 There were also virtually no Japan–US policy talks during the March
1996 crisis, let alone contingency consultations or exchanges of military infor-
mation. Both sides agreed that the March crisis was not severe enough to invoke
‘prior consultations’ as contained in the bilateral security treaty.261 It seems that
the US did not want to run into any complications with Japanese public sensitivi-
ties about the application of the treaty.262 One high official in the PMO involved
in the management of the crisis revealed to Funabashi Yoichi that the govern-
ment could not admit the seriousness of the situation because it might have
triggered a Chinese attack on Taiwan or some similar dangerous situation.263
The Japanese government also made clear that its position was more vulnerable
than that of the US, and Prime Minister Hashimoto even expressed the hope
that ‘the US will exercise self-control’.264
There was concern in the Japanese government that the Taiwan crisis, having
highlighted the strategic importance of Okinawa for US forward deployment in
Asia, might wreck the compromise reached over the return of one US base in
Okinawa, Futemna, and thus endanger once again public acceptance of the US
military presence in Japan.265 Zhang and Montaperto conclude from the
absence of any Chinese diplomatic action against Japan and from the limited
Chinese criticism of Japan that Japan’s restraint was well appreciated.266
However, Funabashi Yoichi quotes the foreign minister, Qian Qichen, who told
his Japanese counterpart, Ikeda Yukihiko: ’Leaving aside the fuss made by the
Americans, you’re the only other country kicking up a fuss. China is shocked by
that’.267 China interpreted the deployment of the Yokosuka-based US aircraft
carrier Independence to the Taiwan area as use of the Japanese–American secu-
rity relationship to interfere in China’s domestic affairs, ‘tantamount to Japan
hitching a ride on US tanks’.268
According to Funabashi Yoichi the US bases in Okinawa were not used
beyond radar support.269 Fukuyoshi Shoji, of Osaka Keizai Hoka University,
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mentions that the US stationed its missile tracking ship ‘Observation Island’ in
Yokohama harbour during spring 1996.270 Moreover, the MSDF supplied oil to
US carrier group vessels.271 Reports that the SDF was put on alert three (the
highest being five) were, however, denied by the spokesman of the Gaimusho.272
The missile tests received a great deal of attention from the media, academia
and politicians. Even a liberal paper like the Asahi Shimbun stated that the PRC
exercises had demonstrated that the Chinese leadership had not shown reluc-
tance about using military might to ensure its national unity, even though it also
points out that the same is true of the US, which deployed its military
resources.273 Professor Soeya Yoshihide commented that the missile tests
‘exposed the fundamental character of Chinese foreign policy at this time of
transition – assertive projection of its long-term desires’.274 Kayahara Ikuo, then
a researcher at the National Institute for Defence Studies, argued that the mili-
tary exercises gave the impression that China’s threshold to use force was shown
to be low and it raised a feeling of alarm (keikaikan) internationally.275
Statements, even by pro-China politicians, were very critical of the tests. The
LDP’s secretary-general, Kato Koichi, was quoted as saying that ‘China’s missile
testing in international waters in the Taiwan Strait was behavior that cannot be
tolerated’.276 But he also ruled out any supporting role by the MSDF:
But what if Japan had sent its Naval Self Defense Forces towards Taiwan in
support of US force? This would have been strongly opposed by the two
Koreas and China and greatly escalated a very delicate and dangerous situa-
tion. Once again, the unique role that the US plays in Asia-Pacific security
was shown.277
Some parliamentarians asked for stronger protests than simply the one made by
the director-general of the Asian Bureau of the Gaimusho to the Chinese
embassy in Tokyo.278 The March 1996 missile tests took place just when the
LDP’s Security Treaty Committee (ampo chosakai) was deliberating ‘[t]he new
meaning of the Japan–US security system’ (Nichi-Bei ampotaisei no konnichi teki igi).
Since the tests were so close to Yonaguni, a major discussion was conducted
during the meeting on 7 March 1996. Thereafter the chairman of the
committee and the LDP’s security specialist, Tamura Shigenobu, went to Foreign
Minister Ikeda to demand an immediate cessation of tests, and on 19 March the
committee sent its proposals to Prime Minister Hashimoto.279 On 16 May 1995
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Councillors passed a unani-
mous resolution asking for a peaceful resolution of the China–Taiwan issue.280
But the Japanese government maintained its cautious approach throughout
March 1996. No threats about cutting ODA were made. Another sign that it was
downplaying events was the government’s statements to the effect that the
deployment of US forces from Japan in the crisis did not necessitate prior
consultations as foreseen in the bilateral security treaty.281 On 13 March a
MOFA official went as far as explaining in the Upper House that US naval
forces were conducting ‘regular exercises’.282 MOFA’s press spokesman declared
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on 12 March that Japan was not expecting any military conflict to arise from the
exercises and expressed its understanding in principle of China’s right ‘to carry
out military exercises using the high seas, so long as those exercises will not
hinder the usage of international seas by other countries’. He denied press spec-
ulation that the SDF in Okinawa had been put on alert.283
Taiwan’s strategic importance
The Taiwan crisis in 1995–6 highlighted the role that the unresolved issue of
Taiwan plays in Japanese–Chinese security relations and in the changing
Japanese security perception of China. The issue has assumed even greater
importance since the 1996 Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Declaration and the begin-
ning of Japan’s involvement in TMD (for these aspects, see Chapter 3).
Reunification with Taiwan and the use of force if Taiwan declares independence
has probably become, for China, the only issue which finds unanimous support
among all sectors of government and the population.284
The most important official statement on the strategic importance of Taiwan
for Japan can be found in the Sato–Nixon communiqué of November 1969. It is
interesting to note that, while the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) security was termed
‘essential to Japan’s own security’, the reference to Taiwan only said that ‘the
maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important
factor for the security of Japan’.285 In the Japanese Defence White Paper of 1979
and 1980 Japan is said to have great concerns about the area because it is close to
Japan and forms part of an important sea lane. But this strategic interest is no
longer mentioned in the following editions. In the 1992 edition, however, mention
is made of the Taiwanese first ‘Defence Report’, which singles out the PRC as
Taiwan’s greatest security threat, followed by a short factual account of the
island’s armed forces.286 Since then, the White Paper has merely repeated short
summaries of Taiwan’s armed forces and their modernization efforts, and there
are other references to relations between Taibei and Beijing. The reason for this
Japanese restraint is most likely that the Japanese government does not want to
raise Chinese suspicions, and that it feels secure about its strategic interests being
guaranteed by the security arrangements with the US.
With the more assertive stance taken since the end of the 1990s vis-à-vis
China by Japan’s politicians, the importance of a peaceful solution to the Taiwan
issue is more clearly addressed. In summer 2000 Foreign Minister Kono declared
in a rather frank speech at the Communist Party School in Beijing that ‘peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait are critically important [shikatsuteki ni juyo] to
the interests of Japan’.287
The expression ‘critically important’ is even stronger than the phrase used in
the 1969 Sato–Nixon communiqué, although ‘security’ is replaced by the softer
‘Japanese interests’, which, however, is clearly the same. Although the govern-
ment has been careful never directly to challenge China’s right to use military
force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, it has always insisted on a peaceful
approach.
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There is not much of a public debate about Japan’s strategic interests in
Taiwan, notably about the key question of whether the status quo or reunifica-
tion with the PRC is more favourable to these interests. Soeya argues that Japan’s
China and Taiwan policies do not have any strategic perspective and that they
are merely reflections of Japan’s alliance with the US.288 He does not offer any
suggestions for Japan’s security interests in Taiwan. According to Nakai
Yoshifumi, a researcher at the Institute of Developing Economies in Tokyo, the
‘Japanese government treats the Taiwan issue as a minimally strategic
concern’.289 Political observers seem currently to be more focused on the impli-
cations of the application of the Japan–US security treaty to the Taiwan area,
and the mode of change to the status of Taiwan. If this process is violent – and
the Taiwan crisis in 1995–6 invoked such fears – it would destabilize Asia and
raise concern about China’s future behaviour to a new height, possibly leading
to an arms race and new military alignments. If Taiwan passed to PRC control,
the US military presence in the region would become even more important to
Japan and increase US influence over Japan. For many Japanese, the treatment
of Taiwan by the PRC is an indicator of the kind of international posture which
the PRC is going to take.290 Tanaka Akihiko also pointed out that if the PRC
becomes militarily capable of simply taking over Taiwan this would raise
concern because Okinawa is not very far from Taiwan. In addition, an arms
race and strengthened military activities by the PRC and Taiwan would heighten
the possibility of armed conflict.291 If China was to take over Taiwan, peacefully
or not, the island would become a major base for China’s navy.292 Soeya
Yoshihide quotes a Gaimusho document of 1956 which expresses as the bottom
line for Japan’s interest that Taiwan ‘will not become a military base of
Communist China in any form’.293 Military specialists may also consider that, so
far, Chinese submarines have to operate in the shallow waters of the Taiwan
Strait and the East China Sea. While they are easily detected there, it would be
different after reunification because they could then operate in the much deeper
waters east of Taiwan and better control the sea lanes to northeast Asia. PRC
control over Taiwan would also mean control over the strait between the
Philippines and Taiwan.
Tensions and even military intervention would also have a considerable effect
on Japan’s use of the important sea lanes east and west of Taiwan. President Li
Denghui is quoted as having said that more than 500 foreign ships, including
more than 200 from Japan, use the Taiwan Strait every day (only 114 ships on
average use the Straits of Malacca).294 More ships pass along Taiwan’s east
coast. It has also been argued that, as the third-largest information-technology
hardware producer after the US and Japan, Taiwan has become so important to
the world’s digital economies, notably to Japan’s production and supply chain
within its Asian network economy, that any damage to factories and supply lines
of Taiwanese companies would deal a strong blow to American and Japanese
companies that rely on Taiwan for manufacturing and components.295 In the
medium term semiconductor supply would be insufficient because Taiwan has a
share of 70 per cent in the supply of Japan.296 The most serious effect of a long
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drawn-out US–China confrontation over Taiwan, even short of war, is, however,
that it would cement China’s views of a US-led world order (on which Japan so
far wants to rely) and make its integration into the world community more diffi-
cult.297 The Taiwanese government is naturally keen to impress on Japanese
opinion leaders the strategic importance of the island since it is in its security
interest. This is, for example, illustrated by the appointment of the retired
admiral Chuang Ming-yao as the new head of Taiwan’s Association of East
Asian Relations, the main official body in charge of relations with Japan, after he
had already served as its Tokyo representative from 1996 to 2000.298 Mutual
visits and conferences, often sponsored by the Taiwanese side, have increased in
order to allow the exchange of information and promote Japanese security
considerations of Taiwan.299 Conservative strategists in Japan, concerned about
China’s assertive security policies, are now more willing to engage Taiwan.
PART 3: NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
Introduction
An analysis of the changing Japanese perception of China’s security policy
would not be complete without taking into account the impact of so-called non-
traditional security concerns, in addition to that of the traditional ones already
outlined. As suggested in the Introduction to this volume, an understanding of
security as ‘the protection and enhancement of values that the authoritative
decisionmakers deem vital for the survival and well-being of a community’ has
to include non-traditional factors with an impact on survival, such as political,
economic, societal and environmental factors. This generic definition is based on
three criteria to warrant the security label in order not to dilute the concept of
security: the value must be vital to survival; the threat to the value must be
urgent; and the value must be determined by the authoritative decision-
makers.300
All the following non-traditional security concerns are directly or indirectly
created by China’s rapid economic development, to which Japan has contributed
significantly through its trade, investment and ODA. China’s economic develop-
ment carries the seeds of self-destruction in terms of ecological unsustainability,
political unsustainability (the creation of social imbalances and dislocations) and
economic unsustainability (for example the collapse of the underlying economic
model of export-led and FDI-driven development due to an international reces-
sion). These negative developments would affect Japan by way of transboundary
pollution, illegal immigration, transboundary crime and economic losses. The
transition phase in China’s development, with all its difficulties (for example
unemployment and underemployment) and generational impatience, has already
led to illegal immigration into Japan, transboundary crime and pollution. But
even the success of China’s economic development generates increased interna-
tional competition for scarce raw materials, food and energy resources on the
70 The rise of security concerns
international market. Finally, China’s economic success would constitute a non-
traditional security challenge to Japan because China’s economic development,
coupled with its demographic and geographic dimensions, will not fail to affect
Japan’s relative economic position and identity as the world’s second-largest
economic power.
Competition for access to natural resources
Competition for access to natural resources, energy and food is the result of
China’s continuing economic development. There is also a direct link with tradi-
tional security concerns: China’s military modernization and, notably, its
territorial claims have been put by Chinese strategists and political leaders into
the context of China wanting to secure access to natural resources.301 Shikata
Toshiyuki, a former Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) officer and now
professor at Teikyo University, assumes therefore that China will probably adopt
a two-track policy of pursuing economic well-being and military strength.302
We have already seen how dependent China has become on oil, for which it
needs either secure access lines (maritime or continental) or its own oil fields,
including in the contested East China and South China Sea. Most of its oil and
gas imports come from the Middle East and pass through sea lanes which are
controlled by the US and its allies, including Japan. Even on the Eurasian conti-
nent, the US and Europe are trying to direct new oil and gas supplies to
Europe and Turkey rather than promoting direct pipelines to China or to Iran
or Afghanistan. Another aggravating factor is the competition for Middle East
oil: not only is China’s oil-import dependence on the Middle East increasing,
but so is that of Japan (86 per cent of total oil imports in 2000) and other Asian
countries.
The oil shocks of the 1970s enhanced Japan’s consciousness of its vulnera-
bility to foreign raw materials, energy and food. Since then it has developed very
successful counter-strategies, although its increasing dependence on these
resources is still a major subject in the public discourse. China is now dramati-
cally increasing its reliance on oil, but it has no civilian oil stockpiling system for
times of crisis. In Asia, only Japan and South Korea have such systems in place
to cushion the impact of any oil-price hike or oil-supply shortages. This may
contribute to China’s taking a less confrontational attitude towards its territorial
claim in the South China Sea for the time being.
It is obvious that China, with its huge population, will need an ever-
increasing share of the world’s food resources. Increasing wealth, in addition,
leads to the consumption of more meat, which requires more grain supplies.
Lester Brown’s prediction in 1994 that China’s food crisis would escalate to a
worldwide food crisis dramatically highlighted this resource issue.303 However,
even specialists are divided on whether raw materials, energy and food resources
will come to be in short supply or whether market forces will resolve the
problem.304 Free-market forces may theoretically solve these problems, but
China is not yet a free market, and even in so-called free-market economies
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there is considerable state intervention when it comes to these goods. In addi-
tion, free-market forces may not solve a particular resource problem in time to
prevent serious economic or even military clashes.
The environmental impact of China’s economic
growth
Closely related to the issue of access to natural resources is the impact of
economic development on the environment, and these have therefore become
the two main issues among non-traditional security challenges in the post-Cold
War era.305 Environmental degradation and transboundary pollution may
aggravate or even act as catalyst in inter-state tensions (although the chains of
causation are very complex) and reinforce those negative perceptions we encoun-
tered in the first part of this chapter. Recognizing a link between environmental
damage and global security, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), which
is the umbrella over all US intelligence agencies, began to monitor these devel-
opments as closely as traditional threats to international security.306 In an
opinion poll in 1999, 62 per cent of the Japanese polled considered environ-
mental degradation to be Asia’s biggest problem for the twenty-first century,
compared to 52 per cent of the Chinese respondents. This was followed for the
Japanese respondents by concern about aging (44 per cent) and demographic
increases.307
Environmental pollution in China has a particular saliency for the possible
negative impact of even successful Chinese economic development on Japan.308
A famous Japanese sinologist, Eto Shinkichi, even called for environmental issues
to be given priority over all other matters pending between Japan and China.309
According to official Chinese figures, 30 per cent of China’s land area is already
affected by acid rain and 18 per cent by desertification.310 These problems
provide further impetus to emigration, including to Japan.
Together with other economic and social problems, environmental problems
could contribute to an explosive mix. In addition, transboundary air and sea
pollution already affects the livelihood of Japan and the Korean Peninsula.311
Pollution of the East China Sea originating from Chinese offshore oil production
in that region potentially adds a further negative dimension to Japanese–Chinese
territorial disputes. Although the impact of China’s pollution is far greater and
more immediate on China itself, the impact on Japan and other neighbouring
countries should not be underestimated, particularly when seen in conjunction
with the possible consequences for China’s political stability and for other more
traditional Japanese–Chinese security issues.
Crime and refugees
Illegal Chinese immigration into Japan and the rise of related crime is now a
considerable problem for Japan. Both are developments which threaten not only
Japan’s internal security but also the country’s identity of a homogeneous nation.
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Both developments are also related to economic circumstances – that is, the
attraction of Japan’s economic strength, the wide gap between the two countries’
economies and increasing unemployment due to the restructuring of China’s
state enterprises.312
Illegal Chinese immigration also conjures in Japan the fear of the conse-
quences if China fails economically. It is obvious that the loosening of central
and even regional control, combined with economic hardship and generational
impatience, is contributing to illegal emigration and the regional expansion of
criminal syndicates based in China. Amako Satoshi writes that if China’s
economy fails and the country disintegrates it is expected that this may lead to
considerable refugee streams into China’s immediate neighbouring countries. He
also recalls that several thousands Chinese refugees landed in Okinawa and
Kyushu after the massacre in Tiananmen in 1989.313 The possibility of 100
million Chinese refugees destabilizing Asia is also mentioned in a book co-edited
by the former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.314 As we will see in Chapter 3,
on the revised guidelines of 1999, ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’ also
includes a scenario in which refugees come to Japan.315
As far-fetched as the refugee scenario may seem now, increasing Chinese
illegal immigration to foreign countries, including Japan, piracy in the South
China Sea, and the involvement of Chinese citizens in regional and domestic
crime are seen as precursors of such disintegration, although these phenomena
can also be interpreted as merely transitional and inherent in the process of
modernizing China’s political and economic system. According to the Japanese
police and the MSA, about 90 per cent of people entering Japan illegally come
from the PRC.316 Until 1991 the number of Chinese nationals arrested for
entering the country illegally remained in double figures, but it rose sharply, to
1,209, in 1997, falling again, to 824 in 1998. Between January and November
2000, 2,814 Chinese nationals were arrested, accounting for roughly half of all
the arrests of foreigners. The number of Chinese being deported is increasing,
and it exceeded 11,000 in 1999.317 According to Justice Ministry statistics,
33,000 illegal Chinese immigrants have been confirmed in the country, the third-
largest group, following illegal immigrants from the Republic of Korea and the
Philippines.318 According to National Police Agency (NPA) statistics, in 1999 45
per cent of all foreigners arrested were Chinese. Of that figure, about 35 per
cent were residing illegally in Japan. Of 770 people apprehended in suspected
human smuggling cases that year, 701 were Chinese citizens.319 In 2000, 38 per
cent of all prisoners of foreign nationality in Japanese prisons were Chinese.320
The number of officially registered Chinese residents in Japan and their share
among foreign residents has been constantly rising, from 40,000 (a share of 6.8
per cent) in 1950 to 252,164 (17 per cent) in 1997. Interestingly, the share of
Chinese residents among foreign residents in Japan in 1890 was 56.6 per cent.321
In 2000, 54.2 per cent of crimes committed by foreign nationals were
committed by Chinese, a 9 per cent increase on the previous year and the first
time on record that the figure has topped 50 per cent.322 In 1994 it was reported
that the Japanese yakuza and organised criminal syndicates in Taiwan, Hong
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Kong and China are helping illegal Chinese immigration into Japan.323 There is
considerable Chinese involvement in the smuggling of firearms and drugs into
Japan. Hundreds of Chinese mobsters from more than ten of Shanghai’s 300
gangs are now active in Japan. The real figures may be several times higher. In
May 1998 the governments of both countries started talks on how to deal with
this situation.324 It is reported that almost 70 per cent of stimulants smuggled
into Japan are produced in China’s Fujian province. The trend marks a change
from the 1980s, when most illegal drugs brought in came from Taiwan, and the
1970s, when the Republic of Korea was the main source.325 The Japanese coast-
guard reported that the largest amount of confiscated drugs in 1999, 48 per
cent, came from China, followed by 34 per cent from North Korea.326 The most
recent crimes involving Chinese include ‘cyber crimes’. In February 2000 the
Japanese police reported that hackers behind a recent series of invasions of
government-run websites gained access to the sites through computers located in
China, the United States and Tokyo University.327
Although these developments are still minor, particularly if one compares
illegal immigration into Japan with that into Western Europe, they have a very
large impact on the perception of a relatively crime-free and isolationist society
like Japan. They aggravate the negative perceptions created by China’s military
developments as analysed in the first part of this chapter. Since crime is much
more widely reported in the media and touches the life, or at the least the imagi-
nation, of individual Japanese in a much more tangible way, one should not
underestimate the impact of these developments on popular Japanese security
perceptions.
Challenging Japan’s identity as an economic power?
Japan’s perception of the international environment and its identity in it as the
world’s second-largest economic power is strongly shaped by economic relations
of power. The challenge to this by China’s economic rise has therefore also to be
considered in the context of an expanded security concept. Economic power
influences not only Japan’s foreign policies, but also its perception of the global
hierarchy and its identity as a global civilian power in this hierarchy.328 This
status and identity are, of course, supported by the comprehensive alliance with
the US.
The opening of China’s economy to the outside from 1978 and the ensuing
economic reforms, followed by spectacular economic growth and seen in
conjunction with its demographic and geographic dimensions, cannot fail to
have an impact on Japan’s identity as the world’s second-largest economic power.
A sustained economic rise will assist China in becoming Japan’s economic and
political rival. With a population of about 1.3 billion, China is second only to
Japan within East Asia in terms of GDP, while it comes very close to Japan in
terms of its volume of foreign-currency reserves. China also comes second in
trade within the East Asian region. Positive evaluations of the scale and progress
of China’s economic modernization were particularly provoked in Japan by the
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impact of World Bank Reports. In 1992 the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)/World Bank estimated China’s per capita GDP at a mere US$500 but its
purchasing power parity (PPP) as being possibly around US$2000. It predicted
that by the early twenty-first century China may surpass not just Japan but also
the US, to become the largest economy in the world.329 The World Bank
announced that China’s per capita GDP in 1996 (1994 figures) was US$2,500 on
PPP, and in this way put China’s economic strength much higher than the per
capita GDP figures would do.330 The reports came out at a time when China’s
economy – which had grown in 1989 and 1990 by 4.4 per cent and 4.1 per cent,
respectively – suddenly surged, by 8.2 per cent in 1991 and by 13.4 per cent in
1992.331 In 1999 Japan’s GDP was US$4,079 billion, compared with only
US$980 billion for China, but the latter’s PPP had now reached US$4,112,
surpassing Japan (with US$3,043) as the world’s second-largest economy.332
China has been very careful with economic forecasts until recently, but in
August 1997 an official Chinese institution, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) published one for the first time. According to that study, China’s
economy was to become the world’s largest by 2030. By adopting the PPP
measurement rather than the per capita GDP formula, it turned out that in 1996
China’s GDP had reached one-quarter of the US’s and half that of Japan. The
forecast said, furthermore, that in 2010, given an average growth rate of 8–10
per cent, China would have surpassed Japan in terms of PPP-based GDP.333 Not
counting the uncertainties about Japan’s economic future as of autumn 2001,
Japan’s GDP was estimated to decrease to US$4,091 billion in 2001 and
US$$4,055 in 2003, compared with US$4,753 billion in 2000.334 But even if
one assumes that Japan’s per capita GDP would rise by only 2 per cent annually
(an overly optimistic assumption in view of Japan’s current crisis) and China’s by
16 per cent, it would take China until 2029 to reach that of Japan.335
To what extent do the Japanese consider China’s rise as a challenge to their
identity? Few mainstream observers of China directly address these questions.
Takahara Akio estimates that Japan may feel threatened by China’s economic
rise because of its feeling of superiority vis-à-vis China in the economic
sphere.336 In its first long-range foreign-policy programme for the Asia-Pacific
region, the ruling LDP merely predicted in 1997 that it was highly likely that
China would overtake Japan economically by around the year 2010.337
Concerns about China overtaking Japan because of certain economic advan-
tages have been reinforced by Japan’s economic problems, starting with its
economic bubble bursting at the beginning of the 1990s.338 Moreover, China’s
rise is directly linked to Japan’s problems because of the widespread relocation of
Japanese companies to China. An extreme reaction came, not surprisingly, from
the right-wing governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, who expressed in an inter-
view his hope that China may disintegrate into several smaller states.339
However, there is not yet any sense of urgency about China overtaking Japan.
Mainstream China specialists point out the huge gap which still exists between
China and other developed countries, and they emphasize the difficulties which
still lie ahead despite past successes. However, the rise of China as an economic
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power and its link to Japan’s economic woes reinforce the general perception of
China as a multifaceted ‘problem’ for Japan, and I will come back to this point in
Chapter 4 when considering the issue of Japanese–Chinese rivalry.
PART 4: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CHANGES
AND JAPAN’S CHINA DEBATE
International and domestic changes
The impact of the above developments has to be considered against the back-
ground of changes in the international strategic environment, in the
Japanese–American alliance and in Japan’s domestic politics.
In contrast to effects in the Atlantic world, the end of the Cold War in Asia
was much less dramatic and, instead, with the sudden loss of the structuring as
well as restraining forces of the East–West conflict gone, new uncertainties were
felt in Japan. The most important sources of potential conflict in Asia – the divi-
sion of China and the Korean Peninsula, but initially also the Cambodian
conflict – were still there. The new era also opened the diplomatic game in ways
which were difficult to foresee. Japan’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre was
enhanced, but this was not simply an opportunity to be seized or left; it was as
much a challenge requiring a response for which Japan’s parochial political
system, used to the comfort of the US security guarantee as well as its diplomatic
umbrella, was not prepared. China became less important for the US as a
bulwark against Russia, but not for Japan as an immediate neighbour. To
strengthen its strategic position China’s leaders decided to improve their relation-
ship with Russia, and the bilateral meeting in Beijing in December 1992 led to
the conclusion of twenty-five agreements, culminating finally, in April 1996, in a
‘strategic cooperation towards the 21st century’.340 In August 1992 China and
South Korea established diplomatic relations which potentially introduced a
moderating influence on North Korea, but it was unclear whether this diplo-
matic enlargement would not on the contrary weaken China’s influence on
North Korea.
The end of the Cold War also created uncertainties relating to the viability
and duration of the future US security commitment to the region, and the ups
and downs of Sino-American relations began to affect Japanese–Chinese rela-
tions as well. According to Kokubun Ryosei the two political conditions that had
supported Japanese–Chinese relations since 1972 were negatively affected by the
end of the Cold War. One was the latent common objective of withstanding the
Soviet Union, which disappeared with its demise. The other was full US support
of the Japanese–Chinese friendly relationship, which now started to show signs
of fluctuation.341
Two events in the immediate post-Cold War era, the 1991 Gulf War and the
North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, illustrated these post-Cold War uncertain-
ties and profoundly influenced security relations with China. The first event
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exposed Japan’s unpreparedness to contribute more to the maintenance of
Western security and thus weakened US resolve to continue its security commit-
ment to Japan in the same way as before. Although the country finally
contributed US$13 billion to the war effort and the post-war rehabilitation
programme, this support appeared belated and reluctant, and politically was not
equivalent to the provision of soldiers by the other Western allies. Japan finally
changed its laws so that the SDF could in future participate in UN PKO as long
as these activities were limited to logistical tasks. This happened for the first time
in 1992, when a SDF contingent was deployed in Cambodia.
The impact of Japan’s reluctance to shoulder international burdens with
greater military connotations was all the greater as it occurred against a back-
ground of a decline in the US military presence in Asia at the beginning of the
1990s. In the Philippines the US closed down Clark Air Force Base and the naval
base at Subic Bay in the wake of the Philippine Senate’s rejection of an exten-
sion of the bilateral base agreement – a move speeded up by the eruption of the
Mount Pinatubo. The administration of George Bush Snr announced plans in
1990 and 1992 for substantial reductions in its forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
These plans were only reversed in 1995 with the US Department of Defence
report ‘US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region’ (Nye Report),
which committed the US to maintaining the existing force level of around
100,000 troops in East Asia (see Chapter 3). Another concern for Japan was the
conclusion of SALT III (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) between the US and
Russia in June 1992, which promised massive reductions in strategic nuclear
weapons but which potentially raised a question mark over the future of the US
nuclear umbrella, notably towards China.
The second event, a suspected North Korean nuclear-weapons programme at
the beginning of the 1990s, had the greatest impact on Japan’s perception of the
post-Cold War world. This event and the handling of it by US and Japanese
leaders created an atmosphere in which China’s military developments looked
more ominous.342 The suspicion about North Korea’s intentions fell on fertile
ground in Japan because of the non-transparent character of the regime in
Pyongyang and the general dislike for North Korea, which usually comes top in
any poll measuring the ‘most-disliked’ country. Moreover, Japanese sensitivity
towards nuclear weapons only enhanced the ill feelings towards North Korea.
In our context, the North Korean nuclear crisis from 1994 onwards is impor-
tant in several respects. First, the crisis has served as a useful tool to engineer the
strengthening of the Japanese–American security alliance, because it helped to
find a new rationale for the Japanese–American security treaty after it had been
solely fixated on the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War. Second, the
North Korean threat became a diplomatic code word in Japan for anxieties
about China’s growing military potential and future intentions, and the need to
enhance the deterrence element of engagement towards China. Third, the
North Korean nuclear crisis and the degree of China’s support for Western
measures to defuse it defined, to a certain extent, the state of US–Chinese and
Japanese–Chinese relations.
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The Chinese commitment to supporting Western measures to contain the
suspected North Korean nuclear programme has been mixed, reflecting China’s
conflicting interests as a long-established ideological and military ally of North
Korea and the function of the North as a buffer against US influence.343 In
addition, China has been concerned about losing influence over an ally which
has looked with concern and distaste at China’s ideological and economic
changes. In September 1994 China withdrew from the Military Armistice
Commission to please North Korea, although it still recognizes the Korean
armistice agreement. China’s limited willingness and ability to exert a moder-
ating influence on North Korea became particularly clear in 1994 over the
stand-off on North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US finally managed to defuse the situation
through the swap of two light–water reactors (LWR) for a North Korean freeze
of its existing nuclear programme, but China refused to join the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), despite being offered the
establishment of its headquarters in Beijing.344 Since then, China’s position on
KEDO has been that it supports the project but feels it can be more helpful by
not joining it.
In conclusion, Japan’s perception of China’s traditional and non-traditional
challenges to its security interests were enhanced by global and regional develop-
ments which made these challenges appear even more ominous, while at the
same time the security commitment of the US alliance partner to the whole
region seemed to be weakening.
Domestically, generational change among politicians and greater Japanese
assertiveness to the outside shaped Japan’s perception of China’s security chal-
lenges. China is now seen as part of the whole, not just as part of a bilateral
relationship where differences are smoothed over by the incantation of yuko
(friendship) and the adjective ‘special’. The generational change was hastened
by the LDP’s fall from power after the party had continuously ruled the
country since 1955. Due to a culmination of scandals and the fear of losing
power, two groups in the LDP split off from the party in 1993 and supported a
no-confidence motion, which led in June 1993 to the fall of the prime minister,
Miyazawa Kiichi. The ensuing general election opened the way to a coalition
government between a breakaway LDP faction and the Social Democratic
Party of Japan (SDPJ). The succeeding coalition cabinets, since 1994 including
again the LDP, brought the SDPJ – the hitherto perennial opposition party –
into mainstream politics when it accepted the Japanese–American security
treaty and the SDF. The power sharing led directly to its rapid decline, but the
worldwide failure and disappearance of Communist states, as well as the revi-
sionist policies of the surviving Communist regimes, notably that of the PRC,
also reduced the electoral chances of the party. Thus China lost a major ally in
its campaign against the security treaty and against increasing Japanese defence
efforts. As we have seen in the context of Japan’s protest against China’s
resumption of nuclear tests, it was under the Socialist Prime Minister
Murayama that Tokyo took unprecedented retaliatory measures against China.
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The new conservative leaders, notably Ozawa Ichiro, with his New Frontier
Party, showed less inclination to exempt China’s policies from criticism and
exhibited a harsher attitude to China’s security policy and its impact on Japan.
The demise of the SDPJ and the emergence of new conservative parties
with younger leaders facilitated a more open security debate about the changes
in the post-Cold War era. Notably, this affected the debate about China’s secu-
rity policies and military modernization, leading from an engagement policy
with emphasis on political/economic enmeshment and deference to one in
which the Realist aspects were increasingly emphasized. Inter-agency politics,
interparty/electoral politics and intra-party/factional politics gained a much
greater influence on Japan’s China policy, considerably diminishing the so far
uncontested control of the China hands in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who
had strived to keep relations with China in quiet and consistent waters.345
Japan’s cautious policy towards sanctions against China in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen massacre was strongly supported by Japan’s diplomats, although it
also enjoyed support from the leading politicians at that time.346 In this new
critical atmosphere, the traditionally more accommodating ‘China School’ of
the Gaimusho lost considerable power. Its members have become less influential
among the other bureaux, and even within the Asian Bureau, to which the
China Division belongs. This is also linked to a more general dissatisfaction
with the Gaimusho in the wake of a widespread anti-bureaucracy mood. The
Gaimusho had come under special criticism because of the alleged mishandling
of foreign-policy issues like the Gulf War in 1991 and its aftermath, as well as
its antiquated style.347 In the 1990s the ministry came to be criticized by some
quarters for being too fearful of offending China, only reporting domestic good
news and being generally too innocent about China’s intentions.348 China’s use
of the ‘history card’ is now criticized as giving Beijing easy access to ODA.349
The right-of-centre Sankei Shimbun has been particularly strong in its criticism of
Chinese policies and of Japan’s ODA policy.350 Even among the China School
diplomats there is growing dissatisfaction with China’s ‘big-power mentality’
and its frequent ‘advice on the history issue’.351
The fragmentation of the Japanese political scene since 1993 has given more
influence to a growing number of more nationalistic and vocal politicians, who
are to be found not only among the older politicians but also among the new
generation.352 The policy issues of the Nationalists go across the whole policy
spectrum, ranging from support for Japan’s candidature for a permanent UN
Security Council seat to a more independent defence posture. Disenchanted with
the traditional deferential tendencies towards China, concerned about China’s
rise to a great power, conscious of Japan’s huge economic power (and at the
same time its economic problems) and fed up with what they see as China’s
exploitation of Japan’s colonial past, many Japanese politicians are reacting
more forcefully to China and demand more reciprocity. This new mood in
Japan’s political world was expressed in November 1998 on the occasion of
President Jiang Zemin’s visit, when the LDP showed strong opposition to
offering China a written apology as Tokyo had done shortly before to President
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Kim Daejung of Korea. Piqued by this refusal, Jiang harped on the issue of
Japan’s past aggression against China during the entire visit, only reinforcing
latent dissatisfaction with China. The election of the right-wing politician
Ishihara Shintaro as governor of Tokyo in April 1999 may have had a great deal
to do with the disaffection of Tokyo’s voters with the traditional politicians, but it
also brought with it many expressions of anti-PRC feelings by the new governor.
These domestic changes have not led to the disappearance of the deep divide
in Japan between the so-called pacifist forces (including left-wingers and liberals,
but also conservative forces which do not yet trust Japan’s democratic institu-
tions) and revisionists (including Realists, proponents of the Japan–US
relationship and nationalists).353 This divide, apart from considerations for other
Asian countries, has been a strong barrier to knee-jerk reactions to China’s poli-
cies along the Realist paradigm. However, we will see that the impact of China’s
challenges to Japan’s security concerns (amplified by US demands for closer mili-
tary cooperation) has significantly reduced Japan’s inclination towards a
restrained or even deferential China policy and strengthened a mood in which
the revision of the Constitution and a more effective military cooperation with
the US might be addressed more decisively.
The debate about the ‘China threat’ theory
Chinese writers assert that the Western ‘China threat discussion’ was launched
by a Japanese academic, Murai Tomohide, a professor at Japan’s Defence
University, and then taken up by other Japanese and American writers for
various reasons.354 However, Murai’s article was not influential in Japan at the
time it appeared.355 Yokoyama Hiroshi, a specialist in Chinese history, even
argues that in some ways China has been seen as a ‘threat’ in Japan since the
nineteenth century because of its failure to respond adequately to the West, its
resulting weakness and then its resurrection under communism.356
It is, however, obvious that China’s security policies, its greater international
assertiveness and its economic growth have caused a shift in the writing of
Japan’s political commentators and China specialists to a greater and more crit-
ical focus on security issues between the two countries. Kojima Tomoyuki dates
this shift towards discussing China as a big power and potential threat to around
summer 1993.357 The US shift from viewing Japan as the new threat after the
demise of the Soviet Union to seeing China instead as the major threat has
certainly contributed to this change in Japan.358 The dearth of reliable informa-
tion about China and a lack of transparency also tend to enhance negative
perceptions. Watanabe Akio therefore calls China the region’s most ‘daunting
challenge’ because ‘it is an enigma on so many fronts’.359
Public opinion
This change can be also observed in public opinion polls. The year 1996, with its
Taiwan Strait confrontation, became a watershed in Japan’s public opinion on
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China when for the first time in the annual poll by the PMO the percentage of
people responding ‘I do not have friendly feelings towards China’ (51.3 per cent)
surpassed the percentage responding ‘I have friendly feelings (45.0 per cent).
According to an analysis by Osaki Yuji, the ratio began to shift decisively in
1989, after the Tiananmen incident, although it recovered temporarily in 1992
in the wake of the Emperor’s visit to China.360 In the 1997 PMO poll the nega-
tive ratio was slightly smaller, and it became slightly positive again in the 1998
poll, by about one percentage point. A poll by Yomiuri released in September
1999 confirms the sharp drop in the evaluation of bilateral relations on both
sides: only 17 per cent of Chinese and 33 per cent of Japanese considered rela-
tions between Japan and the PRC to be good. Compared with a similar poll in
1988, the number of Chinese people who expressed a favourable opinion of
bilateral relations dropped by 34 percentage points, while the number of
Japanese who said they viewed relations favourably fell by 32 percentage
points.361
In a poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun in late January 1997, 55.0 per cent considered
North Korea likely to pose a threat, followed by China, with 39.1 per cent, and
Russia, with 34.7 per cent.362. Asked in the same poll whether China will pose a
threat to Japan in the future, 18 per cent responded that China will be a major
threat, 45 per cent ‘somewhat a threat’ and 22 per cent ‘not very much’.363
According to a comparative poll by the liberal Asahi Shimbun in May 1998, only 9
per cent of Japanese felt a threat from China strongly (compared with 26 per
cent of Americans), and 55 per cent felt it to a certain extent (51 per cent). A
military threat was felt by 22 per cent of Japanese (27 per cent in the US), an
economic threat by 20 per cent (25 per cent in the US), and 18 per cent felt
threatened by the political system in China (19 per cent in the US).364
A multiple answer poll by Yomiuri Shimbun in 1999 seems to confirm that, while
China’s military expansion (31.1 per cent) and the Taiwan issue (27.3 per cent)
scored highest among a list of concerns, most other high-ranking percentages
concerned non-military issues such as China’s increasing population/refugees
(33.2 per cent) and the future of economic and political reform.365 There is not
yet any immediate feeling of threat, which seems also to be confirmed by a poll
by the PMO in January 2000, where concerns related to China ranked only
seventh (US–Chinese relations: 13.1 per cent) and eighth (Chinese–Russian rela-
tions: 11.7 per cent), after the Korean Peninsula (56.7 per cent), arms control
and disarmament as related to weapons mass destruction and missiles (35.2 per
cent), US–Russian relations (17.9 per cent), the situation of US forces around
Japan (16.8 per cent), the Middle East (14.8 per cent) and Russian deployment of
forces in the Northern Territories (13.7 per cent).366
Military threat perception in the literature
Mainstream authors express concern about China’s military modernization, the
rise in military expenditures, the issues of missiles (increase, export, testing), the
development of an ocean-going navy (implications for China’s territorial
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demands) and the general influence of the PLA on China’s politics.367 Nishihara
Masashi pointed out that China was increasing its military power at a time when
the US and Russia were cutting their armed forces and defence budgets.368
Takahara Akio considers a serious arms race in East Asia as likely because of
China wanting to compete with US hegemony in Asia.369 Tanaka Akihiko wrote
as early as 1994 that these developments appear to justify the hegemonistic
power scenario of China’s future.370 Murai Tomohide considers that China’s
armed forces are no longer only for defence, but are now also able to be
deployed to neighbouring countries. He thinks that, although China’s military
forces are not able to attack Japan, the countries in Southeast Asia would bend
towards China if Beijing used military pressure.371
Some scholars focus on the importance of China’s naval modernization, the
territorial claims by China to the Senkaku Islands and South China Sea region,
with their oil and gas resources, and the implications for Japan’s security.
Hiramatsu Shigeo comments that China’s navy is still inferior to the American
and even Japanese navy, but that even without resorting to military aggression
China ‘could deal a serious blow to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea simply by
interdicting sea lanes’. He also warns that, by controlling the South China Sea
and East China Sea, China could strengthen its influence over the countries in
the region and later extend this influence to the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Writing in 1994, he pointed out the necessity of looking at the growing activities
of the Chinese navy in the East China Sea.372
On the other hand, there is a clear perception among the experts that, despite
rapid military modernization efforts, China’s military is still no threat for the US
and Japan.373 Kayahara Ikuo and Amako Satoshi argue that, despite rapid mili-
tary modernization, China is still a long way from being able to project power
and to challenge the US in Asia.374 Their concern is about the lack of trans-
parency in China’s military spending and the unclear political future of China.
Amako calls it ‘threat as an image’ (image to shite no kyoi), which is based on the
perception of China’s intentions and potential threat.375 Nakai Yoshifumi points
to the misgivings in Japan as well as in the US concerning the Chinese political
system and China’s revisionist position towards its status as the two aspects of the
‘China threat’ perception.376 Sakanaka Tomohisa warns of an overemphasis of
China’s military challenge by telling this author that China’s military is outdated,
the relationship of troops to population low, the training of the armed forces
insufficient and China’s industrial level low.377 Kokubun Ryosei similarly points
out that the proportion allotted annually to military expenditures had declined
from around 15 per cent to around 10 per cent, compared with the figure for the
1980s.378 In another book Kokubun also warns that the discussion of the China
threat has something to do with the disappearance of a clear threat in the post-
Cold War period, which threatens the vested interests of the military of every
country.379 Tanaka Akihiko concludes that China’s external behaviour in the
1990s was reactive, cautious and centred on domestic politics. Still, he considers
that the domestic changes in Taiwan could become a trigger for the use of mili-
tary force because they challenge the status quo.380 But he points out that China
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is not inherently evil (juaku) and it would be wrong to assume that once China is
rich it would become evil.381
In this context one has to mention the strong US influence on Japanese secu-
rity perceptions of China. In the first place, the Japan–US alliance introduces
American opinions on China, and Chapter 3 will cover the practical implications
of this. The productive and competitive think-tank culture of the US also
exposes Japan to US evaluations of China. Finally, many of Japan’s younger
China specialists have been trained in the US, and their impact is particularly
strongly felt among the Realist scholars. An important training ground has been
the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo, which for many
years has trained young Japanese scholars in security studies, financially
supported for a long time by the Ford Foundation. But Japan’s much closer prox-
imity to China and the difference between Japanese and US military strength
mediate this influence, apart from the impact of what Professor Royama, a
known Japanese international relations specialist, once called Japan’s ‘unsophisti-
cated pacifism’.382
Conclusions
This chapter has explained Japan’s changing security perceptions of China as a
result of emerging traditional and non-traditional security concerns against the
background of uncertainties and shifts in Japan’s security environment after
1989 and domestic changes. Traditional security threats, notably China’s non-
transparent military build-up, Chinese nuclear tests, the growing military
connotations of the territorial dispute in the East China Sea (against the back-
ground of Chinese territorial assertiveness in the South China Sea) and disputes
in the Taiwan area have particularly alarmed many Japanese China specialists,
as well as the general public. Non-traditional security concerns ranging from
China’s challenge as a rising economic power to transboundary crime and illegal
immigration into Japan have played an important role in reinforcing Japanese
security concerns about China’s security policies. It is difficult to quantify exactly
the influence of the China experts quoted above on decision-making regarding
China, but one can safely assume that the China policy changes to be analysed
in the following chapters would not have been possible without this shift among
the experts who so far had been rather ‘understanding’ of China’s foreign and
security policy. Under the influence of this perception shift and with the emer-
gence of a new generation of politicians, public opinion towards China
hardened, and the China School in the Foreign Ministry moved towards a
greater assertion of Japanese security interests. Whereas the deterioration of
Japanese security perceptions towards China was a new development of the
1990s, Chinese leaders and experts reverted to their previous distrust of Japanese
intentions after the brief exception of the anti-hegemony struggle in the 1970s
and 1980s. In the next chapters we will see how their perceptions were further
affected by Japan’s shift to a greater emphasis on the Realist elements of engage-
ment in reaction to the developments analysed in this chapter.
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Since what China does is like the action of a yakuza, it does not help to confront
it with the face of a gentleman. Faced with a yakuza we can only act in a yakuza
way in return.
Professor Hiramatsu Shigeo, Kyorin University1
The prevalent way of thinking about international relations throughout the
AsiaPacific region is in balance of power terms. Leaders in China, India, Russia,
and other states talk of a multipolar world where major states represent centers of
power, continually maneuvering to create balances. This is the world of Bismarck
and 19th century Europe.
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, US Navy Commander in Chief
of the US Pacific Command2
Introduction
Japan’s engagement of China has been defined in the Introduction as a policy
which consists of providing China with economic and political incentives to inte-
grate into the regional/international political and economic system, hedged by
military balancing through its own military force and the military alliance with
the US. This chapter investigates engagement from a Realist, Liberal and
Constructivist perspective. I conclude that the Realist component of engagement
– power balancing and hedging – has gained greater prominence, which is most
clearly expressed by the strengthening of the Japan–US military alliance in
1995–6. After a similar investigation in 1996, two American scholars, Benjamin
Self (then at the Woodrow Wilson Center) and Michael Green (then at the
Institute for Defense Analysis) called Japan’s China policy ‘a change from
commercial liberalism to reluctant realism’.3 I would like to argue that there has
always been Realism but that it has only become less reluctant. In addition, we
will see that the Japanese government is trying to develop further the other
elements of the Liberal approach in order to pursue engagement more effi-
ciently, but also to counterbalance the negative dynamics of engagement. To this
belongs Japan’s promotion of security dialogues at various bilateral and multilat-
eral levels, which, from a Constructivist perspective, is the utilization of various
3 Between power balancing
and enmeshment policies
communicative processes to influence China’s security discourse and, hopefully,
its future behaviour.
PART 1: MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER BALANCING
The following analysis of Japan’s military and political power balancing shows
how the Realist elements of engagement have gradually gained greater promi-
nence in reaction to China’s assertive or even inimical security policies described
in the previous chapter. Realist scholars in Japan are now openly supporting the
hedging of the Liberal elements through Japan’s military deterrent and a
strengthening of the Japanese–American security alliance.4 The China specialist
Soeya Yoshihide even writes that the idea of containing China is gaining
momentum, but only as an insurance against the failure of Japan’s ‘constructive
engagement policy’. He offers one of the most comprehensive descriptions of
Japan’s engagement policy and its greater emphasis on the Realist elements:
1 ‘emphasis on stability within both China and the bilateral relationship’
(through ODA, caution towards post-Tiananmen sanctions, etc.);
2 ‘long-term goal of integrating China into the regional and global web of
interdependence (in economics) and attaining mutual restraint (in political
and security domains)’;
3 avoiding the pitfalls of the triangular Japan–China–US relationship (for
example playing one off against the other);
4 an increasing weight on ‘containing China’ as an ‘insurance against a failure
in the constructive engagement policy’;5
Conservative politicians now openly espouse military balancing against
China. Ozawa Ichiro wrote in his ‘Blueprint for Japan’ that while cooperating
with China for stabilization and development Japan must also prepare counter-
measures for disorder.6 In its first long-range foreign-policy recommendations for
the Asia-Pacific region in November 1997, the LDP says that ‘Japan must be
candid with China, and must not hesitate to press for more open sharing of
national defense information or to request peaceful negotiations when problems
arise’.7 The policy paper addresses clearly the hedging and power-balancing
sides of engagement, saying that Japan must maintain a ‘good measure of flexi-
bility’ in its policy towards China, make the Japan–US alliance ‘a key dimension
of our China policy’ and ‘maintain a close watch on the direction China is
headed and be prepared to cope with a variety of contingencies’.8
Japan’s military force structure and China
The changes in perception of China in the 1990s seem at first glance not to
have had much impact on Japan’s military force structure and expenditures.
Military budget allocations after 1989 initially declined, and have only recently
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increased very slightly. However, structural changes are by their nature very slow
and the importance of Japan’s military force looks different if the progress of its
integration into the Japanese–American alliance is considered. Moreover, even
the most hard-line observer of China would agree that, given China’s military
backwardness and domestic constraints, it could not suddenly replace the Soviet
Union when the latter gave way to a much weaker and more conciliatory Russia
in 1990.
During the 1980s Japan had considerably expanded its military expenditures
and armaments, driven by the perception of the Soviet threat and American
demands for more burden sharing. With the end of the Cold War, but with a
considerable time lag in comparison with Europe and the US, Japan’s defence
expenditures registered their first nominal decrease since the establishment of
the SDF in 1954 only in 1998, to ¥4.929 trillion; and there was a further decline
in 1999, to ¥4.920 trillion, before it picked up again slightly in 2000. The
picture is different in dollar terms because of the changes in the yen–dollar
exchange rate. The 1998 picture also saw a decrease in dollar terms, but not
1999 (an increase from $37.7 billion to $41.1 billion in dollar terms). This
exchange-rate factor is very important because of Japan’s massive arms imports
from the US. However, reflecting the worsening economic situation in Japan,
the rising costs for the relocation of US troops in Okinawa and the end of the
Soviet military threat, in June 1997 the government reduced its 1996–2000
Five-Year Mid-Term Defence Programme from ¥25,150 billion to ¥24,230
billion, affecting frontline equipment and research and development.9 In the
original 1995 version of that programme the equipment procurement amount
had already been cut by ¥4.28 trillion compared with its predecessor for the
fiscal years 1991–5.10 The new five-year procurement plan for 2001–5 totals
¥25,160 billion (US$209.6 billion at the exchange rate of ¥120 to the dollar),
which is ¥930 billion, or 0.7 per cent over the previous revised plan.11 Major
equipment outlays include the acquisition of four aerial tankers, two 13,500 ton
class helicopter-carrying warships (to replace the previous 5,000 ton class heli-
copter destroyers), and two additional Aegis destroyers.12
In terms of personnel, in 2000 Japan had around 237,000 people in active
military service. The manpower of the army, with 148,500, compares with
113,950 for the British army, whereas the navy strength of the two countries is
about the same, with 43,000.13 Manpower numbers, however, do not directly
translate into fighting power, for example if compared with the UK military,
which has considerable combat experience. Japan’s reserves are relatively low,
with only around 50,000, and recruitment is difficult because of the more
competitive civilian job market. In terms of hardware, the Japanese armed
forces compare much better with its Northeast Asian counterparts, being
constantly upgraded and modernized. The main equipment includes 1,070 main
battle tanks, 16 submarines, some 55 principal surface combatants and 331
combat aircraft (plus 80 combat aircraft and some 80 P-3C in the navy). Since
September 2000 the ASDF has started to take delivery of what will be a total of
130 multirole F-2 fighter-bombers outfitted with the latest in air-to-air and air-
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to-ground munitions, including the Maverick air-to-surface attack missile. This
aircraft has a range of 620 miles and is an improved version of the US F-16
fighter.
Although numerically Japan looks much less impressive than China, the SDF
compares very favourably with China because of the latter’s obsolescent air and
navy equipment and Japan’s continuous force modernization, with the exception
of China’s nuclear force. Only China has nuclear-powered submarines (5); the
ratio of diesel submarines is 57 to 16 in China’s favour; for destroyer/frigates it is
60 to 55; and for amphibious shipping 59 to 9 in China’s favour.14
There are few changes in the SDF’s equipment or posture which can be
traced to having been made or being planned partially or entirely in reaction to
the Chinese military.15 Jeffrey S. Wiltse concluded in 1997 that the ‘reemergence
of China in regional and international affairs has had almost no direct influence
in the modernization process or the orientation of the Japanese defense forces’.16
The Defence Agency officially denies that there has been any Japanese redeploy-
ment to counter Chinese moves.17 But there have been several moves to enhance
the defence posture in southwest Japan, which had been so far neglected. The
Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported in 1995, however, that the Defence Agency had
decided to deploy new F-15 air fighters to Okinawa and to enhance the mobility
of the ground forces in Kyushu. The Defence Agency justified these plans with
the Chinese deployment of SU-27.18 The Yomiuri Shimbun quoted Defence
Agency sources in February 2000, saying that plans adopted earlier for down-
sizing the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) would be complemented by
rearrangements in GSDF divisions so that the GSDF could shift its focus of
operations from the defence of Hokkaido to the containment of potential threats
to the Kanto and Kinki regions.19 Later these changes were brought into
connection with a possible attack by North Korea.20 The decrease of the
number of P-3C from 100 in 1998/9 to 80 now reflects the diminished
Soviet/Russian naval deployment, which has not been offset by Chinese deploy-
ments. However, in response to an increasing Chinese presence in waters around
Japan as well as North Korean incursions into Japanese and Korean waters, the
SDF are planning to set up a patrol-helicopter unit to enhance maritime surveil-
lance. A new unit was inaugurated in March 2002 as part of the Western Army,
with around 660 personnel to patrol and defend the 2,522 islands around
Kyushu and Okinawa.21 For the same reason, the equipment of the Japanese
coastguard is to be improved, and cooperation between it and the MSDF
enhanced.22 The MSDF is to take over or supplement some tasks of the coast-
guard like protection of EEZ/territorial waters.23 At the beginning of the new
century it has become clear that the immediate concern about the instability on
the Korean Peninsula in conjunction with long-term concerns about China is
behind a major drive to radically review the structure of the SDF. In August
2001 the Defence Agency was reported to be planning a substantial revision of
the current 1995 National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) by 2003, with
a view to shifting the SDF’s main deployment to Kyushu and Okinawa to deal
with any possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula or in the Straits of Taiwan.24
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The National Defence Programme Outline of 1995
Study plans by private and official bodies as well as official defence plans and
allied security agreements provide more indications of the extent to which the
changed Japanese perceptions of China’s security policies influenced official
defence policies and strategists in the 1990s. The National Defence Programme
Outline of 1995 and the follow-up to the Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Statement of
April 1996 have been the most important changes with China in mind.25 Both
are closely linked with the February 1995 US East Asian Strategy Report
(EASR), known as the Nye Initiative.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the strength of US commitment to
Asia seemed to diminish in the immediate post-Cold War era. The administra-
tion of George Bush Snr published a report in April 1990, the East Asia
Strategy Initiative (EASI), which proposed reducing US forces from East Asia by
14,000–15,000 personnel, i.e. 10–12 per cent over the following three years.26
The Gulf War had not only strained Japan–US security relations, but also
shown to Tokyo that the US had to rely increasingly on contributions from its
allies. Economic disputes poisoned the Japan–US relationship at the beginning
of the 1990s.
Under the chairmanship of the business leader Higuchi Hirotaro, Prime
Minister Hosokawa Morihiro set up an advisory group in February 1994 which
looked at Japan’s post-Cold War security situation. Published in August 1994
under the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, the report became an
important step towards the 1995 review of the NDPO.27 Although the report
considered it unlikely that a state comparable to the former Soviet Union – one
prepared to confront the US militarily and politically – would emerge in the near
future, it contained two cautionary references to China.28 It spoke of many Asian
nations, ‘including China’, which now had ‘political motives and economic foun-
dations for improving military power’, and referred to ‘various problems that
remain unresolved, such as those that exist across the Taiwan Strait, the status of
Hong Kong, and the widening economic disparity between the inland and coastal
regions’.29 It also recommended that the SDF pay greater attention to new chal-
lenges to security, such as the safety of maritime traffic and territorial air space,
which were partly inspired by China’s involvement in piracy and territorial
disputes. In addition, the report put considerable stress on multilateral security
approaches; this was a response to the government’s desire to contribute more
substantially (that is, SDF personnel) to UN PKO as well as peacekeeping forces,
but may also have been a nod towards pacifist domestic opinion.
The Higuchi Report prepared the way for the re-examination of the NDPO
of October 1976. The deliberations for the revision of the NDPO in 1994–5 led
to some considerable debate about China, but in the end direct references to
China’s security challenges were taken out. Kokubun Ryosei wrote that initially a
text was proposed to the effect that ‘[a]gainst the background of the existence of
great military potentials including nuclear weapons around Japan, it is necessary
for the protection of our security’, but it was dropped because of opposition
from the Social Democratic Party.30 Michael Green confirmed this by
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mentioning early drafts of the revised NDPO which focused on the threat
emanating from China’s military modernization, nuclear tests and expansionist
policies in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. However, these warn-
ings, he added, resurfaced in the speech by Prime Minister Murayama to the
SDF in October 1995 and in later editions of the Defence of Japan White
Papers.31 Christopher Hughes explains that for political and diplomatic reasons
Japan could not officially have referred to a concern about China’s security
policy.32 Tamura Shigenobu, a member of the LDP staff working on security
issues, writes, however, that China’s security challenge was very much on the
mind of the LDP policy-makers, and this transpired also in their talks with US
policy-makers.33 Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, in an answer to a question about
the redefinition of the security treaty before the Diet in October 1995, defended
the alliance by stating that ‘it is important that one does not forget about the
China issue’.34 However, the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 had brought to
the forefront a much more imminent security challenge which could be used
publicly by the government to strengthen national and alliance defence efforts.
As a result, and in contrast to the Higuchi Report, which speaks of a variety of
regional security concerns, the NDPO refers only to the Korean Peninsula.
The NDPO of November 1995 also put much more stress on defence cooper-
ation with the US, mentioning the US thirteen times, compared with only twice
in its predecessor in 1976. In contrast to the 1976 NDPO, the new one stated
that Japan should seek US cooperation from the very beginning of a direct
aggression against Japan. It spoke of the need to enhance the credibility of
Japan–US defence cooperation and proposed to review the bilateral guidelines of
this cooperation, which had been formulated in 1978.
The Nye Initiative: don’t mention the C-word!
At the same time as the Japanese government was preparing the NDPO in close
consultation with the US, the US administration was reviewing its post-Cold
War East Asia strategy. During the second Clinton administration the US
Department of Defence felt the need to counteract the impression in East Asia
that the US would slowly but surely withdraw its troops from East Asia. In addi-
tion, it had also come to a more pessimistic appraisal of the new post-Cold War
era. As a result of the East Asia Strategy Initiative in 1990 some 6,000 US troops
had actually been withdrawn from Okinawa. Under Secretary of Defence Perry
and Assistant Secretary of Defence Joseph Nye, in February 1995 the
Department of Defence released the EASR, known as the Nye Report, which
was meant to draw a line for such withdrawals, promising to keep 100,000 US
troops in Asia.35 This number had also been mentioned in the Pentagon’s
Bottom-Up Review of September 1993.36
For the US, the ensuing strengthening of security cooperation with Japan (as
well as the re-equilibration of the bilateral relationship, which was suffering from
severe economic frictions and the widespread feeling in the US that Japan had
replaced the Soviet threat) was one of the most important steps by the US to
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reassert its willingness to stay in Asia, but not the only one. In July 1996 the US
and Australia renewed their defence alliance (notably intelligence and joint exer-
cises), which was called by Defence Secretary William Perry the ‘southern anchor
of the US strategy in the Asia Pacific region’; he referred to the US–Japan rela-
tionship as the ‘northern anchor’.37 Since 1999 the US has signed a Visiting
Forces Agreement with the Philippines, initiated International Military Education
and Training (IMET) programmes for Southeast Asian officers in the US, and
become involved in an increasing array of regional multilateral exercises.38
At the same time, the Nye Initiative was a reaction to Japanese concerns
about US commitment to Japan’s and East Asia’s security in the wake of the end
of the Cold War, with its new but unclear security challenges. The US wanted
now to adapt the security alliance to a post-Cold War world where China was a
greater concern than the former Soviet Union, to draw the lessons from Japan’s
disappointing contribution (in terms of personnel at least) to the Allied Gulf War
against Iraq, and to reduce Japan’s temptation to tilt towards multilateral secu-
rity alternatives (the latter concern had been raised by the emphasis of the
Higuchi Report on multilateral security).39 On both sides, concern about China’s
future path and role and how to gain the ally’s support for deterring China from
upsetting the current balance of power in Asia was a major motivation. Leaving
Japan alone to balance China would set off an arms race and destabilize the
region, and letting Japan bandwagon with China was also not desirable for the
US.40 A strengthened US–Japan relationship was meant to counter China’s hope
of ‘playing a multipolar game’.41 In some ways this was the revival of a previ-
ously pursued goal: after the revision of the Japan–US security treaty in 1960,
the US saw that ‘Japan offers the prospect of development as an increasingly
important political, economic and, possibly, military counterweight to the rising
power of Communist China’.42
For Japan’s defence planners, the Nye Report brought relief as well as concerns,
since the post-Cold War situation presented an illustration of their
entrapment/abandonment dilemma vis-à-vis the US. Funabashi documents the
concern of Japan’s diplomats, expressed to Nye in the discussions leading to EASR,
that the US might just play China off against Japan or later drop Japan. On the
other hand, they were increasingly worried about China’s military developments
and territorial claims, a concern which in the end got the upper hand in 1995.43
China’s future behaviour and how to engage China with Japan in order to
prevent China playing the US and Japan off against each other were very much
on Nye’s mind.44 With clear reference to China, Nye often expressed his concern
about the instability which could result from the rise and fall of great powers.45
The difficulty was how to formulate and implement a complex policy such as
engagement, which also contains elements meant as hedging, deterrence and
power balancing by the US and Japan, but which is seen by China as, at best,
maintaining American hegemony in Asia (with the allegedly ‘eternal’ benefit of
creating stability and keeping a check on Japan) and, at worst, keeping China
down, containing it and foiling its aspiration for national reunification and taking
back its ‘due historical place’ in Asia. The Clinton administration’s basic foreign-
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policy stance of ‘engagement and enlargement’ also spelled out another element
of engagement which was equally unpalatable in Chinese eyes – changing the
Chinese regime through the propagation of democracy and human rights.
Nye rejected a policy of containment. He argued that containment of China
discarded the chance that China would become a responsible great power in the
region, it would be irreversible and, assuming China’s enmity, would become a
self-fulfilling prophecy.46 He described the US strategy towards China based on
engagement, mentioning ‘a dialogue with China on a broad variety of fronts’
and US promotion of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the
economic area.47 However, Nye could not escape the problem that one crucial
military component of the Realist part of engagement – military power
balancing – relies on the same tool as containment: military superiority or, as
Nye put it, preponderance, which relies on military power.48 Funabashi describes
how difficult it was for the EASR’s authors to find the right language for what
was carefully referred to as ‘China’s evolving role’. The American policy-makers
were torn between the need to justify and redefine the Japan–US military
alliance in the post-Cold War era and addressing China’s role for the alliance
and US strategy in general without sounding as if they were calling for China’s
containment. As Funabashi put it, ‘It was just that, depending on place and time,
Nye’s strategy of “engaging” China could run perilously close to being “contain-
ment” ’.49 After all, the difference is only in the eye of the beholder.
Funabashi speaks of the Nye Initiative as being ‘based on power politics to
the very last’, dealing with China and Japan as two emerging powers, but allying
with Japan to balance China.50 It was clear that the Department of Defence and
the Clinton administration as a whole wanted Japan’s help to balance against
China and to impress on China, with the combined US–Japan diplomatic,
economic and military might, the need for it to become a responsible interna-
tional player and not a new hegemonic force. For diplomatic reasons and to
avoid an ‘entrapment’ dilemma for the Japanese government vis-à-vis its domestic
public, this could not be spelled out so openly.
The 1996 Joint Japan–US Declaration
The momentum created by the 1995 Nye Initiative and the November 1995
NDPO was to result in a Joint Declaration on the occasion of Clinton’s planned
Japan visit in November 1995 which was to give public expression to the
strengthening of Japan–US security cooperation and to lead to more formalized
arrangements. Due to the rape of an Okinawan girl by US servicemen in
Okinawa, Clinton’s visit took place only in April the following year. In Japan the
Okinawa incident led to serious questioning of the military alliance and particu-
larly the concentration of US bases on Okinawa, but the Taiwan Strait crisis in
spring 1996 provided further strength to the argument about the need to balance
China through greater unilateral and bilateral defence efforts.51 In their discus-
sions with the US side, the Japanese realised the important role of the ‘Chinese
problem’ for the US policy-makers.52 The importance of preserving peace in
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East Asia, with reference to the Taiwan Strait confrontation, was mentioned
publicly by Hashimoto as well as Clinton during the latter’s visit to Tokyo.53
However, the Joint Declaration avoided any reference to a security challenge
from China, instead expressing the interest of Japan and the US in cooperating
with China. However, the delay of the summit until after the March 1996
Taiwan crisis had put a much greater emphasis on the common concerns about
China than both sides would have wanted. Moreover, Clinton’s efforts to offset
China’s negative perception of the April 1996 declaration (and the visa to
President Li Denghui in 1995) by courting China in a way which was seen as a
sleight in Japan was to highlight the complexities of a coordinated China policy
by Japan and the US.
The delay until April 1996 also had the result that the American side had to
deal with a new prime minister, Hashimoto Ryutaro (January 1996 to July 1998),
who was much more inclined to strengthen the security relationship than his
predecessor from the Social Democratic Party, Murayama Tomiichi. In the Joint
Declaration of 17 April 1996 it was proposed the promotion of ‘greater policy
coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations
that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan, and which will have an impor-
tant influence on the peace and security of Japan’. Just prior to Clinton’s visit,
both sides had concluded an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
(ACSA) to clarify Japanese logistical support in peacetime but also in times of
conflict in ‘areas surrounding Japan’. The agreement had been suggested by the
US back in May 1988 and was part of the discussion of the 1978 Guidelines for
Japan–US Defence Cooperation. The North Korean crisis in 1994 and the
uncertainties surrounding China had proved the insufficiencies of those guide-
lines and prompted the US to seek their revision.
The Japan–US preparation for the revision of the 1978 guidelines began after
the April 1996 Joint Declaration. In June 1997 a mid-term report on the new
guidelines was submitted by the government, with the final report following in
September 1997. In April 1998 the Japanese government submitted a bill on the
new guidelines (Bill Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of
Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), as well as revisions to the SDF
Law and to the ACSA, which were passed in May 1999 with minor amend-
ments. The public debate on the new guidelines raised various concerns in Japan
which are related to widespread reluctance to get further involved in defence
efforts, and to the interpretation of Japan’s constitutional restraints (for example,
collective defence is not allowed under the government’s – current – interpreta-
tion of the Constitution).54 It has been hotly argued among security specialists
whether the Joint Declaration constitutes a ‘reconfirmation’, a ‘redefinition’, a
‘reinterpretation’ or even a ‘revision’ of the security treaty. Those critical of the
Joint Declaration and its follow-up, including China, call it a ‘redefinition’,
others a ‘reconfirmation’.55 Joseph Nye later admitted that China was right in
saying that the bilateral security treaty had been expanded towards a greater
regional role because he wanted to make the treaty more mutually beneficial in
order to reduce strains in the Japan–US economic and security relationship.56
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Another hotly debated item was the ambiguous clause ‘situations in areas
surrounding Japan that will have an important influence upon Japan’s peace and
security’, which is of particular importance in the context of the new direction in
Japanese–Chinese security relations. As a result of the Diet debates the govern-
ment had to add to this clause the phrase ‘and if left as what it is, has a potential
to develop into a direct armed attack against Japan’.57
The background to Japan–US cooperation on TMD
Before analysing the implications of the clause ‘situations in areas surrounding
Japan’ for Japanese–Chinese security relations, we have also to deal with the
joint Japan–US research into a missile defence system for the area around Japan,
TMD, which cannot be fully understood without considering the impact of
China’s military policies.
The idea of TMD goes back to President Reagan’s Strategic Defence
Initiative (SDI), launched on 23 March 1983. In 1987 Japan exchanged with the
US a Memorandum of Understanding on SDI which led in 1989, for example,
to the production of the US Patriot system, which in its current figuration (PAC-
2) is to intercept aircraft only.58 The first Japanese TMD involvement was the
participation of Japanese companies from December 1989 until May 1993 in
the architecture study of an anti-missile defence system over the West Pacific
(WESTPAC) which bridged SDI and TMD.59 The final report in May 1994
recommended that the US and Japan develop and deploy missile defence
systems against missiles from Russia, China and particularly North Korea, just
after Japan had became alarmed about the North Korean test of the medium-
range ballistic missile Nodong-1 (range of 1,300 km) in May 1993.60 In
December 1993 a Japan–US TMD Working Group was established. In 1994 the
US presented four TMD options to Japan, requiring a budget ranging from
US$4.5 billion to US$16.3 billion to be available by 2004–5.61 In April 1995 the
Defence Agency set up the Ballistic Missile Defence Research Office and in
September 1998 both governments agreed at a Security Subcommittee meeting
to proceed with joint TMD research. On 25 December 1998 Japan’s National
Security Council accepted TMD, which was formalized on 16 August 1999 by
an agreement to conduct a five-year programme of joint technology research on
the technical feasibility of the Navy Theatre-Wide Defence (NTWD) missile
defense system (upper-tier system), which would be deployed on Aegis ships, of
which Japan has four so far.62 The Defence Agency has already decided to
upgrade the Patriot system to PAC-3, which is a lower-tier ground-based TMD
system.63 In addition to the many political problems to be discussed hereafter –
focusing on China – which may prevent Japan from moving to deployment, are
also problems related to costs, technological feasibility, technical cooperation
with the US and Japan’s Constitution.64
Japan’s motivation for joining the research phase of TMD is now more than
just alliance politics and interest in specific technologies, which were predomi-
nant considerations for its involvement in SDI.65 Ogawa Shinichi, senior
Between power balancing and enmeshment policies 93
research fellow and deputy director of the Second Research Department at the
NIDS, argues that, since arms control, diplomacy, pre-emptive strikes and deter-
rence are insufficient to deal with the ballistic missile threat, Japan has started to
consider TMD.66 More than anything else, the North Korean missile test over
Japan on 31 August 1998 (North Korea claims that it was a satellite launch)
alarmed the Japanese public and politically facilitated the government’s partici-
pation in TMD research. But there is no doubt that, although the missile threat
from North Korea is in the foreground, China’s ballistic missile proliferation has
been playing an important part in moving Japan towards TMD, particularly
since the Chinese tests around Taiwan in 1995/6. For diplomatic reasons,
however, the North Korean developments have been highlighted by the Japanese
and US governments. Moreover, we saw in Chapter 2 that China has been a
major supporter of the North Korea missile programme.
The main reasons for the US to involve Japan in TMD are the protection of
US forces in Japan and the hope for Japanese financial, if not technological,
support.67 TMD is also considered a necessary precursor to the planned
National Missile Defense system (NMD), and TMD proponents argue that
TMD will be ineffective without an effective homeland defence to prevent
strategic blackmail by a regional opponent with intercontinental ballistic missile
capability.68 This clearly is also aimed at China and has implications for China’s
opposition to NMD as well as TMD. After the Taepodong-1 test on 31 August
1998 the US Congress passed legislation requiring the Secretary of Defence to
conduct a study on the establishment and operation of a TMD system in the
Asia-Pacific region to protect the US’s ‘key regional allies’.69 Less often
mentioned is the concern that a weakening of the US nuclear guarantee over
Japan may ultimately prompt Japan to consider an autonomous nuclear deter-
rent despite the very large domestic and international obstacles to such a move.70
Selig Harrison even argued that the US nuclear umbrella in itself will not be
enough to prevent such a development if it is not accompanied by global nuclear
arms control to curb China’s nuclear deterrent.71 Morton Halperin, before
joining the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, argued that Japan
might go nuclear if, for example, the US moves closer to China, withdraws from
Asia or cannot resolve the contradiction between its nuclear deterrent policy and
goal of global nuclear non-proliferation. The latter scenario could become a
reality if a lack of progress in nuclear disarmament was to be coupled with an
expansion of the Chinese nuclear capability. Another scenario would be the
development of Korean nuclear capability.72
The Japanese–Chinese debate on Japan’s new security
policy
While there were few diplomatic inhibitions for the Japanese government to
mention the relevance of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula to strengthening
Japan–US defence cooperation, the situation was very different in the case of
China.73 In the interest of good Japan–China relations the government tried to
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soothe Chinese concerns that the strengthening of Japan–US defence coopera-
tion and joint TMD research were not aimed at containing China nor at
preventing PRC–Taiwan reunification. Moreover, the political opposition used
the negative Chinese reaction for its own agenda of curtailing a deeper Japanese
involvement in regional defence alongside the US.
Yet the Chinese side has been very critical of these new security policies and
has voiced strong objection to their implications for the reunification with
Taiwan and for Japan’s greater regional security role.74 It did not believe the
government line that the Joint Declaration and its follow-up did not constitute a
change to the Japan–US security treaty and did not target any specific country.
To make things worse, Japanese–Chinese relations were marred in the summer
of 1996 by the erection of a lighthouse tower on one of the Senkaku Islands by a
rightist group, by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro’s visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine and by Chinese nuclear tests. The first two events further reinforced
Chinese suspicion and criticism of Japan veering to the right (and/or were used
to put pressure on Japan), whereas the latter could not fail to damage China’s
image in Japan and facilitate the public’s acceptance of Japan’s stronger defence-
policy approach.
The inclusion of Taiwan in Japanese–US defence cooperation
The Chinese Japan specialist Wu Xinbo calls the Taiwan issue the most impor-
tant in Japanese–Chinese relations, pointing out that many Chinese believe for
historical and pragmatic reasons that Japan does not want Taiwan’s absorption
by the PRC and prefers the status quo.75 China’s most immediate concern has
been that the new measures to improve Japan–US security cooperation and
Japan’s participation in TMD interfere in its relationship with Taiwan and make
reunification more difficult.76 In reaction to the Japan–US Joint Declaration the
Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement on 18 April 1996 which reiter-
ated, in its first point, that the question of Taiwan was an internal Chinese affair
and that China would resist foreign interference.77 Chinese suspicions were
linked to the geographical ambiguity of Japanese and American statements as to
the application of the Joint Declaration and the new guidelines, and also to the
possible implications of Japan’s TMD participation to the reunification issue.
The concern is not only that Japan’s logistical support will put the US in a
stronger position to intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, but also that this
possibility, as well as the possible involvement of Taiwan in TMD (made more
likely by Japan’s TMD deployment), will encourage bolder Taiwanese resistance
to Beijing’s Taiwan policies.78
The greatest conflict arose within Japan as well as between Japan and China
from the guidelines’ ambiguity as to their geographical application. For China,
the main question has been whether the geographical area includes China, and
notably Taiwan. The Japanese government refused to give any geographical
meaning to the phrase ‘in the area around Japan’ (shuhen), claiming instead that it
was ‘situational’ and depended on the location of the threat affecting Japan. The
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US fully shared this approach.79 The government presented six types of exam-
ples of situations with an important influence on the peace and security of
Japan, including domestic turmoil in a country with large refugee flows into
Japan (which could obviously refer to the Korean Peninsula as well as China).80
The first benefit of this ambiguous stance was that the possible scope of
Japanese cooperation with the US could be expanded beyond the geographical
limits of the so-called Far Eastern clause in Article 6 of the 1960 Japan–US
security treaty.81 Second, this element of strategic ambiguity further enhances
the deterrence value of Japanese–US security cooperation. Or as Soeya puts it,
the reaffirmed Japan–US alliance is ‘primarily a tool to maintain general
strategic stability over the Taiwan Strait’.82 China saw proof of an extension of
the geographical scope of Japan–US military cooperation in the fact that the
Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Declaration mentioned a dozen times the ‘Asia Pacific
region’, but not once the ‘Far East’.83 Takagi Seiichiro, then professor at the
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, rebuffs such an interpretation
since references to the Asia-Pacific came up in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of
the growing economic integration of the region.84
The question of whether Taiwan is an object of Japan–US defence coopera-
tion goes back to the Far Eastern clause of the revised Japan–US security treaty
in 1960. In an official declaration on the scope of the Far East on 26 February
1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke defined it as broadly (but not exclusively)
the areas north of the Philippines and surrounding Japan, including the areas
under the control of South Korea and the ROC (Taiwan).85 The 1969
Japan–US joint communiqué between Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and President
Richard Nixon called the ‘maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area
… a most important factor for the security of Japan’ (see Chapter 2). When
Japan normalized relations with China in 1972, the foreign minister, Ohira
Masayoshi, presented a ‘unified government understanding’ in the Diet which
said that the ‘Taiwan issue is basically an internal problem of China. The
US–Japan security treaty should be implemented cautiously with consideration
of the friendly relationship between Japan and China’.86 During the normaliza-
tion talks Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had asked for the nullification of the 1969
Japan–US agreement on Taiwan and for the non-application of the Japan–US
security treaty to Taiwan, but the speedy conclusion of diplomatic relations took
precedence over any written agreement on these two items. Prime Minister
Tanaka Kakuei only responded that he understood, and after normalization
declared in the Diet that nothing about these two items had changed.87 The
issue was raised again in 1978 with the conclusion of the bilateral Peace and
Friendship Treaty. Foreign Minister Sonoda told the Diet in September 1978
that the 1969 Japan–US joint communiqué had lost its meaning. On another
occasion he declared that the new treaty with China had made it unnecessary to
consider Taiwan as a part of the ‘Far East’ covered by the Japan–US security
treaty, but that the status of Taiwan as part of the Far East in its relation to the
Japan–US security treaty was a question to be settled through consultation
between Japan and the US.88 But several days later, in December 1978, he
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backed down and explained that the Japanese government had not started
consultations because of concerns about the possibility of the Soviet Union
gaining influence in the Taiwan Strait if the Far East clause was changed. The
US State Department had earlier declared that they saw no need for consulta-
tions on the Far East clause.89 This Japanese reversal is worth remembering
because the Chinese side did not forget about it and Foreign Minister Sonoda’s
first statement was recalled in 1997 by the Chinese vice-foreign minister.90 In
April 1998 the vice-foreign minister, Yanai Shunji, increased confusion when he
tried to bridge the gap between the meaning of the Far East and shuhen, stating
that the concept of ‘situations surrounding Japan’ is similar to the meaning of
‘Far East’ used in the 1960 revised security treaty.91
Interpretational somersaults on Taiwan’s inclusion 
after 1996
Not only has the Japanese government been unwilling clearly to rule out the
inclusion of China and Taiwan from the application of the new guidelines, but
contradictory official statements after April 1996 have only reinforced the
commonsense conclusion that Taiwan, as one of the most likely flashpoints, is
included. There has also been no coherence between statements from the
Japanese and US sides.92 Moreover, the Japanese side did not do well in
dispelling Beijing’s suspicions when briefing China on the new guidelines. The
US side was well aware of the need to handle China carefully with regard to the
strengthening of Japan–US defence cooperation, and Joseph Nye was the first to
brief China, in November 1995, before the planned and then cancelled visit by
President Clinton.93 The Japanese briefings in Tokyo and Beijing have been
carried out, however, by officials of lower rank and have been conducted belat-
edly. Japan’s most comprehensive background briefing took place only in March
1997 at the fourth round of Japan–China security talks.94
Joseph Nye told Funabashi Yoichi that the US side tried to convince the
Chinese that the Joint Declaration was directed at contingencies on the Korean
Peninsula and not China.95 Only a page later, Funabashi quotes Akiyama
Masahiro, the director of the Defence Agency’s Defence Bureau, who said that
he explained to the Chinese that neither China or Korea were the reason for the
reaffirmation.96 But that China was certainly on the mind of the US administra-
tion, as it was in the case of the Nye Report, is documented by a briefing of
visiting Japanese politicians on US views of East Asian security in June 1997 by
the deputy assistant secretary of defence Kurt Campbell. He mentioned five US
security concerns:
• instability in North Korea;
• Sino-Russian rapprochement as a potential threat in the next fifteen years;
• the Chinese military build-up as a non-negligible development;
• unstable PRC–Taiwan relations;
• the growing military spending in Southeast Asia.97
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While a Japanese diplomat was preparing the Chinese side for the imminent
April 1996 declaration, US Secretary of State Perry declared at about the same
time that the US–Japan alliance was also an insurance against the possible desta-
bilization of the region by the PRC.98
There were also some statements of the obvious on the Japanese side: an
article in the Beijing Review claimed that Foreign Minister Kono declared in a Diet
interpellation on strengthening the Japan–US security treaty in 1995 that it was
now necessary to consider the presence of China.99 In March 1997, during the
4th Security Dialogue, Tanaka Hitoshi, deputy bureau director of the
Gaimusho’s North American Affairs Bureau, replied to insistent Chinese ques-
tions about what Japan would do if military tensions occurred in the Taiwan
Strait: ‘It depends on the case’.100 According to a Taiwanese newspaper, Prime
Minister Hashimoto declared in a private meeting in April 1997 that not only
the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait but also the Spratly Islands would
be included in the expanded Japan–US security cooperation. The following day
the US Department of State denied this.101 As a result, China reportedly
included the Spratly Islands in an expression of concern to the Japanese govern-
ment when criticizing the revised guidelines and their ambiguous geographic
scope.102
The confusion in the Japanese government about the inclusion of Taiwan was
heightened in July 1997 when Kato Koichi, then LDP secretary-general and
known to be pro-China, told the Chinese government that the new guidelines
had as their background changes on the Korean Peninsula. According to other
reports he explicitly excluded Taiwan.103 This prompted the chief cabinet secre-
tary, Kajiyama Seiroku, a known pro-Taiwan LDP member and opponent of
Kato, to say on a television programme in August 1997 that the peninsula was a
problem, but that this should not mean that other regions were not also a
problem. The area of Japan–US defence cooperation naturally included the
Taiwan Strait. This was then supported by several statements from the govern-
ment.104
In May 1998 Takano Toshiyuki, director-general of the Northern American
Affairs Bureau, told a Diet committee that Japan’s logistical support for US
forces in regional emergencies would be limited to the Far East and its
surrounding areas, as defined under the Japan–US security treaty. He was
severely reprimanded for having given a geographical meaning to shuhen which
included Taiwan and led to a rise in Chinese protests. In a clarification Yamazaki
Taku, chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, told the Chinese
ambassador that developments concerning Taiwan would not constitute a
regional emergency unless Beijing tried forcefully to reunify Taiwan with the
PRC.105 The Chinese side could hardly take this as a reassurance. The concern
of the Chinese government about these developments was demonstrated during
the acrimonious discussions about the wording of the November 1998 Joint
Declaration: while most remember visiting President Jiang Zemin’s demand for
an apology for Japan’s past deeds, the other demand concerned a clarification on
Taiwan.
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In 1999 Ozawa Ichiro, then leader of the Liberal Party, which was part of the
coalition government, declared that Russia, the Korean Peninsula, China and
Taiwan would naturally come within the scope of the new Japan–US defence
cooperation guidelines.106 Ozawa explained later to a high-ranking Chinese offi-
cial that the revised guidelines should set an appropriate limit to Japan’s help and
prevent such support from getting out of hand (zuru zuru kakudai suru koto ni
hadome o kakeru).107
In order to soothe vehement Chinese opposition to the revised guidelines,
Prime Minister Obuchi made several conciliatory remarks, although he still did
not explicitly exclude Taiwan from the application of the security treaty or lift
Japan’s ambiguity. In June 1999, at the G-8 Summit in Cologne, he reminded his
colleagues that Northeast Asia was not amenable to the same kind of use of
force as NATO used in Kosovo, implying that China should not worry that the
US would use force against Taiwan or Tibet.108 On the occasion of his visit to
China in July 1999 he said to Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in Beijing that in
applying the revised guidelines Japan would consider Japanese–Chinese friendly
relations as one of its important national interests (‘Chugoku to no yuko kankei mo
juyo na kokueki no hitotsu to shite jushi shite iku’) and that ‘The law will be applied
under our sovereign decision’ (‘Horitsu no unyo wa waga kuni ya shutaiteki na handan
no shita ni okonau’).109 This was not really much of a change from the official
Japanese position given by Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi in 1972 (quoted
above). Moreover, Obuchi was also quoted in July 1999 as saying that he did not
expect the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, thus basically telling the Chinese
that it would all depend on them. As one high-level Defence Agency official told
the author: ‘There is no clause which says that Taiwan is not part of
“shuhen” ’.110
It is therefore not surprising that the Chinese don’t seem to have any doubt
about Taiwan’s inclusion in the guidelines.111 Moreover, they fear that a mili-
tarily stronger Japan is more likely to support US intervention in Taiwan.112 It is
not clear, however, to what extent the Chinese appreciate (or want to appreciate
for tactical reasons) from Japanese interpretational somersaults that Taiwan’s
inclusion is contested even among conservative leaders. But Japan’s consistent
cultivated ambiguity about the legal status of Taiwan (see Chapter 1) and the
increasingly warm relations between the island and Japan (see Chapter 4) can
only further increase China’s suspicion about Japan’s ‘true’ intention on the
Taiwan issue.
China’s opposition to TMD
China’s strident opposition to Japan’s involvement in an upper-tier TMD (China
is not opposed to Japan upgrading the Patriot system!) is also linked in the first
place to its perceived impact on China’s national reunification.113 Beijing voiced
its opposition to Japan’s participation in TMD for the first time on the occasion
of the 3rd Japanese–Chinese Security Dialogue in January 1996.114 China is
concerned that an Aegis-based Japanese NTWD system could easily be used for
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the defence of Taiwan by deploying these ships nearer to Taiwan and/or could
make the acquisition of such a system by Taiwan more likely. From a technical
point of view, Taiwan could easily be included in the currently researched
NTWD system, because the defended footprints have a diameter of several
hundred kilometres, to nearly 2,000 km.115 Even if Taiwan is covered by TMD
neither formally nor through direct deployment, the US can de facto cover it by
a TMD located on US naval platforms.116 Moreover, the administration of
George W. Bush has made its commitment to the military defence of Taiwan
much more explicit, and in July 2001 John Bolton, US under-secretary of state
for arms control and international security, stated that Taiwan could be covered
by a missile defence system.117 Japan’s concern about North Korean missiles is
often presented by Chinese observers as an excuse to protect Taiwan from PRC
missiles. In fact, in 1999 Taiwan’s defence authorities asked the US to sell them
Aegis ships, but even the Republican Bush administration turned this request
down (at least for the time being), out of consideration for relations with China
as well as for practical reasons.118 President Li Denghui is quoted as having
proposed in August 1999 that Taiwan should join a Japan–US TMD system.119
Some Japanese have argued that a Japanese upper-tier TMD system might be
useful to deter Chinese missile attacks or even to defend Taiwan in such a situa-
tion.120
Apart from the impact on Taiwan, China advances several more reasons for
opposing Japan’s TMD deployment, in particular, and TMD in general.121 One
concern is that it may be a step for Japan to acquire a more offensive missile
capability, or even ultimately to go nuclear. TMD is compared to a shield behind
which Japan may prepare a spear. The Chinese see Japan’s TMD participation
as a further strengthening of the Japan–US military alliance against China.122
At least from a technical point of view, the Chinese side has a point. TMD is not
a purely defensive system because:
• the components involved can be used as offensive potential;
• in theory, TMD can be used as a shield for offensive purposes;
• since it will necessitate cooperation with the US for reasons of technology/
budget/alliance cohesion, let alone operational necessities, it can never just
be separated from the different agenda of the US and its regional/global
goals.
TMD would require a much greater real-time integration and cooperation with
the US than ever before, with a considerable loss of independent Japanese
decision-making.123
China also voices concerns that TMD would spark an arms race and unhinge
the regional and global military balance. The Japanese government, however,
believing in the deterrence value of TMD, argues that TMD would prevent an
arms race.124 The latter argument is, however, very controversially discussed
among experts.125 China is also concerned that TMD is only part of the US
intention to build an NMD system which is to neutralize China’s limited nuclear
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deterrent.126 This concern was confirmed by the Bush administration in 2001
when it dropped ‘national’ from NMD to reflect concern by European allies
about decoupling. Together with Russia, China warns that TMD and NMD
would destroy the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. American experts recog-
nize that a TMD system would raise ABM Treaty compliance issues and would
also have an NMD capability for defending US allies in East Asia from North
Korea.127 The administration of George W. Bush has made it clear since 2001
that it is keen to drop the treaty altogether, and has proceeded along these lines.
The Chinese concern about the ABM Treaty is politically rebutted by
Urayama Kori as being based more on a free-riding spirit than concern for that
treaty, since China is a non-signatory of the treaty and has propelled the move
towards TMD by its own missile developments.128 Moreover, China is also criti-
cized for invoking the logic of the ABM Treaty while pursuing its own missile
defence projects.129 While there are good technical, political and budgetary
arguments against TMD, China’s criticism also betrays an unwillingness to
accept a Japanese right to consider protection against Beijing’s growing nuclear
missile deterrent.130 In the eyes of the Chinese, as a country militarily allied with
the US and under its nuclear umbrella, Japan is perceived as having no right to
protect itself against China’s smaller nuclear deterrent. China’s ‘delegitimization’
of Japan’s protest against China’s nuclear deterrent came up as early as 1994,
when Beijing refuted Japan’s protest against continued Chinese nuclear tests by
pointing to the US nuclear umbrella. Japan’s claims to be a non-nuclear power
are countered by the observation that Japan is a ‘quasi’ nuclear power because of
its advanced nuclear and rocket technology and its possession of considerable
plutonium stockpiles.131 These observations are also reflected by some Western
observers. Barry Buzan argues that Japan has a ‘recessed deterrence’.132
American representatives of the Realist School even predict that Japan will go
nuclear in the future, which finds a ready echo with China’s historical deter-
minism.133
Political power balancing of China
A much less often noticed strengthening of the Realist aspects of Japan’s
engagement policy towards China is linked to Tokyo’s more activist foreign
policy. It basically consists of mirroring military deterrence and power
balancing by building a front of as many countries as possible to politically deter
China from being an ‘irresponsible’ country (‘soft containment’), and thus to
further encourage it to become a stakeholder in a global order based on
Western-initiated international norms and regimes.134 In what follows I will
limit myself to East and Central Asia as the main areas for Japan’s political
power balancing against China. However, Japan’s foreign policy towards its
main partners, as well as multilateral fora like the G-8, also includes elements of
political power balancing in the form of raising the subject of China, seeking
understanding of Japan’s China-relevant perceptions and policies, and
promoting exchange of information on China.
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One reason for the low visibility of Japan’s power-balancing policy is prob-
ably that it has become submerged in the general perception of Japan asserting
its foreign-policy interests in many areas more strongly and trying to play a more
important role in Asian affairs. Another reason is Japan’s low-key diplomatic
style. The impetus for this greater foreign-policy activism goes back to the US
(and other Western and Asian allies) urging Japan to share more international
burdens, but also to Japan’s greater self-confidence as the second-biggest
economic world power and the towering economic giant of Asia which has grad-
ually been translating this economic power into political power.135 The following
will show that many elements of this greater foreign-policy role are supported by
various policy constituencies whose motives may include goals which have
nothing to do with China (for example improving Japan’s investment opportuni-
ties in Vietnam), let alone with power balancing. It is important to notice the
growing role of the Defence Agency in developing relations with Asian countries
which are relevant for power balancing against China. Although the Gaimusho
is in charge of Japan’s security policy and the relevant top posts in the Defence
Agency are headed by diplomats on secondment, since the 1990s the agency has
increased its contacts with and intelligence gathering about other countries,
notably with regard to Asia. The 1995 Defence Programme Outline stated the
intention of expanding relations and contacts with other countries beyond the
US. In 1997 the Defence Agency established the International Planning Division
(Kokusai Kikaku ka) within the Defence Bureau for this purpose.136 Greater
interest in PKO is also part of this opening as is interest in more bilateral
defence dialogues.137 The search for a greater international security profile in
Asia also reflects the concern that Japan’s voice will otherwise not be sufficiently
heard in view of US involvement in regional security dialogues.138 At the same
time, these contacts enhance Japan’s political enmeshment of China by putting
pressure on Beijing’s reluctant military leadership to be as willing as other Asian
countries to facilitate military exchanges.
The policy tools of political power balancing and deterrence in Asia include
wooing countries away from falling into the Chinese orbit (Burma); obviating the
build-up of Chinese military power and intervention by strengthening neigh-
bouring countries with domestic instabilities (Central Asia); supporting countries
which are natural allies against China because they have grievances towards
China (Vietnam); and encouraging Asian regionalism to induce China to
become a responsible power supporting the status quo rather than face an adver-
sarial Asian common front (ASEAN).
The area where Japan’s foreign policy has become most assertive and activist
is doubtless Asia, notably East Asia and Southeast Asia.139 Japan’s geographic
location means that it is dependent on stability in the region, where it has been
successful in creating an economic network which is very much centred on Japan
in terms of trade, technology transfer, FDI and ODA. The key sub-regional
organization is ASEAN, which straddles Japan’s sea lanes of communication.
The main security problem of this region – apart from economic and political
instabilities like those in Indonesia and before that in Cambodia – is China’s
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territorial claim to the whole of the South China Sea. Japan therefore has many
interests in keeping ASEAN as politically coherent and economically prosperous
as possible in order to counterbalance any destabilization which may originate
from this problem. This effectively also means preventing Chinese hegemony
while supporting the continuation of US regional predominance.140 While some
countries may to some degree resent US influence, they do not want instability
or Chinese hegemony, which might cause Japan to regain a position more remi-
niscent of the period before 1945 than of its post-war economic predominance.
If possible, the region wants both the US and Japan to balance China. As Lee
Kuan-Yew put it: ‘At present the balance is maintained by the US. In future it
will be necessary that the US and Japan balance China. Together with the US,
Japan will naturally be able to exert the role of balancing’.141 This is closely
related to the Asian interest in having the top economic world powers continue
their strong economic involvement in Southeast Asia rather than shifting to
China.
Japan’s policy tools towards Asia are mostly economic and diplomatic because
of Asian and domestic Japanese sensitivities relating to military power. Japan has
played a major role in strengthening the political and economic resilience of the
Southeast Asian countries, which was demonstrated again in the aftermath of
the Asian economic crisis. Since the 1990s Tokyo has increasingly introduced
bilateral security dialogues with its Southeast Asian partners, in addition to
multilateral security dialogues mainly in the ARF. In addition, it has a dense web
of military attachés at its regional embassies and it encourages Asian officers to
study at its military educational facilities.
The obstacles for Japan’s power balancing are the political, economic and
cultural diversity of the region (including the sizable Chinese minorities in many
of the region’s countries), China’s competition for leadership, the scope of the
political and economic challenges from China, divergent and/or contradictory
US policies towards the region, and Japan’s inability to come to regionally more
acceptable terms with its past. ASEAN may be the most advanced regional asso-
ciation outside of the European Union (EU), but it encounters considerable
difficulties in creating a free-trade area, let alone shaping a security community.
At home in Japan, the underdevelopment of strategic debate and strategic
thinking puts severe restraints on pursuing a consistent and effective policy of
power balancing, particularly at times when difficult policy choices have to be
made.
Chinese–American policy differences, or US policies which make China and
the other Asian countries rally against the US (for example the US emphasis on
human rights) can further help China to prevent an Asian front forming against
it. Any strong anti-China position immediately makes many Asian countries
wince away from the US. This was illustrated when US Defence Secretary
William Cohen declared on his visit to Hanoi in March 2001:
[O]ne of the very important and beneficial aspects of ASEAN is that you
have collective interests, and those collective interests can in fact, if you act
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in concert, give considerable leverage in dealing with China in the future on
a peaceful and cooperative basis.142
While many Southeast Asian leaders may secretly agree, they do not like to be
put on the spot and to emphasize the anti-China slant of their regional integra-
tion efforts.
The following analysis of several bilateral relationships with Asian countries
distils the China-relevant power balancing of Japan and illustrates the problems
mentioned above.
Burma/Myanmar
A particularly interesting but also complex case is Japan’s policy towards
Burma/Myanmar. Despite its geographic and political distance from Japan, the
death of 190,000 Japanese in Burma during the Pacific War and the involve-
ment in Burma’s independence struggle have created special links between the
two countries.143 The Japanese love affair with Burma continued after the war,
leading to considerable Japanese ‘quasi’ reparations and later generous ODA
programmes. The establishment of the martial law regime by the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988 caused a cooling of
relations and curtailing of aid. However, in contrast to its Western partners,
notably the US, Japan has been much more accommodating to the new regime,
arguing for maintaining a dialogue and some aid rather than comprehensive
sanctions.144 As a result Tokyo has been criticized by the US and Europe. In
May 2001 US Secretary of State Colin Powell criticized Japan for providing aid
for the construction of a hydroelectric plant in Burma.145 While most motiva-
tions for this policy line are related to sentimental Orientalism, disapproval of
imposing Western human rights ideals on a poor developing country, hope of
playing a mediating role between Burma and the West and/or economic consid-
erations, there are strategic considerations as well.146 First of all, Burma is now
member of ASEAN, which Japan strongly supports. Since Burma faces (like
Cambodia) considerable difficulties of integration into the association for polit-
ical and economic reasons, Japan has been keen to help this process in order to
avoid a weakening of ASEAN.147 Second, Burma’s close links with China (rein-
forced by Western disapproval of its regime) are seen as a possible threat to
Japan’s sea lanes of communication through the Indian Ocean. There are
reports of Burma having allowed China to set up listening posts in its territory
for surveillance of ship traffic in the Indian Ocean.148 There is the feeling that
Japan has to work against a too-close Burmese–Chinese relationship in order to
provide China with more incentives to be committed to the security of sea lanes;
otherwise China could be tempted to open a land corridor to the Indian Ocean
through Burma. The current Burmese regime is seen as the only possibility of
stabilizing Burma politically and economically.149 In view of Burma’s past trou-
bled relationship with China (support of Burmese insurgencies), some Japanese
policy-makers and specialists consider there to be enough political will in Burma
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to avoid too close a relationship with China. Nagatomi Yuichiro, a former
Ministry of Finance official now working for a Ministry of Finance (MOF)
linked institution, explained to this author that Burma is a ‘cordon sanitaire’
against China.150 The most immediate difficulty for Tokyo in pursuing this
strategic calculus is US/European opposition to the Burmese regime and the
fear of becoming isolated from its Western partners. Incidentally, Tokyo’s lenient
approach to Cambodia’s governance problems has many similar motivations.
Vietnam
Japan has become more active in Vietnam because of its economic interests, and
its desire to stabilize this most important but also very vulnerable new ASEAN
member (since 1995) and to build up ASEAN against China.151 However, Japan
often had to accommodate different US policies towards Vietnam, although
currently there are no longer any major divergences. Vietnam is particularly
important in Japan’s power balancing because of Vietnam’s difficult history with
its Chinese neighbour and its geographic/demographic dimensions. As a new
member of ASEAN it has gained further importance: on the one hand, it has
the potential to make a substantial contribution to ASEAN as an important bloc
because of its size; on the other, it may weaken ASEAN’s strength and cohesion
because of its political and economic differences and backwardness. Since
Vietnam became a member of ASEAN Tokyo has been very keen to stabilize it
and to help with its integration into the association. The current weakness of
Indonesia has made the stabilization of this big country even more important.
Vietnam is Japan’s fourth-largest aid recipient, after Thailand, China and
Indonesia. For Vietnam, Japan is the biggest ODA donor since the resumption of
ODA in 1992. In terms of cumulative investment, Japan is Vietnam’s fourth-
largest foreign investor. Tokyo’s embassy in Hanoi counts among the top twenty
Japanese embassies in the world.
The defence relationship has grown astonishingly fast. Since 1995 Japan has a
military attaché in its embassy (GSDF). The Japanese director-general for
defence visited Vietnam in 1997 and 2000, which is a rare development of
contacts for a country with which no relations existed before. In 2000 both top
defence officials agreed bilateral cooperation on maritime search-and-rescue
operations for civilian ships in the South China Sea, which had been suggested
by the Vietnamese defence minister.152 In March 2001 Foreign Minister Kono
Yohei proposed to his Vietnamese counterpart the holding of politico-military
talks between the two sides composed of Foreign Ministry and defence offi-
cials.153
India
Japan’s potentially most important Asian partner for power balancing outside
ASEAN is India. The country had been neglected by Japan for most of the post-
war period because of geographic/cultural distance, limited economic interest
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and their divergent positions in the East–West conflict.154 India’s opening
towards the West after the end of the Cold War, politically as well as economi-
cally, made it a more interesting partner. Its crucial role for the maintenance of
stability in the South Asian region, along Japan’s sea lanes of communication
through the Indian Ocean, but also its role in the UN (India and Japan support
each other in striving for a permanent Security Council seat, although Japan
refrains from stating this publicly because of India’s nuclear policies) and in the
non-aligned movement, make it an important political partner. But India’s diffi-
cult relationship with China and its potential to keep a check on China in the
future have been important incentives for both to discuss common strategic
interests. This also becomes quite obvious when looking at the exchanges, which
started to pick up after 1997 and which survived the crisis in the bilateral rela-
tionship after India’s and Pakistan’s explosion of nuclear devices in May 1998.155
After the South Asian tests yet another motive for continuing an expansion of
political dialogue with India was the concern that Indian nuclear-weapons devel-
opments might accelerate the build-up of China’s nuclear arsenal.156 After
having initially imposed economic sanctions on India and Pakistan, Japan and
the US relaxed them when the two new nuclear powers promised in 1999 to sign
the CTBT in future and to abstain from further tests. Japan has made clear that
it does not want to link the whole bilateral relationship to the CTBT
issue.157After the terror attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, India
became even more important to Japan (strongly encouraged by a pro-India shift
in US diplomacy) and it dropped its sanctions against India (but also against
Pakistan), which had been imposed after the nuclear tests.
High-level visits started in July 1997 when Foreign Minister Ikeda went to
India. This was followed by three visits by Japanese defence officials. The first
high-level defence talks were planned for May 1998 but temporarily fell victim to
India’s nuclear test. Reciprocal visits resumed, however, in 1999 with the former
prime minister Hashimoto’s visit to India in February 1999 and Foreign Minister
Jaswant Singh’s visit to Japan, followed in January 2000 by the visit by Defence
Minister George Fernandes, the first ever by an Indian defence minister, which
resulted in an agreement on regular defence talks.158 When Prime Minister Mori
visited India in August 2000, he agreed with his counterpart, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, to set up three Wise Men’s panels, of which one is devoted to dialogue
on security policy (‘High-Level Security Forum’), starting in 2001.159 Both sides
agreed on a ‘Global Partnership between Japan and India in the 21st Century’,
marking a strong difference to Mori’s visit to Pakistan during the same South
Asia tour. India is also included in Japan’s Asian initiative to combat piracy after
the Indian coastguard was helpful in arresting the pirates of the Alondra
Rainbow. In November 2000 a patrol vessel of the Japanese coastguard visited
India and Malaysia and implemented joint training to combat piracy. As part of
Japan’s logistical support to the US and British forces in the Indian Ocean after
11 September 2001, the SDF obtained oil in Mumbai (formerly Bombay).160
The strengthening of Japanese–Indian ties did not fail to attract negative
comments from China, and Indian media interpretations on the need of the two
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countries to ‘deal with China’ together only reinforced Chinese suspicions.161
Prime Minister Mori’s visit was criticized by the Chinese media as an attempt to
contain China.162 The Japanese–Indian security relationship will not easily turn
into very effective political power balancing, however, because of India’s nuclear
policy (and India’s perception that Japan does not want to understand the
China-related rationale for it), its missile testing (Japan, for example, strongly
protested the Indian missile test in January 2001), the need for a certain balance
towards Pakistan, and Japan’s concern about Chinese sensitivities – which has
become stronger since the administration of George W. Bush made a very public
display of its pro-Indian line, particularly after the terror attacks on 11
September 2001.163 It is understood in Japan that it may be useful for the
regional balance to improve Japanese–Indian relations, and the campaign
against terrorism since 2001 has given additional incentives, but it would be
counterproductive for their relationship to be stressed too much.164
Russia and Central Asia
Japan’s post-Cold War policy towards Russia and Central Asia is also partly
motivated by power balancing against China.165 In 1997 Prime Minister
Hashimoto Ryutaro launched his ‘Eurasia Diplomacy’ as part of a new
approach to post-Cold War Eurasia. Most of the policy was oriented towards
Russia and China, and one brief part dealt also with the so-called Silk Road
countries – that is, the five new Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and three new countries
in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).166
The policy speech was Japan’s belated response to the end of the Cold War
and the eastward expansion of NATO since 1990, which is having a major lasting
impact on Japan’s strategic environment, notably concerning its relations with
Russia and China. These developments had initially deprived Japan of any
shaping influence on the emerging Eurasian security structure and sidelined it in
the competition to gain access to considerable energy resources. The strong
US/European support of Russia’s political and economic rehabilitation and inte-
gration isolated Japan in the Western camp and demanded a new approach to its
main Russia-related concern, the return of the so-called Northern Territories.
The resulting economic and political engagement of Russia by Japan was also to
countersteer the closer Sino-Russian relationship. With the July 2001 Treaty of
Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, the improvement in
Moscow–Beijing relations achieved a new high point. Despite all the limitations of
the scope of a Sino-Russian rapprochement and its questionable future, in the
strategic as well as the economic sphere, there are many in Japan who are
concerned about NATO expansion pushing both countries together into an
uneasy alliance with negative implications for the Eurasian security environ-
ment.167 The Russian–Chinese honeymoon may not last very long, but in the
meantime it will strengthen China, particularly militarily, and give it a breathing
space.168 One of the most negative outcomes has been China’s acquisition of
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advanced weapons from Russia. Criticizing the strengthening of America’s
alliances, China has directly linked NATO’s expansion and the strengthening of
the Japanese–American security alliance in April 1996 to its improving relation-
ship with Russia.169 This connection seemed to have received official US
endorsement (later disavowed) by deputy assistant secretary of defence Kurt
Campbell when he said that the new Japan–US guidelines were the Asian version
of NATO’s eastward expansion.170
Japanese–Russian relations have improved remarkably in all spheres since
Japan started its ‘smile offensive’ towards Russia in 1997 under Prime Minister
Hashimoto. Despite the primacy of the territorial conflict, Hashimoto also had
power balancing against China in mind. He is quoted as saying, ‘We must make
Russia Japan’s ally. We don’t want China and India fighting for supremacy in
Asia in the 21st century. That’s why we need to keep Russia as a balancer’.171 In
the security area, Japanese–Russian military confidence-building measures and
military visits have been most conspicuous, and they have a certain showcase
effect on China, which has been very reluctant in responding to similar Japanese
proposals (see further below).172
It is doubtful that Japan’s new Russia policy will in the foreseeable future
attain its foremost goal, the return of the Northern Territories. Nor has this new
policy done much to prevent closer Sino-Russian ties. On the contrary, China
and Russia are actively involved in expanding the function and membership of
the Shanghai Five regime, which in 2001 was renamed the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (now including Russia, the PRC, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).173 Japan has become one of the top
ODA donors in the Central Asian region, although its focus on yen loans in
countries with weak governance may in the long-term weaken rather than
strengthen them. In the more immediate future, stabilizing the new Central
Asian republics and preventing spill-over effects from their problems may
prevent China from having to use force against its own Muslim minority of
Turkic minorities (notably an estimated 7 million Uighur, but also some Kazakh,
Tajik and Kyrgyz) and against its Central Asian neighbours (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), thus reducing the need for China to increase its mili-
tary strength. The oppressed Turkic minorities in China’s Northern border
region have become discontent, and they have more than sympathies with their
ethnic brethren (for example Uighur in Uzbekistan) to help them in their
struggle against the government in Beijing; which could, however, become a
pretext for Chinese intervention in Central Asia. 174
In the long run a stabilized and Western-oriented Central Asia might provide
‘soft containment’ of China and help to integrate it into the region, while
strengthening Japan’s hand in the regional competition with China. For Realist
strategists like Professor Sato Seizaburo, Japan’s Silk Road diplomacy is a means
of encircling China with buffer countries. He considered power politics to be the
best way to reach China’s leaders, with their nineteenth-century understanding
of international relations.175 Japan’s support for China’s secure access to oil and
gas in Central Asia may not only reduce international market pressure in view of
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China’s increasing energy demands, but also relieve the need for China to
become more assertive in the South China Sea and East China Sea, where the
US navy may block Chinese shipping.176
Finally, in the context of Japan’s Russia/Central Asia policy one has to
mention Mongolia, where Japan has become the most important ODA donor.
Japan’s ODA accounts for around 25 per cent of Mongolia’s annual budget. It
was visited by Prime Minister Kaifu in 1991 and by Prime Minister Obuchi in
1999. The February 1995 visit of the Mongolian defence minister resulted in an
agreement on a regular security dialogue. While Japan’s disproportionate polit-
ical and economic involvement in a nation of only about 2.4 million inhabitants
also has to do with its attraction as a racially close people and Tokyo’s desire to
respond in non-military ways to Western demands for international burden
sharing, the strategic considerations with regard to China are no secret.177
Korea
The Korean peninsula does not lend itself easily to Japanese political power
balancing. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not amenable
to any kind of front-building against the PRC. Kim Ilsung prompted the PRC
leadership to espouse the theory of Japan’s revival as a militarist country from
1970, until the Chinese party leadership later recognized it to be mistaken.178
Because of their difficult bilateral relationship, Japan and the DPRK have not
yet achieved established diplomatic relations, and even talks to that end have not
made any progress. Since the PRC is North Korea’s most important backer, the
current leadership in Pyongyang is not likely to risk its relationship with Beijing
by showing any sympathies for Japan, even after the future establishment of
diplomatic relations. In principle, however, there is concern in Pyongyang about
China gaining too much influence over the country, particularly in view of
North Korea’s growing economic and political dependence on China against the
background of its failing economic and political system and China’s model char-
acter for the reform of a Socialist system.
In the case of South Korea, there are also severe limits to Japan even giving
the impression of trying to win Seoul over to power balancing against China.
Seoul’s priority is to reduce China’s concerns about national reunification, to
avoid any reinforcement of the Pyongyang–Beijing axis and, if possible, to get
China’s tacit, if not active, support for reducing tensions on the peninsula. South
Korea is, moreover, anxious to keep all its powerful neighbours (including the
US) in a balance which does not endanger its security or reduce its diplomatic
and economic options. Finally, its relationship with Japan is still fraught with
many problems, as was demonstrated by the cooling of relations in 2001 after a
successful improvement, which had started in 1998. Still, China’s growing
regional importance provides an additional motive for a better relationship with
Japan. South Korea cannot afford any isolation in the face of an increasingly
powerful China. The planned Free-Trade Agreement between Japan and South
Korea is very much inspired by the wish of both countries to enhance their
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bargaining power vis-à-vis China’s economic power.179 But security cooperation
with Japan is a very delicate issue in view of Japan’s past colonial history on the
peninsula and China’s sensitivities. South Korea shares the same military
alliance partner with Japan but is very wary of any linking of the two alliances.
Even the development of military exchanges has been advanced only very
prudently, and it was suspended in 2001 when the history textbook dispute flared
up yet again. The extent to which Chinese considerations are taken into account
was demonstrated in August 1999 when Korea proposed to invite Chinese naval
officers to observe a planned Japan–Korea joint training exercise in the East
China Sea. Due to the MSDF’s refusal, the Chinese were not invited.180
Moreover, Seoul has declined to participate in TMD, not only because its
concerns have to do with very different categories of North Korean weapons,
but also because of China’s opposition. Seoul has also no interest in Japan
strengthening its military potential or its military cooperation with the US to
such an extent that China is encouraged to become a hostile power in Northeast
Asia. In view of these circumstances, and despite concerns about China’s rising
power being similar to Japan’s, South Korea’s role as a power balancer of China
is limited to maintaining its military strength and hosting US forces, and this is
directed in the first instance against North Korea. Other elements of Japan’s
engagement policy vis-à-vis China are, however, supported by Seoul’s efforts to
include China in moves to settle the division of the peninsula (for example
China’s participation in the now-stalled Four Party talks since 1996), and to
support China’s involvement in regional and sub-regional discussions and coop-
eration (ASEAN3, ARF, etc.).
PART 2: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENMESHMENT
A Bilateral and multilateral security dialogues
Introduction
Engagement is most widely presented and discussed as political and, notably,
economic engagement – or what I would prefer to call ‘enmeshment’, in order to
differentiate the wider concept of engagement from the policies which aim at
providing political and economic incentives for China to become a responsible
world power which accepts international norms and regimes.
The tools of political enmeshment rely on involving China in ever closer
dialogues and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. At the
bilateral level, the aim is mainly to convey to China Japan’s points of view and
interests, and to create mutual confidence. At the multilateral level, confidence
building is complemented by socialization – that is, communicating to China the
norms of the international community, persuading it of the merits of adhering to
them, and enmeshing it increasingly into the web of international commitments,
responsibilities and benefits which accrue from them to make it a ‘stakeholder’.
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The incentives of political enmeshment for China are exchanging information
and evaluations related to bilateral and international issues, gaining benefits on
issues of national interest (for example reunification with Taiwan), establishing
linkages to economic enmeshment with its material incentives, and accommo-
dating its desire for regional and international recognition and leadership.
It is only to these enmeshment elements of engagement and their goals that
the Japanese government refers in the official presentation of its China policy. In
its basic policy for relations with China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely
states:
It is important to call on China to become a constructive partner in the
international community, so as to maintain stability and prosperity in the
Asia Pacific region. In this regard, the following points should be stressed:
a. Support for China’s open and reform policy through such measures as
economic cooperation and support of China’s early accession to the WTO
[World Trade Organization].
b. Promotion of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation (high-
level exchanges, Japan–China Security Dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum,
APEC among them).181
In 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s vice-minister, Kawashima Yutaka,
explained the first point as developing ‘a dense web of mutual interdependence
and common interests’ so that China could develop a ‘deeper understanding that
to be part of the international system is indispensable to its reform, open door
policy and modernization’.182
In a recent report by a Gaimusho-initiated study, the aim of Japan’s China
policy is described as getting China to become a member of the international
community (kokusai shakai no ichiin) and China’s economy becoming part of the
global economy (sekai keizai to no ittaika).183
In what follows I will focus on the issues and policy tools of political enmesh-
ment, which is relevant for security in its expanded understanding, as explained
in the Introduction. Before doing so, however, it is useful to illustrate the diffi-
culty both sides experienced in even establishing a framework for political
enmeshment in the security area – that is, in agreeing on how to qualify the
bilateral relationship. China attaches great importance to such qualification in
order to express some of the goals it hopes to achieve in a bilateral relationship
and to differentiate between various bilateral relationships. Since China aims at
a new world order in the post-Cold War era, consisting of a system of partner-
ships rather than traditional security alliances, it has given to several
partnerships the epithet ‘strategic’ to express this desired shift away from
strategic alliances of the past.184 In the case of Chinese–Russian relations, we
have seen that the relationship was qualified in 1996 as a ‘strategic partnership
of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination directed towards the
21st century’.185 According to the Japanese China expert Kojima Tomoyuki,
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strategic partnerships are defined as having an influence which is long term,
which not only affects the two countries but concerns the region and the world,
and which consists not of a single aspect but of a variety of aspects, which
include economic, security and other considerations.186 In the case of the
Japan–China relationship, Japan did not want to attach the adjective ‘strategic’
because it could be interpreted by suspicious neighbours as a regional hegemony
or contradict the Japan–US military alliance.187
But up until 1998 the Japanese–Chinese relationship was not even officially
called a partnership. Such a proposal was only made by the Japanese side in
preparation for President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998.188 On
this occasion, both sides finally issued a Joint Declaration on Building a
Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development. Japan
was the last major country in the 1990s with which Beijing concluded an agree-
ment which qualified the relationship under China’s new ‘multipolar diplomacy’
as a partnership of some kind. The delay was due to the various bilateral
disputes and China’s reluctance to give too much public recognition to Japan’s
importance. However, after the 1996 Japan–US Joint Declaration, China
realised that continuing to exclude Japan from its ‘partnerships’ would only push
it closer to the US. Although the term ‘strategic’ was omitted, there are indica-
tions that for China the relationship is a ‘strategic’ one, albeit not in the narrow
military sense. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji declared in 2000, for example, that ‘it
is important to foster Japan–China relations from the strategic standpoint’.189
Bilateral security dialogue and military exchanges
The promotion and expansion of bilateral dialogue has been an essential part of
the political enmeshment element of the Japanese government’s engagement
policy towards China since the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1972. As
we saw in Chapter 1, Japan only reluctantly suspended political dialogue and the
exchange of official visits with China as part of Western demands for sanctions
after the Tiananmen massacre, and was actively pushing for ending these sanc-
tions.
The establishment of security-related dialogues and exchanges between Japan
and China was slow to begin after the establishment of diplomatic relations in
1972. At the urging of the Japanese government, the exchange of defence
attachés started in 1974 (see Chapter 1). Since 1999 the Japanese embassy in
Beijing has also had a Defense Agency official, and since the sending of a
defence attaché from the MSDF in 2000 the embassy now has representatives
from all three services.190 The Chinese embassy in Tokyo has also four military
representatives. But more important for mediating conflicts and exchanging
security-relevant information and views are the exchanges of civilian and mili-
tary officials working in various security-relevant areas in both governments.
The development of dialogues and exchanges in the security area occurs at
the following levels:
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• defence minister;
• vice-defence minister;
• top uniform level (for example chief of the General Staff);
• working level (political-military talks and military-to-military talks);
• functional (medical officers, intelligence officers, educational institutions);
• unit level (for example naval visits).
So far there have been no unit-level exchanges or military-to-military talks. The
functional exchanges between educational institutions, to which China agreed in
1998, have not advanced much beyond visits by heads of these institutions. In
1999 China started a two-month course (Asia Pacific security into the 21st
century) at its National Defence University and a uniformed Japanese from
NIDS took part. The Chinese side itself only refers to it as a ‘symposium’.191
The Chinese military has participated in the annual Asia-Pacific Security
Seminar on Confidence-Building Measures (for military officers), organised by
NIDS since 1994, but did not attend in 1996 and 1997. They have also attended
other international seminars and conferences organised by various other organs
of the Defence Agency (for example the Asia-Pacific Forum of Defence Officials,
organised since 1996).
Naval ship visits have been conspicuously absent from the bilateral exchanges.
The failure by the Chinese side to follow through on its agreement to such visits
in 1998 is all the more significant since China is maintaining an active naval-
exchange programme with many other countries. During the 1990s China’s
navy sent ships to over twenty countries and hosted port calls from seventeen
countries.192 Japan and China agreed to ship visits for the first time on the occa-
sion of the visit to Japan by Defence Minister Chi Hao Jian in February 1998,
and this intention has been reiterated at every high-level meeting since then.193
When it looked close to realization in 2001 the deterioration of the bilateral rela-
tionship after Li Denghui’s Japan visit and the new textbook crisis pushed the
project into the background once again. The first Chinese navy ships are now to
visit Japan in 2002 on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations.
Given China’s top-down government structure and the degree of instrumen-
talization of exchanges to influence other countries, the development of security
dialogue and military exchanges has always been heavily dependent on the
initiatives of the top leadership, with top-level visits making a start but also
exposing the exchanges to the vagaries of the political climate. Until the 1980s
security discussions were limited to the top leadership and the diplomatic
services of both countries, or occurred on unofficial occasions. Apart from the
aforementioned 1984 unofficial visit by the Chinese defence minister, Zhang
Aiping, and the return visit in 1987 by his Japanese counterpart, Kurihara Yuko
(see Chapter 1), China’s chief of the General Staff, Yang Dezhi, visited Japan in
1986. Reflecting China’s acceptance of Japan’s defence efforts and its alliance
with the US at the time, Zhang Aiping was very much in favour of more
exchanges, but the Japanese side was reluctant to agree to these Chinese
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proposals and set limits.194 Before defence exchanges could expand, notably
between defence establishments, Japan suspended them in the wake of the
Tiananmen massacre in 1989. In addition, relations cooled at the end of the
1980s because China had started to criticize Japan’s defence policies again. As a
result of these sanctions, it took Tokyo until May 1993 to propose the resump-
tion of the bilateral security dialogue and the involvement of Beijing in regional
security discussions to the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen (see Table 3.1).
Since then the bilateral security dialogue has become a means of gaining a
better understanding of China’s security policies as well as passing on Japanese
concerns about some of China’s security policies. The visit of Foreign Minister
Muto Kabun to China in May 1993 was an opportunity to complain to Qian
about repeated attacks on Japanese fishing boats in the East China Sea and also
to raise the issue of Chinese nuclear testing.195 When Foreign Minister Hata
visited China in January 1994 he queried his interlocutors about the intentions
behind the 15 per cent increase in the Chinese defence budget and urged China
to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR).196 On the occasion of Muto’s visit, the establishment of a bilateral
security forum to enhance the transparency of both countries’ defence policies
and to conduct dialogue on regional security issues was agreed. Qian Qichen
declared respect for Japan’s wish to take on an important global political role and
reversed the earlier Chinese criticism of Japan’s participation in PKO in
Cambodia.197 As a result, the first meeting of the bilateral security dialogue
(headed by bureau chief officials of the Japanese and PRC foreign and defence
ministries) took place on 20 December 1993 in Beijing. However, the Japanese
side was not successful in receiving Chinese agreement to its proposal of
including military personnel.198 The agenda of the meeting included confidence
building through enhanced transparency, proliferation of nuclear weapons and
missiles, nuclear-weapons tests, regional security cooperation and UN PKO.
Japanese hopes for a coordinated approach towards the North Korea did not
materialize.199 In January 1995 the second round of the security dialogue
included civilian and military representatives for the first time.200 The third
round of the security dialogue, in January 1996, had the largest number of mili-
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Table 3.1 The chronology of the security dialogue
Date Place
1a December 1993 Beijing (only diplomats)
1b March 1994 Beijing (only defence officials)
2 January 1995 Tokyo
3 January 1996 Beijing
4 March 1997 Tokyo
5 December 1997 Beijing
6 October 1999 Tokyo
7 June 2000 Beijing
8 April 2002 Tokyo
Source: Gaiko Forum, November 2000, p. 53; Yomiuiri Shimbun, 3 March 2002
tary representatives so far because the Chinese delegation head was the deputy
chief of the General Staff, Xiong Guangkai. Defence exchanges picked up in the
second half of the 1990s with a series of visits by leading defence officials from
Japan (administrative vice-minister of defence, chairman of the Joint Chief of
Staff and the president of the National Defence University), reciprocated by a
visit of the chief of the General Staff to Japan. But it was obvious that Japan
was made to appear as the side requesting more exchanges while China did not
feel the same urgency.
After the Joint Declaration in April 1996, the Japanese side wanted to win the
understanding of China while the latter sought all means to oppose the resulting
enhancement of Japanese–American security ties because of its suspected anti-
Chinese orientation. Initially, this meant that the Chinese government
suspended exchanges.201 The Defence Agency had started to see the expansion
of military exchanges with all Asian countries as beneficial and used the promo-
tion of the exchanges with other countries, notably with Russia, as a lever to
prompt the Chinese military leadership to be more willing to engage.202
Nishihara Masashi, now heading the Japanese Defence University, mentioned
improved security links with Russia as a means of preventing China from using
its increasingly close ties with Russia to put pressure on Japan.203 Exchanges and
security discussions between Japan and Russia have been held since 1996 at all
levels. The first exchange visits of naval vessels took place in Vladivostok and
Tokyo in July 1996 and June 1997, respectively, and they have been continued
since then on a regular basis. Japanese–Russian naval ship visits since July 1998
have advanced to the level of joint disaster drills.204
A breakthrough in Japanese–Chinese exchanges seemed to have been
achieved with the official visit to Tokyo by Defence Minister Chi Haotian in
February 1998, the first official visit of a Chinese defence minister, which was
reciprocated in May of the same year by the director-general of the Defence
Agency, Kyuma Fumio. During Chi’s visit, both sides agreed on the intensifica-
tion of mutual exchanges in different fields and at different levels.205 However,
the momentum did not last long, and no further visits at the same level occurred
as of summer 2001. Vice-ministerial exchanges (Jimu jikan) had last occurred in
1997, but they were suspended in May 1998 and resumed only in November
1999 with a visit by Vice Minister Ema to Beijing.206 The 6th Japan–China
Security Dialogue took place in October 1999 after a gap of one year and ten
months.207 The eighth meeting was delayed until April 2002 because of the
renewed textbook crisis and the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister
Koizumi in 2001, which had derailed most bilateral meetings between the two
countries.
Japan’s goals for bilateral security dialogues and military exchanges may be
summarized as follows:
1 Explanation of Japanese defence policies and reassurance of China about
Japan’s goals.
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2 Protests against certain Chinese defence policies (nuclear tests, increases in
defence expenditure, etc.).
3 Building confidence through the enhancement of the transparency of both
sides’ defence policies.
4 Improvement of communication by widening scope and number of chan-
nels;
5 Gaining Chinese support for stability on the Korean Peninsula and on other
regional issues.
Explaining to the Chinese side and winning their consent to, or at least their
tacit acceptance of, the intensification of Japanese–American military coopera-
tion and its ensuing measures (notably revision of the guidelines and TMD) has
been the central goal of bilateral dialogue and exchanges since 1996. The keen
Japanese wish for these meetings gave the Chinese side the opportunity to use
the scheduling of them (as well as opposition to Japan’s wish for expansion and
upgrading of these exchanges) to protest and to put pressure on Japan to recon-
sider its new defence policies. As Yang Bojiang writes: ‘Sino-Japanese military
relations cannot exceed their political and/or economic relations’.208 Suspension
or curtailing of exchanges is all the easier for the Chinese side since it can rely on
government-controlled media to transmit its opinion to Japan and other coun-
tries. In contrast, Japan has been much more careful in venting its displeasure
about Chinese defence policies publicly, and prefers confined diplomatic venues
for this purpose, although this has somehow changed since September 1992,
when Japanese politicians started to raise their concern publicly about alleged
Chinese intentions to buy an aircraft carrier (see Chapter 2).
An overwhelming part of the dialogue and exchanges is basically aimed at
confidence building. As we will see in greater detail in the context of multilateral
security discussions, the Japanese/Western concept of confidence building is
very different from that of China.209 Within the bilateral context, confidence
building for China ideally means Japanese agreement on the major security poli-
cies at stake, and this is a precondition for engaging in security dialogue and
exchanges, or at least determines the level and scope of such dialogue. This is, of
course, very different from the idea of confidence building as a step towards
facilitating the solution of disputes and disagreements. As a result the
Japanese–Chinese security dialogue has been hostage to the vagaries of the
general political relationship and the agreement, or rather lack of it, on partic-
ular security policies. Just at a time of conflict of interest when the need for
enhancing mutual understanding and reducing the political temperature is most
needed, China reduces, or even suspends, political and security dialogues. The
problematic nature of this approach is also recognised by some Chinese security
experts.210
Urging greater Chinese transparency about its defence policies has been a
major item on Japan’s agenda since the beginning of the working-level security
talks in 1993. Progress in this matter has been glacial because transparency
within the Chinese government system, even outside the security sphere, is not
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very developed and is seen as a danger to the rule of the Communist Party. In
the security area, transparency is seen as a danger to national security because it
would diminish an important force-multiplier of a military so much behind
Western forces and invite foreign interference. In short, the Chinese basically
consider transparency to be inappropriate for a weaker country like theirs.211 In
addition, transparency in the form of access to information on the military
strength of China’s adversaries through visits to military installations can also
serve as a deterrent by impressing on China its military weakness and the futility
of using military force. This complaint has been made frequently by China
towards the US.212 Japanese demands for explanations concerning its rapid
increases in defence expenditure are rebutted by pointing to the PRC’s domestic
economic growth, the need to modernize and the low increase rate in compar-
ison with some advanced countries.213
Still, there has been some progress in China’s military transparency, and
although it cannot solely be ascribed to Japanese efforts because of concurrent
multilateral and other bilateral dialogues, Tokyo has certainly been an important
voice. Due to international pressure, China finally published a White Paper on
Arms Control in 1995 and a White Paper on National Defence in 1998. It is
significant that the Chinese side used the third Japan–PRC working-level security
talks in January 1996 to announce the publication of the White Paper on Arms
Control.214
The establishment of a telephone hotline for emergencies has a special
symbolic value for confidence building as well as improving communications. A
hotline was finally opened between the seats of both leaderships in October
2000, when Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Japan, after it had been proposed
in November 1998 by Japan on the occasion of President Jiang Zimin’s visit.215
The expansion of fora and agenda
The Japanese government has been trying to expand the fora and agenda of
security-relevant subjects as it has done in other subject areas relevant to the
bilateral relationship (for example regular human rights consultations since
1997). In addition, there has been a growing involvement by private institutions
in enhancing the bilateral security dialogue.
Consultations related to the territorial issues between the two sides and the
start, in July 1995, of the first senior-level consultation on arms control, disarma-
ment and non-proliferation on Japan’s initiative have already been mentioned in
Chapter 2. After the end of China’s nuclear tests, gaining China’s support
against nuclear proliferation and missiles (notably by North Korea) became the
new centre of Japan’s interest in the latter forum. On a more general level, Japan
hopes to bring Beijing within international arms-control agreements in view of
China’s importance for the success of global and regional nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, arms control and disarmament. In the 1980s Japan was instrumental in
encouraging China to sign the NPT.216 Since 2000 Japan has also been leaning
on China to ratify the CTBT in order to facilitate the treaty entering into force.
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For China, on the other hand, the arms control forum has become very useful to
oppose TMD and the militarization of space.217
In 1995 the Japanese government also started unofficially to explore China’s
interest in talks on PKO cooperation, probably encouraged by China’s reversal
of its initial criticism of Japan’s participation in PKO in Cambodia.218 At that
time the Defence Agency suggested joint training for PKO.219 Although PKO
cooperation continues to be mentioned during political talks, no forum has yet
been set up.220 The subject has also raised interest outside government chan-
nels. During his visit to China in December 2000 Hatoyama Yukio, the leader
of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), proposed a Common Agenda which
included PKO, next to environment and information technology.221 Two
Japanese think tanks have also separately proposed some kind of PKO coopera-
tion with China.222 However, China’s general attitude towards PKO in general,
let alone PKO cooperation with Japan, is still very reserved, particularly after
the resurgence of PKO since the end of the 1990s. Moreover, China probably
does not want to give any additional support for Japan enhancing its own PKO
involvement.
Japan has also failed so far to conclude an agreement on preventing incidents
at sea between the two navies. Such agreements had become an important
confidence-building measure during the Cold War. Japan and Russia signed one
in May 1993, and the subject has been on the Japanese–Chinese agenda since
Defence Minister Chi Haotian’s visit in 1998. However, China is not likely to
agree to it until after the exchange of ship visits. Such an agreement will become
more than just a confidence-building measure once the Chinese navy becomes
more of a blue-ocean navy and encounters with the Japanese navy are more
likely. A complicating factor for the conclusion of an agreement is probably the
territorial dispute about the EEZ and the Senkaku Islands.
Mention has also to be made of Japan’s removal of chemical weapons from
Northern China which date from its war against China before 1945, because this
constitutes an additional, albeit coincidental, forum for military exchanges.
Under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Japan is obliged to
remove chemical weapons which the Imperial Army abandoned after its retreat
in 1945.223 When Japan was first confronted with this obligation in 1992, during
the negotiations for the Convention, it dragged its feet for internal bureaucratic,
financial and technical reasons before actual removal operations started in 2000,
based on a 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between Japan and China on
the Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China.224 Only in
November 1995, following the declassification of US government records on the
issue, did the Japanese government finally admit the use of chemical weapons
during its war against China. However, the removal of these abandoned
weapons may be useful for Japan’s engagement strategy since it brings a consid-
erable number of Japanese and Chinese military personnel together until at least
2007 (this CWC-imposed deadline is likely not be met for technical reasons).
In response to Japan’s public security concern with crime related to China
(illegal entry, drugs and other organized crime), in 1999 both sides started a
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regular Japan–China Public Security Authorities Consultations meeting. The
Japanese delegation in 2000 included officials from the National Police Agency,
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and
Welfare, the Public Security Investigation Agency and the Maritime Safety
Agency.225 Other exchanges of law-enforcement institutions are now also taking
place. Katzenstein and Okawara report on closer ties between Japanese and
Chinese provincial police forces.226 It has yet to be seen how effective these
consultations will become. Japan is certainly still far behind South Korea, which
in October 2000 signed a criminal extradition agreement with the PRC.227
Japan as China’s second-class security partner?
In conclusion, one has to state that bilateral security dialogue and military
exchanges are still underdeveloped, notably in comparison to those China has
with other major countries in Asia and Europe, let alone with the US. The
difference from the developments in the Japanese–Russian defence relationship is
particularly striking. The need to remedy the situation is regularly recognized by
Chinese leaders visiting Japan, but changes are still very slow and very much
hostage to the vagaries of negative events in the bilateral relationship, as the
stalement in 2001 yet again illustrated.228 Simply expanding the number of fora
is not enough if there is no will to talk. China’s political instrumentalization of
dialogue and exchanges is illustrated fittingly by its attitude to telephone diplo-
macy. The Chinese side takes a rather casual attitude, and one Japanese Foreign
Ministry official was quoted as saying: ‘When they don’t want to talk to us, they
say it is not customary in China to conduct telephone diplomacy. Yet, when they
want to tell us something, they think nothing of ringing us up’.229
The reasons for this underdevelopment of security relations, however, go
beyond China’s political frontloading and instrumentalization. One other reason
is the Chinese perception of Japan’s international ranking as an independent
actor. For most of the post-war period China has seen Japan as dependent in its
foreign and security policy on the US, which has been the last arbiter in any
conflict of interest.230 In theory, China could consider both alliance partners as a
tool to influence the other, but the perceived weakness and second-class status of
Japan in the alliance means that China’s leaders tend to see the US as the main
interlocutor and lever. It will take China a long time to overcome its reluctance
to treating Japan as an equal partner.231 Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A.
McVadon speak of the PLA’s persistent negative attitude, which is based on the
premise that the SDF should not be trusted and should not be treated as a
normal national military organization.232 In another publication McVadon
writes about the hatred harboured against Japan by many PLA officers, which
made them rebuff Japanese overtures towards military-to-military contacts.233
These attitudes are all related to and reinforced by the growing regional
Japan–China rivalry (see Chapter 4).
Finally, bilateral dialogue and military exchanges at government level are
sometimes affected by bureaucratic and political structures. As one senior China
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specialist in the Gaimusho wrote to the author: ‘Chinese policies toward Japan
and vice versa do not have comprehensive, integrated approaches, but are divided
into separate political, economic and security areas. Occasionally consultations or
adjustments are taking place, but basically each area is pursued on its own’.234 An
example of insufficient domestic communication on the Chinese side was the
conflict over the incursion of Chinese ‘research vessels’ into Japan’s EEZ and
territorial waters in 2000. During his visit to Japan in October 2000 Prime
Minister Zhu Jongji claimed not to know about the Chinese navy’s intrusions even
though the issue was supposed to have been solved in summer of that year.235 The
incident showed that the Chinese Foreign Ministry and even the prime minister
are sometimes not sufficiently informed about certain activities of the PLA.
Whereas the Gaimusho is responsible for Japan’s security policy and the Defence
Agency is to execute it, the distance between the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (Waijiaobu) and the PLA is much greater. The PLA can act fairly indepen-
dently from the rest of the government (albeit not from the CCP). Other factors
like insufficient briefing of top political leaders may aggravate this problem.
Track II and Track III dialogues
The 1990s saw a rise in bilateral security dialogues at Track II (semi-official and
academic) and Track III (private) levels in order to overcome the difficulties
encountered by official dialogue channels (Track I). Private involvement in
promoting security relations between Japan and China has been increasing,
along with the increase in general private Japan–China contacts and
exchanges.236 One of the most influential and best-funded organizations is prob-
ably the Sasakawa Japan–China Friendship Fund (about US$2 million operating
funds per year), which has established good relations with the Chinese military.
The work most relevant to the bilateral security relationship is the funding of
conferences on security issues, the Japan–China Security Research Exchange
(including the invitation of retired high-ranking military officers to Japan) and
university scholarships for Chinese security specialists to study the Japanese
language.237
Track II activities would seem appropriate for the two countries because
China has practically no private organizations involved in security issues, and
even in Japan the private sector in this specific area is very small. However, there
was a drop in interest after the Tiananmen incident, and the growing perception
of China as a threat affected the enthusiasm on the Japanese side as well.238
Falling interest has also been recorded at the non-governmental level, which is
not concerned with political or security issues. As an example, since 1994 the
formation of sister-city links has dropped off rapidly.239
Another circumstance affecting the efficacy of the Track II and private levels in
the security area is the decline of the pro-China lobby in Japan. This is particu-
larly noticeable in the LDP, with the death or fading away of major actors like Ito
Masayoshi, Gotoda Masaharu and Takeshita Noboru. These leaders (and the
bilateral private associations which they supported) had played a crucial role in the
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normalisation of diplomatic relations with China and smoothed the many
conflicts which had regularly shaken the relationship since then.240 The impor-
tance of such figures in times of Japanese–Chinese tensions was demonstrated
most recently when Nonaka Hiromu, a former secretary-general of the LDP, was
officially invited by the Chinese government in July 2001 to mediate the crisis over
the revised textbooks and the planned visit of the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime
Minister Koizumi. Nonaka apparently won the favour of China when he visited a
memorial museum in Nanjing in 1998 in his capacity as LDP secretary-
general.241 Domestic turbulences in Japan have, however, continued to weaken
such figures: Nonaka Hiromu is now outside the political mainstream and Kato
Koichi lost his power base when he had to leave the Diet as a result of a corruption
scandal in 2002. On the Chinese side, similar figures who had been instrumental
in supporting the relationship have also disappeared. Moreover, Chinese
researchers who are specialists in Japanese affairs have to be very careful not to
appear as ‘apologists’ for Japan, and their role as go-betweens is therefore limited.
To enhance the non-governmental level of dialogue and exchanges between
Japan, on the one hand, and China and Korea, on the other, Prime Minister
Obuchi’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century suggested a process
of ‘neighbourly relations’ (rinko) in January 2000.242 The process would be based
on Japan’s full understanding of the histories, traditions, languages and cultures
of the peoples of its neighbour countries. While the report received considerable
attention (notably because of his recommendation about elevating the role of
English in Japan), it has not been followed up and was soon forgotten among the
disputes arising thereafter between Japan and China.
Multilateral security dialogue and exchanges
Multilateralism is understood in international relations as ‘coordinating behavior
among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct’.243
For Japan, multilateralism has for a long time been a politically minor but
rhetorically and financially (in terms of contribution) important feature of
Japan’s foreign and security policy tools even while its US-focused bilateralism
has been preponderant. The Japan–US framework has been the strongest
constraint to (Japan’s desire not to move out of step with US policies) but also the
strongest incentive for (US demands for Japanese burden sharing, Japan’s diplo-
matic hedging) the vigour and direction of Japan’s multilateral diplomacy, in
addition to the country’s economic interests and the outcome of the dichotomy
between its pacifism and military alliance with the US.244 Increasing the involve-
ment in multilateralism and carefully enhancing the autonomy of diplomacy are
effective ways of softening the consequences of the ‘alliance game’ of abandon-
ment and entrapment.
Multilateralism reduces transaction costs, enhances transparency and
predictability, and socializes countries around generally accepted norms of
behaviour.245 It has therefore become an important part of the political enmesh-
ment of China by Western countries like Japan and the US, but also by its
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regional partners. To promote China’s involvement in multilateralism Japan has
been active on its own as well as in supporting similar endeavours by other coun-
tries. Even Japan’s interest in participating in Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) was
initially strongly motivated by its desire to bring China into yet another regional
multilateral institution.246 The attraction of multilateralism for China is a
combination of economic benefit, prestige, peer pressure and competition with
other powers. Not being part of an international or regional organisation can be
such a liability politically that joining it may appear the lesser evil.
Multilateral approaches to security at regional level aim at the establishment of
a cooperative security arrangement through dialogue, consultation, confidence-
building measures, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and public security
cooperation. There is no clear concept of an enemy country as in bilateral secu-
rity arrangements; instead, the enemy is strategic instability and the possibility of
conflict breaking out among the parties to the cooperative security arrange-
ment.247
One of the main advantages of multilateral security discussions is the circum-
stance that the ‘political baggage’ which may burden the bilateral relationship
(for example the history issue between Japan and China) becomes diluted in a
multilateral framework. Compared with bilateral security dialogue and
exchanges between Japan and China, the process of multilateral security
approaches in many ways facilitates the addressing of sensitive security issues. A
Japanese diplomat is quoted as saying about the ARF in this context: ‘Japan
wants to say nice things to China bilaterally and bad things multilaterally’.248
Without doubt, multilateral dialogue and exchanges have a positive impact on
bilateral contacts, and both are helped by Track II and Track III exchanges. The
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) prepared the way for and then
provided input into APEC, and the same can be said about the role of ASEAN
Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN–ISIS) and the Council
for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) for the ARF.249
Multilateral security approaches can contain the same deterrence function as is
in bilateral power balancing with other countries against China: Japan can build
coalitions with other Asian states and use this to apply peer pressure on
China.250 China has therefore warned against using ARF as ‘multilateral
containment of China’.251 Using the multilateral stage, Japan can also introduce
proposals and ideas through other regional members and assuage Chinese
concerns about Japanese regional leadership.
Multilateral security approaches are also encouraged by those who doubt
that a balance-of-power policy in Asia will work, at least not on its own. Kosaka
Masataka argued that the diversity and weaknesses of Asia’s main players
would prevent one country from establishing superiority, and that the competi-
tion and cooperation among them would prevent a system of power balancing
which could solve the problems occurring in the international society.252
Tennichi Takahiko warns that balance of power will not establish a common
agenda in the region, nor would it necessarily operate in a period of power
transition.253
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A kind of first step in the direction of multilateral engagement of China
occurred when Prime Minister Kaifu visited China in August 1991. He proposed
deepening the bilateral dialogue on issues of importance to the whole interna-
tional community like arms control, disarmament and the environment, and
referred to this international society-relevant level of bilateral relations as
‘Japanese–Chinese relations in the global community’ (‘sekai no naka no Nitchu
kankei’).254 One result of Kaifu’s visit was China’s accession to the NPT to
improve its international standing in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre. In
Chapter 1 we saw that Japan became relatively isolated in the Western camp in
its eagerness to resume normal relations with China after the Tiananmen
massacre, and the 1991 Kaifu visit to China became the most high-profile
symbol of the Japanese position. In order to enhance Western acceptance of
Japan’s conciliatory policy and to do away with the special character of the
Japanese–Chinese relationship, the government was keen to project
‘Japan–China relations which contribute to the international community’ by
prompting China to become a responsible power.255 But this was also a recogni-
tion of the fact that relations could not be further developed by merely relying
on the bilateral level and that this could only be done by cooperating on a multi-
lateral level.256
The expansion of norms first tried out in Europe during the Cold War, as well
as domestic pressures, played an important role in assisting Southeast Asia’s and
Japan’s conversion to multilateral security mechanisms after 1989.257 The
increase in regional security meetings in the 1990s at Track II and Track III
levels helped Japan as well as China to adopt these new values to varying
degrees. The previously mentioned Higuchi Report of August 1994 had reflected
this shift by putting considerable stress on multilateral security approaches at the
regional and global level. Multilateral security approaches were deemed appro-
priate in the new post-Cold War climate, which was characterized by strategic
uncertainties and the absence of a clear-cut enemy. An important step toward
greater Japanese support for cooperative security at the global level was made
when Japan passed the International Peace Cooperation Law and participated
for the first time in UN peacekeeping in Cambodia in 1992.
The main obstacle to Japan’s embrace of multilateral security approaches in
the region was the opposition of its American alliance partner to the concept
until the end of 1992.258 With the start of the Clinton administration in 1993,
the US abandoned its opposition to regional security approaches, which it had
harboured because of concern about losing its influence over regional security in
Asia and about further weakening the Japanese willingness to enhance
US–Japan security cooperation. The new US stance was expressed in the April
1996 Joint Declaration, in which both sides stated that they wanted ‘to further
develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and eventually, security dialogues
regarding Northeast Asia’.259 The statement was intended to convince China,
but also other Asian countries, that Japan and the US were not only focusing on
bilateral security approaches while providing US backing for Japan’s strong
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support for regional security approaches. Multilateral security approaches there-
fore became important as reassurance measures for Japan’s increasing military
efforts. At the beginning of the ARF’s discussion about confidence-building
measures, Japan even tried to replace the expression by using the term ‘mutual
assurance measures’.260 Regional security approaches have been useful in recon-
ciling the disparate aspects of engagement policy towards China, but also in
narrowing, in a much broader way, the gap between what Mike Mochizuki
called the ‘civilian internationalists’ and the ‘great power internationalists’ in
Japanese politics.261
Japan’s aims in embracing multilateral dialogue and exchanges which are most
relevant to its policy to China may thus be summarized in the following way:
• reassurance of all its Asian neighbours about its security policies, particu-
larly after the strengthening of Japan–US relations in 1996;
• building confidence and creating transparency;
• getting support from its Asian neighbours to prompt China to become a
responsible regional partner, while hedging against Chinese non-compliance
by preparing a front against China (notably concerning the peaceful solution
of the Taiwan issue);
• addressing the South China Sea issue and getting China’s support for the
peaceful resolution of other regional security issues (notably Korean divi-
sion);
• prevailing in the competition for regional influence with China.
The role of ARF
ARF has become the most important regional forum for security multilateralism
in Asia where Japan can work towards the achievement of the above agenda.
The Japanese government played an important part in the process which led to
the ARF’s creation in 1994. As early as September 1991 Foreign Minister
Nakayama proposed that security issues should be on the agenda of the ASEAN
Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN–PMC). But the Japanese initiative was
very guarded and Nakayama did not consider including China and Russia.262
Initially Japan planned to have groupings of concerned nations discuss problems
like Cambodia or the South China Sea, or to simply use existing fora like APEC
or the ASEAN–PMC. Until 1992 there were discussions in Japan as well as in
other APEC countries about whether APEC should also deal with security
issues.263 The Thai prime minister, Anand Panyarachun, who opened the APEC
meeting in Bangkok in September 1992, suggested in his opening speech that
APEC could play a role in regional political and security coordination. No other
member echoed this sentiment and the association agreed not to take on a polit-
ical role.264 Secretary of Defence William Perry was still suggesting the inclusion
of security issues into the APEC agenda in 1995, but by then this was no longer
an option because China did not want it, with Taiwan being an APEC member,
and ASEAN was concerned about its leadership.
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When ASEAN and its seven dialogue partners (Australia, the US, the EU,
Canada, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand) finally decided in July 1993 to
set up the ARF, China and Russia were observers, but they became members of
ARF when it had its first meeting in Bangkok in 1994. The Japanese government
had changed its position on the exclusion of China in spring 1993.265 Even
when the ARF was established the Japanese approach was very cautious,
insisting on the supplementary role (to the existing Japan–US military alliance) of
such institutionalised regional security dialogue and its function of reassurance
rather than confidence building.266 At the same time the Defence Agency
became interested in regional security dialogue and officially recognised that
dialogue among Asian nations was an important means of improving the secu-
rity environment in Asia and reducing uncertainties.267
In recent years the ARF process has not made much progress because of the
growing diversity of the group since the expansion of ASEAN’s membership
and the crisis in Indonesia, which had been the leading force. The ARF’s
programmatic intention of moving from confidence building via preventive
diplomacy to conflict resolution is notably hindered by China’s and Vietnam’s
reservations. At present, ARF discussions are limited to exploring the ‘overlap’
between confidence building and preventive diplomacy. Not least because of
China’s reluctance about cooperative security, progress is only moving ‘at a
pace comfortable to all participants’, by consensus and ‘on the basis of non-
interference into one another’s internal affairs’, as the standard expressions
describe it.268 There seems to be a very pronounced deference by the ASEAN
member states towards China. They consult closely with China before setting
the agenda for the Senior Officials Meetings so as to keep China on board,
which considerably weakens the ARF’s ability to handle conflicts of interest.269
Takagi Seiichiro, then professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy
Studies, called China’s attitude towards ARF ambiguous: on the one hand
China was praising ARF for its contribution; on the other it does not think that
multilateral security cooperation should touch the fundamental areas of the
defence system of individual nations.270
Despite all the shortcomings of ARF, China’s different views on confidence-
building measures and other regional issues, the inclusion of China into the
ARF and ASEAN has drawn Beijing into regional security multilateralism more
than its leadership was initially willing to accept.271 This success has been paral-
leled at the global level by China becoming more and more involved in
multilateral regimes.272 Within the space of three years the Chinese went from
being hostile to confidence-building measures, to voluntarily co-chairing the
working group on confidence-building measures, to proposing their own.273
While initially China refused any multilateral discussions about the South China
Sea, it now accepts them as long as they do not touch on issues of sovereignty.
Moreover, it has accepted that a resolution has to be based on international law.
The pressure from the ARF for greater Chinese military transparency had a
decisive influence on China’s decision to issue two defence-related White Papers.
Japan played an important role in China’s hesitant steps towards greater Chinese
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military transparency by strongly pushing for it bilaterally as well as multilater-
ally.274 Even if their content does not go much beyond what was publicly known
already, it was the first step in the right direction.275 China still puts an emphasis
on declaratory measures (for example ‘no first use’) without inspections.276 One
should also consider that several ARF participants are also uncomfortable with a
high degree of transparency, which is demanded by Western countries.277
ASEAN’s desire for leadership in regional security talks has also led to the
first trilateral summit meetings between Japan, China and the Republic of
Korea. Since ASEAN and the ARF’s agenda were initially focused on ASEAN
issues, while some of the most urgent disputes concern Northeast Asia, ASEAN
was risking diminished saliency as well as losing its leadership in regional secu-
rity. For this reason as well as others, since 1997 ASEAN has been organising
the ‘ASEAN3’ forum on the occasion of the post-ministerial meetings. This
forum aims to promote economic linkages and maintain a direct line of
communication with Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul. At the Hanoi meeting of
December 1998 they agreed to institutionalize the meeting and to include a
security agenda. The new forum prompted Prime Minister Obuchi at the time
to suggest a trilateral Japan–China–South Korea summit meeting, but he was
rebuffed by the Chinese side. When Prime Minister Zhu Rongji agreed at short
notice to a trilateral informal breakfast meeting during the Manila Summit of
November 1999, Zhu initially insisted that this mini-summit should only discuss
economic issues. China was obviously concerned about the relationship with
North Korea and was more interested in a Free-Trade Agreement with
ASEAN.278 The three leaders met again trilaterally on the occasion of the
ASEAN3 summit in Singapore in 2000. They agreed to meet annually at the
same occasion and agreed to designate 2002 as the official year of exchange
between their citizens.279 Korea expects from this trilateral forum help from
China on North Korea, participation at the head table of Northeast Asian
leaders, and balancing of its two big neighbours to enhance its own diplomatic
position. Japan hopes to create yet another channel for communication with
China and get support from Korea for the issues where both agree. Since Tokyo
is excluded from the Four-Power talks on Korea, such a venue is also a means of
increasing its say on the peninsula. China’s interest is mostly economic and it
would prefer to stick to an economic agenda but has by now accepted that
regional security issues have to be discussed because of Japan’s and Korea’s
strong desire to do so. But China’s role will be limited because it is only repre-
sented by its prime minister, whereas the president has the final authority in
Chinese foreign and security policy.
South China Sea
With the South China Sea being the greatest long-term security issue in the
region and Japan not being able to bring it up in its bilateral security exchanges
with China, Tokyo has sought to use regional security fora to deal with it. China,
however, has been very reticent to include security issues in fora which are of
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direct relevance to it. This concerns not only the Taiwan issue (which the other
ARF participants would like to raise) but also the South China Seas issue, in
which most ASEAN members are directly involved. At the July 1993 ASEAN
Foreign Ministers meeting, Qian Qichen stated that it (ARF) ‘should not make
decisions nor take common action on a certain country, a certain region or a
certain question’.280 China also opposes the involvement of states which are not
geographically contingent to the South China Sea, which excludes not only the
US but also Japan. China is wary of discussions even among regional claimants
in order to avoid the internationalization of the conflict. It now allows the
discussion of the South China Sea in general, but not its legal territorial aspects.
High hopes had been put on efforts by ASEAN, the ARF and an ongoing series
of informal Workshops since 1990 on the South China Sea.281 However, these
workshops have not got far, and ASEAN and China, and even the ASEAN
members among themselves, have failed to narrow their differences on a
proposed Code of Conduct.282 While ASEAN wants specifically to include a
halt to any occupation of islands and reefs, China insists on a much weaker
wording which excludes any action that would ‘complicate the situation’.283
One approach Japan has started to use in order to influence the issue of the
South China Sea indirectly and to promote cooperative security approaches in a
tangible way is the proposal of measures to improve maritime safety in the area.
Nishihara Masashi suggested in 1995 the establishment of a UN naval and air
peacekeeping force to monitor the movement of ships and aircraft in the South
China Sea.284 Sato Koichi, of Hoso University, proposed that Japan could work
towards the establishment of something like the 1968 Malacca Strait Council.285
The increase in piracy in the South China Sea in the last few years has prompted
the Japanese to become active in this area. As a result of some well-publicized
piracy cases the aircraft and vessels of the Japanese coastguard were deployed as
far as Thailand (the Alondra Rainbow case) and India’s Andaman Islands (the
Global Mars case).286 Subsequently, Prime Minister Obuchi proposed an anti-
piracy conference at the Japan–ASEAN Summit held in Manila November
1999. In March 2000 Japan sponsored a ‘Preparatory Meeting of the Coast
Guard Agencies for the Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships’ in Singapore, followed later by the ‘International
Conference on All Maritime Related Concerns, Both Governmental and Private,
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ and the ‘Regional
Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ in Tokyo
(27–29 April 2000). The latter was attended by coastguard agencies from Brunei,
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam. At this conference, Japan proposed to ‘explore the possibility of
providing support for those Authorities which request technical assistance’ to
train personnel and provide relevant technology and equipment.287 As we saw in
Chapter 2, China has been, directly or indirectly, involved in piracy in the
region. Incidentally, when in 2000 the coastguard considered the budgetary
request for two jets capable of flying long distances because of the mounting
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cases of piracy against Japanese vessels in Southeast Asian waters, officials stated
that the aircraft would also be tasked to keep a watch on Chinese research vessels
in Japan’s EEZ.288
China has, however, reacted rather reluctantly to the Japanese initiative. The
main reason is most likely concern about any infringement of its sovereignty and
any admission that its anti-piracy measures may not be sufficient. Another
circumstance is China’s opposition to Japan assuming a regional leadership role
(see Chapter 4). During the anti-piracy meetings China opposed the presence of
Japanese coastguard vessels beyond Japan’s maritime borders.289 China said it
did not consider it necessary to hold joint exercises in waters related to China, as
was suggested by Japan. China also strongly resisted Japan’s proposal for joint
exercises and patrols. ‘We clearly don’t need joint exercises with other countries,’
said Li Ding, a senior border-security official from China’s Public Security
Ministry; ’We already have an assured ability to investigate piracy crimes
ourselves.’ China’s suspicions were certainly not alleviated by India criticizing the
Chinese stance.290
In the context of diffusing the South China Sea issue one may also mention
US military Track II activities, in which Japan has always taken part, whereas
Chinese participation is more recent. In the mid-1980s the US military in the
Pacific Command started to socialize military and civilian defence officials from
various Asian countries through regional seminars and conferences.291 Since the
beginning of the 1990s the US Navy in Newport has organized the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which is part of the International Sea Power
Symposium. China took part in the WPNS for the first time in 1996, when it
met in Tokyo. During the later years of the Clinton administration the US mili-
tary became very active in promoting cooperative security and joint exercises in
the field of disaster relief.292 Although China has not yet taken part, it was
represented by observers when the exercise called ‘Pacific Reach 2000’ (a multi-
lateral submarine rescue exercise) was held in October 2000 with the US,
Japan, South Korea and Singapore.293 China warned Japan about the latter
event ‘that countries concerned in carrying out this kind of activities or military
exercises should not do anything that may be detrimental to stability and peace
in this part of the world’.294 But in June 2001 China participated in the first
Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise, which was sponsored by
Singapore.295
Track II and Track III security discussions
The multilateral security dialogue in Asia crosses the borders of Track I
(government-to-government), Track II and Track III. The borderlines between
the first two are very diffuse: they often mean the participation of the same
government officials in an official or private capacity, in addition to academics
and specialists, and the funding of both may come directly or indirectly from
the government.296 The main governmental institution on the Japanese side for
Track II is the Gaimusho-funded Japan Institute of International Affairs
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(Kokusai Mondai Kenkyusho, JIIA), which is led by diplomats on secondment
and staffed by private researchers. In contrast to the bilateral Track I level,
Track II and Track III security discussions have been easier to establish and
operate. There are now a number of fora which include Japan and China
either within Asia-wide or trilateral (for example involving Japan, China and the
US) fora.
Asia-wide, the most important Track II forum is CSCAP, established in June
1994, which supports the ARF through working groups formed to address issues
identified in ARF statements. It brings together security specialists from
academia and former as well as current defence officials.297 Other major Track
II organisations promoting regional security dialogue are the North Pacific
Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and the Northeast Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (NEACD).298
The first Asia-wide Track II forum in which China has taken a major role is
the Boao Asia Forum, established in 2000. It was initiated by the former
Australian Prime Minister Hawke and the former Philippine President Ramos in
1998 to create an Asian version of the Davos World Economic Forum, but
China became the main actor in organizing its first meeting in November 2000
in Boao on Hainan Island. The meeting was attended by delegations from
twenty-five Asian countries to discuss issues concerning regional economic devel-
opment and cooperation. From the Japanese side, Okamoto Yukio and
Nakasone Yasuhiro, both known for their interest in security rather than
economic issues, took part.299 The Chinese side invited Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichiro to a meeting of the forum in April 2002, on the occasion of the thir-
tieth anniversary of the establishment of Japanese–Chinese diplomatic relations.
Trilateral Track II and Track III discussions in various configurations have
become particularly important because they may facilitate Japanese–Chinese
encounters, they can offset trilateral configurations from which either Japan or
China is excluded, they may prevent playing one against the other, and they can
reduce the suspicion of other East Asian players about Japan–China contacts.
The latter applies particularly to the Republic of Korea, which has a histori-
cally ingrained concern about being squeezed by either China or Japan, or, in
the worst case, by both at the same time. The most important is the Nitchukan
no Sankyoku Forum (Japan–China–Korea Trilateral Forum), established in
1996, which is organized by JIIA on the Japanese side, the China Institute of
International Studies (Zhongguo Guoji Wenti Yanjiusuo, CIIS), and the Institute
of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) in Seoul.300
The main trilateral Track II and Track III conferences are between Japan,
China and the US. In April 1996 the Japan Centre for International Exchange
(JCIE) launched its ‘Global ThinkNet’ scheme, which in a way laid the founda-
tion for such trilateral security discussions either at Track II or at Track III level.
In December 1996 JCIE launched a trilateral workshop in Beijing in collabora-
tion with the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, and the Chinese Reform Forum on the Chinese side and the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace on the US side.301 It was followed by
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several similar JCIE-sponsored conferences.302 Trilateral Track III talks were
also initiated by several private institutions, like RIPS, which invited the Beijing
Institute of Strategic Studies and the Center for Strategic & International
Studies in Washington.303 Several substantive publications also resulted from a
trilateral meeting organised by RIPS, Pacific Forum Hawaii (Center for
Strategic and International Studies; CSIS) and Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue
Xuehui.304
At the same time, the Japanese government has also been pursuing the idea of
a trilateral Track I forum. In the spring of 1997 it approached the US about
holding a China–Japan–US summit on security in the Asia-Pacific. The US did
not react to the suggestion but in August made a similar proposal to China.305 It
conveyed the proposal, through National Security Advisor Samuel Berger when
he visited China in August 1997, as an issue on which the US wanted to reach
agreement during President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Washington in October that
year.306 The matter was discussed again at a summit between Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto and US President Bill Clinton in Denver in mid-June 1997
on Hashimoto’s initiative in order to prepare his meeting with Jiang in
September 1997. Hashimoto proposed a meeting of defence ministers from
Japan, the United States and China, a trilateral summit of the three countries
and a Northeast Asian sub-regional security forum that would focus on the
Korean Peninsula, based on current bilateral security dialogues.307 The US
seemed to have continued a cautious attitude towards the idea, saying it was too
early to discuss such issues when the two governments had not yet reached an
interim agreement on the new guidelines for bilateral defence cooperation.308
This negative position was reversed in 1997. In September of the same year
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told visiting Japanese journalists that China could
agree to hold a trilateral meeting if it was an informal meeting among academic
circles.309 At the November 1997 Li Peng–Hashimoto summit in Japan both
leaders emphasized ‘promoting tripartite relations’.310 In July 1998 a prepara-
tory trilateral conference in Beijing allowed the then president of the Japan
Institute of International Affairs, Matsunaga Nobuo, to get China’s agreement
for a trilateral dialogue at Track II level. The first trilateral meeting then took
place at Harvard University in January 1999; it was followed by another in Japan
in September of the same year and two meetings in 2000. At the May 1999
summit between Prime Minister Obuchi and President Clinton, the latter
expressed public support for trilateral efforts for the first time by expressing his
hope that ‘great things could be achieved in the Asia-Pacific region’ if the three
countries cooperated.311
The difficult birth of this trilateral Track II forum (and the failure to have it
at Track I level as planned by Japan) symbolizes the treacherous dynamics of
the trilateral Japan–US–China relationship. Interviews by this author with
some participants prove the same with regard to its actual operation. The orig-
inal hope of Japan was to make it more difficult for China to say one thing to
the US and another to Japan.312 In addition, Tokyo hoped to be more
successful in soothing China’s concerns about the intensification of
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Japanese–US defence relations since 1995. But there was also concern about
possible damage to the Japan–US relationship, and the Defence Agency consid-
ered it possible that the US would dominate such a forum if there was not first
an improvement in Japan–China relations.313 For China, the venture raised
fears of Japan and the US ganging up on it and diminishing its ability to offset
its weakness by playing one against the other. Turning down the proposal for
the forum or reducing its level was seen as a means of showing displeasure
with the 1996 Joint Declaration. Lu Zhongwei, vice-president of CIIS, clearly
expressed that China thought the time not yet ripe for Japan–China–US
dialogue because China was facing a two-against-one situation, particularly in
the wake of the revised defence guidelines.314 From the US perspective, we
have seen the concern that a trilateral forum might reduce its leverage on
Japan to follow through with the 1996 Joint Declaration. Moreover, it enhances
the US diplomatic burden.315
The evaluation of security dialogues
In contrast to the bilateral level, regional security dialogues and exchanges at
Track II and III levels have flourished and have come to play an important role
in Japan’s political enmeshment of China.
The relative ease of establishing Track II and Track III fora is due to the
lower expectations and, in the case of the Japan–China security relationship in
particular, the lower weight of the burdening baggage of the bilateral relation-
ship. Moreover, Asian countries are more comfortable with dialogue fora:
whereas the Atlantic believes in institution building, Asia has shown more
interest in creating networks.316 But, as Fukushima Akiko notes, Track II
dialogues may be easy to create but it becomes difficult to maintain the initial
momentum unless there is a certain raison d’être.317
The dialectic dynamics between the various Track levels are very useful for
each of them. Without the consensus-building work of the Track II and Track
III level meetings, the regional Track I institutions, which in the security field is
the ARF, would not have been created as early, and this certainly had a positive
influence on Japanese–Chinese bilateral exchanges. However, the trilateral activ-
ities at Track II and III or ARF have not yet led to a trilateral
government-to-government forum.
On the other hand, the following observations of China’s attitude have
slowed progress on China’s involvement in multilateralism in general, and raise
the question of the efficacy of multilateral approaches in time of a crisis:318
1 China remains ambivalent, if not suspicious, of global regimes; it is
concerned about any infringement of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,
foreign influence.
2 China aims at maximization of rights and minimization of responsibilities
and obligations.
3 It puts primacy on economic growth.
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4 In the case of security multilateralism, China still demonstrates a greater
tendency towards tactical learning (adaptation) rather than normative
learning.
A further obstacle related specifically to the Japanese–Chinese relationship is the
rivalry between the two countries (see Chapter 4). Based on China’s cultural
background and recent historical experience, Yuan Jing-Dong described the
essence of Chinese attitudes towards multilateralism and regionalism as ‘thinking
unilaterally, pursuing issues bilaterally, and posturing multilaterally’.319
From Japan’s perspective (a perspective shared by the other Asian countries to
varying degrees), regional security approaches are only supplementary to
national security approaches and, moreover, face many obstacles due to the
diversity of the members. Multilateral dialogue and exchanges have ‘worked’ so
far because there has not been a serious challenge by a major crisis – and thanks
to military and political power balancing. The Indonesian political crisis and
Timor have shown, however, that ASEAN, let alone ARF, has difficulty in jointly
undertaking any major action or even finding a common position.
Have Japan’s efforts (and that of other relevant countries) been successful in
employing regional security approaches for the political enmeshment of China?
Judging the issue as a process and as only part of a much more complex policy,
the answer should be positive. China has been willing gradually to accept greater
involvement in regional security cooperation, albeit with considerable reserva-
tion and ambiguity. China now feels a greater urge to defend its security policies
and to reassure its Asian neighbours that it does not want to constitute a threat
to them. The following quote from the Gaimusho’s spokesman in March 1997
gives an official view of this development:
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Prime Minister Li Peng
specifically said that development of China would not become a threat to
any other country. This was the first time a Chinese leader explicitly talked
about this. The Government of Japan does not make an official assessment
to this part of the statement. However, it may indicate that the Chinese
leaders are more sensitive about the reactions of China’s neighbors on this
subject. Therefore, we will continue dialogue with the Government of
China on defense policy in order to realize more and more transparency in
the defense policy of China in the future.320
The academic discussion about the success of this element of engagement
evolves around whether the progress in China’s attitude is just tactical or norma-
tive learning. I would like to follow Bates Gill’s dismissal of such either/or
dichotomy and speak of processes which occur interactively – that is, ‘learning
and adaptation’, ‘learning to adapt’ and ‘adapting to learn’.321 The slowness of
these processes cannot only be put at China’s door but also at Japan’s: as an
advanced industrialized country with over 125 million inhabitants, one might
expect greater intellectual and political input from Japan into regional coopera-
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tive security.322 In addition, Japan’s failure to come to terms with its historical
legacy has not helped either.
B Economic enmeshment
Introduction
Economic enmeshment is based on the assumed pacifying and democratizing
effects of increased economic interdependence. The use of economic policy
tools for the prevention of potential security challenges by China is aptly
described by the picture of two boxers locked in a close embrace which prevents
either of them from generating the necessary force seriously to hurt the other.323
The objective of this part is to give a brief overview of Japan’s role in China’s
economic integration at the bilateral, regional and global level in terms of trade,
investment and institutional anchoring. Against this background, we will ask in
Chapter 4 how this integration affects the bilateral security relationship and to
what extent it has created dependencies which could be beneficial for Japan to
protect its security interests.
At the bilateral level, trade, FDI and ODA are the most important instru-
ments for economic enmeshment. The multilateral level is concerned with
supporting the activities of the former (for example creating rules for FDI) and
making China adhere to international norms. There are many specific policies
which straddle political and economic enmeshment but cannot be dealt with in
detail here. One is the use of ODA aimed at helping China to build a more func-
tional political system which supports economic enmeshment (for example
assistance to build a judicial system which facilitates the dispute settlement
needed for international economic activities) as well as political enmeshment
(cooperation, confidence building). Another example is helping China with its
environmental problems, which, apart from reducing problems of trans-
boundary pollution reaching Japan and enhancing Japan’s ecological security,
supports economic enmeshment (making China’s economic modernization
sustainable) as well as political enmeshment (cooperation, confidence building,
the creation of ecological interdependence).324
In Japan’s public perception and official pronouncements, economic
enmeshment figures as the most prominent policy tool in Japan’s engagement
strategy towards China. The main condition which facilitates this emphasis on
the Liberal agenda of engagement is Japan’s position as a ‘global civilian
power’. The prominence of economic enmeshment in Japan’s policy towards
China is also regionally welcome, since a more Realist emphasis is feared to
give rise to political and military tensions. Historically, the civilian-power
project owes much to the Japanese reflection on its war of aggression against
China before 1945.
But economic enmeshment would not have been possible without China’s
economic opening since 1978, its emphasis on achieving economic security and
‘comprehensive national power’, and the importance given to economic relations
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with Japan. Moreover, the arrangement of renouncing war reparations in the
expectation of major Japanese ODA flows to China has given Japan a particu-
larly strong position in China’s economic modernisation.
Economic enmeshment of China is widely supported by all major political
orientations in Japan. Even specialists like Nishihara Masashi who emphasize the
potential military challenge of China express support for this approach while at
the same time urging that the power balancing element of engagement not be
neglected.325 Ozawa Ichiro says in his ‘Blueprint for Japan’ that ‘Japan must do
everything possible to foster China’s stability and development’.326 Business
interests were a major influence in the preparation of the normalization of
diplomatic relations in 1972. With the growing relocation of Japanese manufac-
turing to China and the importation of manufacturing goods from China,
economic interests in Japan today go well beyond the trade sector, where they
were established in the 1970s. Moreover, a majority of Japanese are convinced
that the promotion of China’s economic development will also promote democ-
ratization in that country. In a Yomiuri Shimbun poll in 1997, 57.1 per cent of the
Japanese polled expressed the belief that economic development in China will
promote democratization, compared with only 27.7 per cent in the US. Only
18.5 per cent of the Japanese said no to the proposition, but 51.7 per cent of the
Americans did so.327
The Chinese side welcomes foreign economic interests since the decision in
1978 for an export- and FDI-led modernization of the economy. Within the
concept of ‘comprehensive national power’, military power and economic power
is given similar status in China’s modernization. Moreover, China is espousing
the idea of economic security being part of military security. China’s National
Defence White Paper in 1998 said:
Economic security is becoming daily more important for state security. In
international relations geopolitical, military security and ideological factors
still play a role that cannot be ignored, but the role of economic factors is
becoming more outstanding, along with growing economic contacts among
nations … more and more countries regard economic security as an impor-
tant aspect of state security.328
Trade
Japan’s economic interactions with China have only taken off on a grand scale
since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. Before 1972 the Cold
War context and Japan’s submission to the US’s China containment policy did
not allow trade and investment to occur on a significant scale despite the obvious
complementarity of both economies (China: cheap labour, raw material, huge
market; Japan: capital, technology, economic aid and export market). On the
Japanese side, it was private business interests driving economic interactions,
with the government trying to reconcile their scope with the parameters given by
Japan’s alliance with the US. From 1972 the government has been actively
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encouraging economic interactions, providing a facilitating framework (for
example an investment protection agreement) and using governmental tools
(notably ODA) in order to promote economic enmeshment as well as Japan’s
economic interests. Both governments have been actively promoting Japanese
FDI into China, supporting if not initiating bodies like the Japan–China Trade
Expansion Council (established in 1985) and the Japan–China Investment
Promotion Organization (established in 1990). Although private economic inter-
ests became the driving motor of the phenomenal rise of Japanese–Chinese
economic interaction after 1972, the facilitating role of government has been
instrumental in encouraging companies to go into China despite stark contrasts
between the two economic systems, the ups and downs of China’s economic
modernization policies, and bilateral political frictions.
In 1993 China became Japan’s second most frequent destination for exports
(see Table 3.2). Today China is Japan’s second-largest trade partner, after the US,
whereas for China, Japan is the largest. According to the Japan Export Trade
Organization (JETRO), the total of Japan’s import and export trade with China
in 2000 came to US$85.8 billion, an increase of 29.5 per cent over the previous
year, and for the first time topping the 10 per cent mark as a percentage of
Japan’s total trade figure. According to US figures, US–China two-way trade in
2000 was US$116.4 billion.329 Since 1988 China has enjoyed an uninterrupted
trade surplus with Japan, but only according to Japanese statistics.330 In the
period 1995–2000, this surplus increased from US$11.6 billion to US$25.3
billion.331
Investment
The role of Japanese investment in China’s economic success and in creating inter-
dependence between the two countries is impressive, and trade and investment have
become closely linked due to Japanese relocation of manufacturing to China.
Overall, however, trade has developed in a more positive way than investment in
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Table 3.2 Japanese–Chinese trade (in US$ billion)
Exports Change (%) Imports Change (%) Total Trade balance
1988  9.475 +14.3  9.858 +33.2 19.334  –0.382
1989  8.515  –10.1 11.145 +13.1 19.661  –2.629
1990  6.129  –28.0 12.053   +8.1 18.183  –5.923
1991  8.593 +40.2 14.215 +17.9 22.808  –5.622
1992 11.949 +39.1 16.952 +19.3 28.901  –5.003
1993 17.273 +44.6 20.564 +21.3 37.837  –3.291
1994 18.681  +8.2 27.566 +34.0 46.247  –8.884
1995 21.930 +17.4 35.922 +30.3 57.853 –13.991
1996 21.891   –0.2 40.543 +12.9 62.435 –18.652
1997 21.781   –0.5 42.041   +3.7 63.823 –20.259
1998 20.098   –7.7 36.893  –12.3 56.991 –16.795
Source: Gaiko Forum, October 1999, p. 72
terms of absolute and relative amounts as well as in comparison with Japan’s other
Asian FDI recipients.332
Since 1992 Japanese investment in China has exceeded US$1 billion every
year. But US investment outstripped Japan’s investment in 1993 by 60 per cent.
Japanese investment increased more after the increase of the yen in 1993.333
This development was helped by rising production costs in Japan and the need
to reduce direct exports from Japan to the US.
According to Japanese figures, the total Japanese investment in China at the
end of 1998 amounted to 18,000 cases, with a value of US$33 billion. Until
1996 China came first in Asia as the destination for Japanese investment; in 1997
it came second after Indonesia; in 1998 third, with 16.3 per cent, after Thailand,
with 21.0 per cent, and Indonesia, with 16.5 per cent.334 The Asian economic
crisis in 1997 affected China considerably, because it led to a decline in Japan’s
importance as a provider of FDI and a market for Chinese products. Japan’s
FDI declined from 258 cases in FY 1997 to 112 in FY 1998. According to
Chinese figures for the calendar (rather than the fiscal) year of the two years, the
number of cases on a contract basis fell only from 1,402 to 1,198.335 Since 2000
there seems to be an increase again.336
The scale of Japan’s FDI is more important than the above bilateral figures
would suggest. Bilateral trade and investment are only part of a geographically
and economically much larger picture, which is related to the manufacturing
network Japanese companies have established in the whole of East Asia and in
which China has been firmly integrated.337 Although FDI figures put Japan
behind Hong Kong and Taiwan, the figures for the latter two cannot entirely be
divorced from Japanese FDI sources. Much of Hong Kong’s investment actually
originates in other countries, including to a substantial degree Japan. Japanese
banks play a major role in Hong Kong. Taiwanese investment in China comes to
an equally large extent from Japanese sources. If we take this into consideration,
Japanese investment in China is probably higher than US investment in China.
As a result, Japanese companies are directly as well as indirectly acting as
providers of capital, technology, market and general production/trade faciliators
(through trading companies).
ODA
ODA is the policy tool of economic enmeshment which is most directly related
to the government’s China policy, notably also in the security area. It is also the
most important material policy instrument to enhance trade and FDI. This
intention to draw Beijing closer to the West by encouraging Deng Xiaoping’s
policies of economic reform and opening the country was expressed by Prime
Minister Ohira when he decided in December 1979 to extend the first yen loan
to China.338
Facilitated by its economic success and capital surplus, Japan achieved the
position as China’s top or second-highest aid donor.339 China is one of the
world’s largest recipient of economic aid, and total net official flows (including
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official development assistance and other official flows) amounted to US$56
billion during 1981–98. Multilateral institutions, of which Japan is often the
second-largest contributor, accounted for the largest share in this period, with
US$24 billion. Japan was the largest bilateral source of official flows during this
period, with US$18 billion (to Indonesia, US$21 billion; Thailand US$14
billion). Around 90 per cent of Japan’s ODA to China consists of loans. In 1999
Japan provided US$1.23 billion in ODA to China. Except for the two years
1990 and 1991, Japan provided more than half of China’s bilateral ODA
between 1979 and 1998. China’s biggest ODA donors in 1998 were Japan,
Germany, the UK, Canada and France, in that order. Japan’s aid accounts for
more than one-third of overall (bilateral and multilateral) ODA to China and it
occupies over 30 per cent of state investments done through the national budget.
Japanese banks accounted for one-third to one-quarter of the foreign-bank
lending to China in the mid- to late 1990s, but the Japanese share fell markedly
after 1997.340
Multilateral economic involvement
Multilateral economic organizations play an important part in economic
enmeshment in various ways, most importantly by transforming the country’s
preferences to conform with those adopted by the other member states and to
promote further integration.341 Espousing the assumptions and goals of these
organizations, Japan was supportive of China’s involvement throughout the
1990s. China has become a member of a number of global and regional organi-
zations. In 1985 China decided to participate in PECC, and joined the group at
the Vancouver meeting in November 1986. It joined APEC in November 1991,
along with Taiwan and Hong Kong, thus marking a further step towards over-
coming its international isolation after the Tiananmen crackdown. At the time of
writing this book, China had still not joined WTO, although it joined its prede-
cessor organisation the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as
early as 1982 as an observer and applied for full membership in 1986. Japan has
been actively supporting China’s WTO membership and it signed the required
bilateral agreement with China in July 1999, whereas the US did so only in
November 1999. Although the Japanese move is presented as sending a political
signal to the US about speeding up China’s WTO membership, Japan is not seen
as a facilitator or go-between for China–WTO relations. However, Japan seems
to be arguing for making it easier for China.342
As in the case of China’s enmeshment in regional security, its participation in
economic multilateralism and regionalism is coloured by considerable reluctance
and minimal input. In the case of the WTO, it is, moreover, questionable
whether China is politically able and/or willing to play by the rules because of
the expected onerous costs to the Chinese economy, at least at the beginning.
Takagi Seiichiro characterized China’s involvement in Asia-Pacific economic
cooperation in the following way, which also applies in many ways to what was
said above regarding its involvement in regional security cooperation:
Between power balancing and enmeshment policies 137
1 The Chinese approach is basically reactive and passive.
2 It is based more on damage limitation than making a positive contribution
to multilateralism.
3 China wants to proceed in an incrementalist way.
4 China’s involvement seem to be related to the ‘greater dynamics, such as
regional or global developments’.343
An additional feature is the possibility of Japanese–Chinese rivalry colouring the
creation and shaping of international regimes. In 1997 China – but also the US,
albeit for different reasons – opposed Japan’s proposed creation of a US$100
billion Asian Monetary Fund to help the regional economies after the economic
crisis.344 Later China changed its attitude in the face of widespread Asian
support for the idea. On the positive side, multilateral economic institutions have
so far been successful in prompting China to adhere to the rules, although China
has always bargained hard to protect its national interests.345
Japan and China’s export- and FDI-led strategy
Japan’s economic enmeshment of China has contributed significantly to Beijing’s
economic success and to the degree of bilateral and multilateral enmeshment.
Since 1980 China’s real GDP has grown more than 7 per cent annually in all but
three years (1981, 1989 and 1990).346 Although the rate of China’s economic
growth has slowed down since 1996, China still has an annual growth rate of
around 7 per cent, and is expected to keep the rate at from 6 to 7 percent during
the first decade of the twenty-first century.347 While this may seem high to the
mature industrialized countries, particularly to Japan with its very low growth
rate, for China it is the minimum rate which is required to absorb new arrivals
on the job market. A growth rate under 8 per cent may even lead to an increase
in the size of non-performing loans in the troubled financial sector.348 China’s
export expanded almost twenty-fold in the period 1978–99, and its import
almost fifteen-fold. In 1999 China ranked as the ninth-largest export nation and
tenth-largest import nation in the world. It is now the seventh-largest trading
nation and increased its share of world trade to 3.9 per cent in 2000. Total
foreign trade grew by 31.5 per cent, to reach US$474 billion in 2000.349 As a
result, China’s foreign trade:GDP ratio rose from 11.4 per cent in 1979 to 38.1
per cent in 1992, and reached 40 per cent in 1994.350 The growing integration
of China into the world economy is also illustrated by the role of FDI: joint
ventures and other forms of ownership with foreign participation now account
for over 50 per cent of China’s trade.351 According to some economic indicators
(for example the GDP:trade ratio or the role of FDI in the domestic economy),
China is even more integrated into the world economy than Japan.352 China has
attracted the third-largest amount of foreign investment in the world, behind
only the US and Britain (overtaking Britain in 2000), rising from US$41 billion
in 2000 to US$46.8 billion in 2001.353 In Chapter 4 we will try to evaluate the
implications of this economic achievement for Japan’s security interest.
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Conclusions
The 1990s saw a strengthening of the military but also of the political power-
balancing elements of Japan’s engagement towards Japan. Not all the
momentum came from China’s growing security challenges: the strengthening of
the Japan–US security relationship and notably TMD were also inspired by
North Korea, but China’s shadow loomed always in the background. Moreover,
referring publicly to China was not considered diplomatic and conducive to the
overall strategy of engagement. Japan’s greater diplomatic assertiveness was the
general background for the efforts of power balancing through building up secu-
rity relations with Asian countries. At the same time, Japan enhanced
considerably the political and economic enmeshment elements as a complement
to the Realist elements of engagement. Japan’s efforts at bilateral and multilat-
eral security dialogues at Track I, II and III levels met with certain, albeit slow,
success in involving China more closely in bilateral and multilateral security fora,
which gave Japan, China and any other fora members the opportunity to explain
their positions and gain greater understanding of the other sides’ perceptions
and reactions. Japan has certainly played a useful role in China becoming less
reluctant towards involvement in multilateral fora. The instruments of economic
enmeshment have not only contributed to China’s economic development (as
well as to Japan’s commercial benefit) but also integrated China to a great extent
into the regional and global economy. Have these various elements in Japan’s
engagement policy made the Japanese–Chinese security relationship more stable
and offset the negative developments of the 1990s? To answer this question I
want to evaluate in more detail the various dynamics resulting from Japan’s
engagement and question some of the assumptions behind engagement.
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There is nothing … that adequately prepares us for the mixture of respect,
disdain, emulation, and rivalry that has characterized the relationship between
China and Japan for many centuries.1
Introduction
Bearing in mind that Japan is only one of the countries pursuing engagement
towards China, albeit the most important one after the US, this chapter looks at
the positive and negative dynamics arising from the different policy tools of
Japan’s engagement. First of all I want to look at the general debate about the
assumptions underlying political and economic enmeshment. Economic
enmeshment can address many problems and prevent China from opting for
security policies which would be inimical to Japan’s security interests, but the
vagaries of economic development, even when successful, do not point to any
predetermined positive or negative outcome. One of the ambivalent dynamics
arising from political and economic enmeshment is the impact on
Japanese–Chinese rivalry and competition. It has been referred to several times
in the preceding chapters and deserves a comprehensive analysis as a shaping
factor as well as a consequence of engagement. Since the US is one of the most
important variables for Japan’s security relations with China, I want to examine
more closely the dynamics inherent in the triangular framework for the pursuit
of engagement. Finally, we have to look at the gradual abandonment of
Japanese deference and restraint towards China because of the recognition of its
negative dynamics in the face of growing rivalry and competition in the bilateral
relationship.
Open issues of political and economic enmeshment
The general debate between the Realist and Liberal schools of international
relations about the conceptual soundness of engagement of China is still raging,
because China has become neither an aggressive expansionist power nor a capi-
talist liberal democracy which has renounced the use of force, for example for
solving the Taiwan issue.2 China’s future as a peaceful and compliant member of
4 The dynamics 
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the international community is still uncertain, with many obstacles on the road
being acknowledged by both schools. The Realists emphasize the likelihood of a
negative outcome because of their Realist assumptions, but they cannot prove it.
They point to China’s growing military power, its increasing assertiveness and its
willingness at least to threaten to solve the Taiwan issue by non-peaceful means.
The German sinologist Kay Möller, referring to the limitations of China’s
opening policy and the very serious structural, domestic and foreign policy prob-
lems, considers a peaceful evolution the least likely outcome.3 Since no one
considers fully fledged containment politically feasible as an alternative to
engagement, Realists can only recommend a mix of policy tools which is more
or less weighted towards military and political power balancing and hedging.
However, this leaves them vulnerable to the accusation of inviting the very
outcome they warn about.
Liberalists can refer to some encouraging tendencies in China towards
becoming a more democratic and capitalist country, but they still cannot claim
that these tendencies are irreversible, that the feared transition period will be
mastered successfully; nor can they establish a clear causality between a given
engagement policy and the outcome, exclude the (later) hijacking of economic
strength for non-peaceful purposes or guarantee the political and ecological
sustainability of economic development.4 Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott L.
Kastner cautiously conclude that the goals of economic enmeshment have been
achieved, but warn that core issues of national sovereignty and the uncertainty
about future political scenarios may reduce the role of economic interests.5 As
we saw in Chapter 2, China’s economic modernization has already caused
serious social and ecological disruptions, with as yet unknown consequences for
China’s political stability and the political sustainability of the course of current
reform. Since the economic reform process creates positive as well as negative
dynamics, it cannot be considered to be on ‘autopilot’.6 There is concern that
China’s economic growth path – export- and FDI-led development – may create
the same conditions which devastated parts of Southeast Asia in 1997.7
Moreover, China’s economic modernization creates non-traditional security
concerns including transboundary pollution, illegal immigration and competi-
tion for scarce resources on the international market. The growing opening of
China to international market forces has weakened central government control,
which may reduce the temptation of using military means to solve security
issues, but it can also prevent the government from effectively limiting such
unwelcome developments.
We saw in Chapter 3 that China’s response to political and economic multi-
lateralism is still hesitant, ambiguous and minimal. The question is why China,
as a major and self-confident power, should accept rules which were written by
Western-oriented governments before it joined and which may incur economic
and/or political costs. But even if China joins, can the relevant institutions main-
tain their character in view of China’s political and economic size and its
revisionist agenda? The problem is whether the expected gains in advancing the
goals of engagement by admitting China to a multilateral institution will not
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outweigh the costs to that institution in terms of its efficiency and coherence.
This problem has been very prominently raised in the last years in the context of
China’s membership of the WTO or ARF.
But, despite these reservations, Liberals are positive about developments in
China. While traditional Realism is still the dominant feature in the PRC’s
foreign-policy outlook and content, PRC analysts have begun using concepts
such as interdependence, geonomics, global norms and international community
as China’s open-door policy and its economic interdependence with the outside
world have developed. This can be particularly well observed in China’s growing
regional outreach to Asia, where it has to respond to concern about China’s
territorial demands and military modernization. It has become ‘an increasingly
invested stakeholder in international security and economic systems’.8 Thomas J.
Christensen considers that China’s ‘realpolitik quest to restore its place among
internationally recognized great powers might actually be the most important
force pushing China into international institutions and agreements’.9
The problem for the Liberals is the difficulty of tracing causality in indi-
vidual cases of policy because engagement is channelled through domestic
perceptions and domestic structures which may hinder or impede a given
policy.10 Eliciting cooperative foreign policies rather than conflictual policies
depends on how much influence internationalist economic interests can wield in
the non-democratic state.11 Certain engagement policies are accepted, thanks to
a coalition of Chinese policy-maker constituencies, despite different assumptions
and intentions on individual policies (for example the economic opening of
China). Finally, causality can not be attributed to just one engagement partner.
The US and Japan are the most important ones, but the EU and other Western
countries play a crucial role as well and may be more important in certain
sectors than the US and Japan.
The interdependence of China and the international economy is growing.
But the increase in this interdependence is not the same in all sectors, the
leverage given to China’s engagement partners is partial and ambiguous, and at
the same time it also creates trade conflicts and it enhances rivalry. While there is
no consensus that greater involvement in the international economy leads to a
more peaceful stance, one can at least say that economic interdependence and
integration are increasingly limiting the room for governmental behaviour which
is far outside international norms. China’s Realpolitik approach in the security
sphere is increasingly constrained by international commitments, status relation-
ships, power balances and foreign values. China’s economy is enmeshed to such
a high degree into the world economy that it could not extract itself without
suffering severe domestic problems, because its fast-growing standard of living
and the legitimacy of its leadership are based on it.
China’s economic success: good or bad?
This favourable tendency confirming the Liberal approach to engagement is also
acknowledged by Japanese Realists. Tanaka Akihiko argues that engagement has
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turned China into a status-quo power (genjo ichi seiryoku).12 According to a critical
China specialist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the economic reform process
has put China on an economic track towards free capital markets which seems to
be irreversible.13
At the same time, many Japanese observers see challenges for Japan in the
case of China’s success or failure.14 Yokoyama Hiroshi even expressed concern
that if China failed Beijing would blame Japan because of its involvement
through FDI and ODA.15 The conclusions of Japanese experts on whether
China’s economic success is good for Japan’s security depend very much on the
vantage point of the observer. Security specialists, who are more likely to be
Realists, tend to stress the possibility that China’s economic and political devel-
opment might either go wrong or have negative implications for Japan’s security
and other interests. Economists like to point out the huge tasks and challenges of
China’s economic development.
It seems that Japanese China-watchers are more sceptical about China’s
economic development and future, or are at least giving greater credence than
Western China experts to the possibility that China may disintegrate internally
or become unable to handle the fallout resulting from failed social and economic
policies.16 The mixed experience by business in China since the country’s
opening in 1978 has created an atmosphere which now allows a more sober eval-
uation.17 Professor Tanaka Akihiko even wrote ‘We cannot dismiss the possibility
that China will fall into the same sort of confusion as Indonesia experienced in
1998’.18 Many others describe the various dangers and shortcomings of China’s
economic development.19
One indication of concern in Japan’s bureaucracy about the sustainability of
China’s economic development is the ongoing review of ODA policy towards
China, which has been so instrumental in this development.20 A 1999 Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) study of Japan’s ODA to China
mentions, among other unstable factors, macroeconomic growth, lack of reform
in state-owned enterprises, expansion of poverty and regional disparities and
environmental degradation.21 The security implications are implied rather than
spelled out.
Although China survived the Asian economic crisis of 1997 rather well, and
even played a positive role in its containment, that experience and China’s
economic slowdown (which started even earlier) have had a sobering effect on
many China-watchers and made them see China’s development in a more crit-
ical light, although the majority does not anticipate its collapse. There also is a
feeling in Japan that China bears some responsibility for the outbreak of the
crisis because of the earlier devaluation of the Renminbi.22 This feeling is in
contrast to many Western opinions, which instead praised China for not
devaluing the Renminbi after the outbreak of the 1997 Asian crisis.
This more critical assessment of China’s economic problems has certainly
been one of the most important factors in considering negatively the linkage
between economic growth and military security, but there is also a greater aware-
ness in Japan of the implications for ‘human security’ of failed economic and
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social development in developing countries, which was particularly highlighted
by Russia’s problems.23 Notably, defence analysts are, not surprisingly, more
inclined to combine the conclusion that China’s economic growth will encourage
China to become a threat with the warning that current economic growth
creates systemic problems.24 Even economic success may undermine the current
political system of China because of the growing discrepancy between the polit-
ical and economic systems, leading to economic collapse or to the establishment
of a more aggressive political regime.25 While China’s entry into the WTO is
generally seen as likely to exert a positive influence on China’s economy and
global integration, a Defence Agency official pointed out to the author that it
will devastate China’s agriculture, with unpredictable consequences.26
The August 1994 Higuchi Report on Japan’s defence mentioned China’s diffi-
culties transforming itself into a market economy and the ‘widening economic
disparity between the inland and coastal regions’.27 Analysts in the Defence
Agency are concerned about the threat to China’s domestic stability emanating
from the economic slowdown, pointing, for example, to localized riots in the
countryside.28 In 2000 alone there were said to be around 10,000 cases of local
rioting reported in the Chinese press, and one can assume that there were many
more that went unreported.29 Lieutenant-Colonel Kato Hisanori of the GSDF
mentions that, due to China’s military modernization and its strategic aims
(including the option of liberating Taiwan by force and protecting its territorial
interests in the South China Sea), as well as the inherent negative dynamics in
China’s economic development, new threats different from those during the
Cold War era may arise. In particular, he includes threats arising from the prolif-
eration of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, from massive
movements of refugees, and from causes other than political or economic prob-
lems (that is, environmental damage).30
Finally, there is the debate on the extent to which Japan’s contribution to
Chinese economic growth helps China to develop its military capability. From a
Realist perspective this help is considerable and casts doubt on the validity of the
Liberal approach to engagement. From a Liberal perspective there is the hope
that, in the end (I would like to add: but will it happen in time?), the spread of
economic interdependence and welfare will diminish any aggressive intentions
which might be nourished by a strengthened defence potential and military
industry as the inevitable consequence of economic enmeshment. Japanese
ODA, investment and technology transfer certainly help China’s armament
industry directly or indirectly.31 One difficulty in assessing this is the fact that
Japan is not the only advanced industrialized country active in China. Even after
the US stopped non-lethal arms transfers to China after 1989, weapons tech-
nology reached China directly or indirectly.32 Japan has even been more careful
than the US in transferring high technology to avoid a commercial boomerang
effect. Another difficulty in assessing the impact of economic interactions with
Japan is the scarcity of empirical data. Trade and investment flows with
threshold countries inevitably provide at least dual-use technology and equip-
ment (for example measuring instruments) which can be used for military
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production.33 Often the greatest obstacle to such leakage is the high boundary
between civilian and military production. In China, however, this problem may
be offset to some extent by the high involvement of military production sites in
civilian production. In 1998 the Chinese press reported that between 1,200 and
1,300 converted military factories had absorbed about US$4.5 billion in foreign
investment by the end of 1997 and that this investment was particularly welcome
in the shipbuilding, automobile, computer and other high-technology sectors.34
It is also obvious that Japanese and other FDI frees the state to invest scarce
resources in military production rather than in civilian sectors.
The tenuous link between interdependence and leverage
In Chapter 3 we saw the extent to which Japanese and Chinese economic
fortunes have become dependent on each other. The assumption of the Liberal
School is that interdependence reduces friction, helps to make the newcomer a
peaceful stakeholder in the world community, and gives leverage to the country
which engages on the strength of its economic power. Does the Japanese experi-
ence bear this out?
Economic interdependence is a very ambiguous concept in the actual world
of economic interactions. Although the economic dependence of China on
Japan appears to be higher than the other way round because of the direction of
FDI and ODA flows, other indicators indicate a growing Japanese dependence
on China. China, as Japan’s second-largest trade partner, cannot easily be
replaced by another country. The importance of China for Japan is even more
visible in terms of Japanese dependence on China for Japan’s relocated manu-
facturing industry, particularly in view of Japan’s reluctance to graduate from
certain manufacturing sectors. China, as a growing regional and intra-regional
gravitation power, is increasingly becoming a competing economy in manufac-
turing sectors and even in research, where Japan has so far enjoyed superiority,
forcing it to constantly adapt, relocate and restructure even if it will be very diffi-
cult for China to catch up with Japan’s high technological advance as long as
Japan’s economy does not go into irreversible decline.35
This has an impact on what Denny Roy referred to as the deterrence value of
interdependence.36 Japan’s leverage over China accruing from its position as
China’s economic partner is obviously reduced by the growing equality of
mutual dependence and vulnerability. Moreover, there is no clear Japanese hier-
archy of issues which could be singled out for ‘penalties’ against a ‘misbehaving’
China, and many of these issues are influenced by US positions. The same
dilemma applies to the US–China relationship. Paul A. Papayoanou and Scott
L. Kastner express the concern that economic ties may constrain US ability to
balance China if core issues of national sovereignty (Taiwan) and unfavourable
future political scenarios reduce the effectiveness of engagement.37 Are human
rights important enough to trigger penalties, and what kind of penalties should
then apply, or is this threshold only reached with the ‘unprovoked’ invasion of
Taiwan? In the case of human rights, there is no consensus on whether
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improvement in China can be speeded up by pressure now (but with what
tools?) or whether it is better to further engage China and wait for long-term
success.
There is empirical evidence for ODA giving Japan some leverage. The
Japanese government did not just rely on the assumptions of the democratic
peace theory, but has been trying to use ODA to influence China’s security
policy. The Japanese government under Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi enun-
ciated in 1979 ODA principles targeted specifically at China, stipulating, among
other things, that no military assistance would be provided.38 This was, first of
all, a consequence of Japan’s ban on arms export, but it was also meant as a
signal to China that Tokyo did not want to strengthen China’s military potential,
not even as part of China’s anti-hegemony campaign against the common Soviet
adversary.39 In the general ODA guidelines of 1992 Japanese ODA was made
contingent on the security policy of the recipient. In 2000 Miyamoto Yuji, then
minister at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, wrote that ‘[s]ecurity considerations
in Japan’s ODA to China are natural’.40 In practice, however, the Japanese
government has not strictly insisted on China adhering to the 1992 guidelines.
Nevertheless, Japan twice suspended its ODA to China to protest against
Chinese policies. As we saw in Chapter 1, however, Japan was merely following
the US lead in 1989, when it temporarily suspended ODA, and was working
hard behind the scenes to convince the US to reinstate it. Only the suspension of
the grant portion of its aid to China and the delayed disbursement of the loan
portion after China’s nuclear tests in May and August 1995 was initiated by
Japan (see Chapter 2). But China’s subsequent moratorium on nuclear tests
cannot simply be attributed to pressure from Japan.
Still, since around 1994 Japan has used its ODA position to reduce the heat of
bilateral conflicts, sometimes successfully, as well as to protest at the highest levels
against Chinese security policies.41 Japanese insistence on greater Chinese mili-
tary transparency has certainly contributed to the publication of Chinese White
Papers, even if it has not slowed down China’s military modernization. We saw
in Chapter 2 how the Chinese government carefully controlled the public outcry
in 1996 on the occasion of the Senkaku Islands dispute, even to the point of
becoming vulnerable to domestic criticism about caving in to Japanese pressure.
This is also confirmed by Chinese experts. Jin Xide, a researcher at CASS,
mentions that Japan’s ODA programme has been a success in that it has
suppressed to some extent trouble originating from issues related to Japan’s past
and the Japanese–US security treaty.42 An indirect official acknowledgment of
Japanese pressure was given by Zhu Rongji in Tokyo in 2000, when he said that
Japan should not use its economic assistance as a diplomatic card to draw
concessions from China.43 In May 2000 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang was
quoted, on the subject of Japan’s plan to review ODA to China because of
Beijing’s steep increase in military spending, as saying: ‘This issue should not be
discussed in a political context’.44
These official linkages of ODA with Chinese security policies increased
because widespread dissatisfaction with such policies had led to an increase in
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critical comments on ODA in many Japanese quarters.45 In August–September
2000 the LDP delayed its consent to low interest loans to China because of the
unresolved issue of incursions by Chinese research vessels.46 The irony is,
however, that as a result of demands for cuts in ODA to China and other devel-
opments, the ability of the government to use ODA as a major tool to influence
China may soon decline.
Japan’s ODA budget declined in FY 2001–2 by 3 per cent, and for FY
2002–3 cuts of 10 per cent were decided.47 With regard to China, ODA has
recently come under fire because there are increasingly critical comments that
aid is often wasted, that China does not stick to its conditions, that aid should go
to areas where there is real need, including the environment, that China is not
grateful, that China is itself an ODA donor, that China does not acknowledge
the aid domestically, and that China spends too much on the military. Moreover,
there is a feeling that Japan is losing its ODA leverage on China because of
China’s successful economic modernization.48
As a result of these various concerns about ODA, Japan is reducing its yen
loans for infrastructure projects in China’s coastal provinces, is giving more
attention to inland provinces and plans to concentrate on poverty reduction and
environmental projects. Loans pledged in FY 2001 dropped by 25 per cent on
the previous year, to ¥161 billion, the biggest drop since ODA to the country
began in 1979.49 The Gaimusho and politicians with foreign-policy knowledge
are fighting a further decline in ODA in general and to China in particular,
arguing openly that ‘it serves a crucial diplomatic function as Japan doesn’t have
military forces’.50 In 2000 Japan stopped giving China a lump sum for each five-
year economic plan, and from 2001 ODA is negotiated on a year-by-year basis,
as has always been mandatory for all other Japanese aid recipients.51 This may
give Japan more frequent opportunities to exert leverage over China, but the
reduction in the size of individual stakes may work against Japan’s leverage.
Japan’s decrease in its ODA to China should be offset by the fact that other
Western countries have also been reducing their overall ODA (with a lower share
of China’s ODA compared to Japan). However, if the experience in 2001 is
anything to go by, the annual negotiation rounds will also lead to annual frictions
with China when the next ODA plan is being negotiated, particularly if the
negotiating round becomes affected by other disputes.52 At the same time, China
is becoming less dependent on ODA and more interested in investment because
of the progress of economic development.53 The relative weight of yen loans has
declined and, instead, private investment is becoming increasingly important.54
Rivalry and competition
The positive dynamics of economic and political enmeshment are further quali-
fied by the increasingly apparent economic and political rivalry and competition
between Japan and China. Engagement partly mitigates or offsets this rivalry,
but it also partly reinforces or even creates it. Takagi Seiichiro argued as early as
1994 that a considerable part of the ‘China threat’ discussion has become a
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discussion about Japan–China rivalry and a fight for hegemony in South East
Asia.55 Even a Chinese scholar like Wu Xinbo referred to ‘competitive coexis-
tence’.56 Denny Roy concludes that ‘serious political tensions between China
and Japan are certain, and military conflict is likely, if China’s economic power
continues to grow rapidly relative to Japan’s’.57 Is the goal of economic enmesh-
ment – that is, China’s economic development – therefore counterproductive to
Japan’s security interests because it engenders tensions and rivalry? What about
the relationship between political-strategic rivalry and political enmeshment? In
order to explain these dynamics we have to look at economic as well as polit-
ical/military elements of engagement and how they interact.
Economic rivalry
Some elements of economic rivalry have already been mentioned in the context
of China’s economic success challenging core values of non-traditional security
like national identity, the acquisition and/or protection of rank or competition
for natural resources (Chapter 2). Here we want to look at concrete frictions
arising from the economic relationship rather than the ideational challenges or
future challenges about access to natural resources.
First, we have to ask how seriously China’s economic development is consid-
ered a threat to Japan’s economy. In an opinion poll of the general public by the
Yomiuri Shimbun in 1997, 74 per cent responded that China’s economic power will
pose a great or some threat, and in another poll in 1995, 37 per cent thought
that China will have more economic power than Japan and become Asia’s
biggest economic power.58 In 1995 a Nikkei–Dow Jones poll found that 16 per
cent of Japanese already regarded China as the strongest economic power in the
world, compared to 5 per cent of Americans. In the future, 66 per cent of
Japanese saw China as the strongest economic power, compared to only 17 per
cent of Americans.59 Nakanishi Terumasa, then professor for international rela-
tions at Shizuoka Prefectural University, stated in 1994 that the ‘China issue’ was
also a question of Japan’s ‘economic survival’, although he did not refer to China
as an immediate challenge.60
There are several indicators that point to relatively low Japanese concern
about the (at least immediate) impact of China’s economic development:
1 The prevailing preponderance of the US as an economic partner for Japan
in public opinion: public opinion polls in Japan still indicate that, in terms of
economic relations, the US will be more important for Japan in the future –
40 per cent (both in 1998 and 1997), whereas only 31 per cent and 36 per
cent (1998 and 1997, respectively) thought that China will be more impor-
tant, with 23 per cent and 19 per cent (1998 and 1997, respectively)
considering both equally important.61
2 The perceived gap between the two economies: a recent report reviewing
Japan’s ODA to China points out that although China’s GDP increased by
3.8 times between 1979 and 1998 the gap between Japan and China in
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terms of per capita GNP rose, from 34:1 (US$8,730:260) in 1979 to 43:1
(US$32,350:750).62 In 1997 Japan had a share of 72.4 per cent of the total
GDP of East Asia, compared with 8.3 per cent for China. The per capita
income of Japan was higher than that of China by the factor 53.3.63 Nakai
Yoshifumi points out that, while China’s economy may at some time in the
twenty-first century become the world’s largest economy, this is based on
considerable assumptions, like coping with limitations on a global scale of
limited raw materials, food problems, population and environment, and
above all the assumption that China would pursue the transformation of its
economy into a liberal market economy. However, at present China’s GDP
is only one-ninth that of Japan and one-thirteenth that of the US.64
3 Japanese business is not reducing its involvement in China. Instead,
Japanese–Chinese economic relations have witnessed a tremendous expan-
sion since 1978, and Japan’s economic woes are fuelling an increase of
industrial relocation to China and cooperation with China. While business is
often accused of being the slave of short-termism, this does not apply so
much to how Japanese business is generally judged. Japanese–Chinese
economic relations have developed so well because of the underlying
complementarity of the two countries’ economies.65 The involvement of
Japanese business in China is shaped by the perceived business environment
in China (including the political climate) and the consideration of risks
against future prospects.66 In the latter calculation there are certainly
flowing considerations of how sales or investment may affect the competitive
status of Japanese business to avoid a so-called boomerang effect. This is
one of the reasons why Japanese FDI into China has been less than that of
the US, or is less spectacular than Japan’s ODA to China. But, in general,
either the strong economic relationship does not reflect an urgent concern
that it would be counterproductive for Japan in terms of competition or it
reflects the confidence (or perceived necessity) of Japanese business that it
can stay ahead of China. However, the strong involvement of Japanese busi-
ness in China reflects evaluations of opportunities and the business climate
for foreigners rather than considered opinions of the long-term soundness of
China’s economic development. While profits are not high, sales are rising
and there is widespread optimism about the Chinese market.
Despite this low level of immediate Japanese concern about China as a
(potential) economic rival, and the rise of cooperation between Japanese and
Chinese enterprises at an increasingly equal level, we also witness more
economic tensions between the two countries, which is due to competition and
rivalry. Growing Chinese exports to Japan threaten politically sensitive economic
sectors (agriculture, small business) in Japan and have led to an increasing
number of trade conflicts. In the past the Japanese government retreated from
planned protectionist measures, for example to curb surging Chinese imports of
textile and apparel in 1995. However, against the background of recession in
Japan and domestic pressure on the ruling conservative parties, Japan imposed
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punitive tariffs on certain Chinese agricultural imports in April 2001 and China
retaliated with tariffs on some Japanese imports.67 In addition, Japan has
become much more vocal about what it considers obstacles put up by China
against Japan. These frictions are likely to increase, particularly during the tran-
sitional period after China joins the WTO.
Japanese businesses active in China have become increasingly critical of the
difficulties they encounter in China which are linked to the country’s economic
and political problems, while at the same time considering China a crucial
market. But these negative observations and complaints from business reinforce
the negative perception of China’s economy and the bilateral relationship in
general.68 The collapse of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment
Corporation (GITIC) in 1999 had a very negative effect on the perception of
China’s economic health.69 Japan was particularly hit by it because its banking
sector is the greatest creditor of this institution. In January 2000 a Chinese court
ordered a debt-collection freeze for a number of Chinese non-banks, effectively
making it impossible for creditors to get their money back. Chinese non-banks
owe foreign banks a total of around US$8 billion, half of which is said to be
owed to Japanese banks.70 In addition to the China-generated problems from
which all foreign companies suffer (non-transparent regulatory framework, arbi-
trary tax system, etc.), Japanese companies have recently been targeted by
Chinese court cases.71 At the same time, some of the problems Japanese FDI
encounters are due to the greater reliance on the Japanese banking sector
(compared with the US) or to the low indigenization of Japanese transplants.72
Paralleling the Japanese government’s greater willingness to protest about
China’s security policies, it is now also raising these economic issues more
publicly with the Chinese government at all levels.73
According to a German economist, economic conflicts (for example over
market access, anti-dumping charges, investment licenses, etc.) arise as a conse-
quence of the close economic relationship, Japan’s delay in restructuring its
economy and differences over the distribution of gains, but are not indicators of
a fundamentally flawed relationship.74 However, they are also the consequences
of competition and rivalry between countries which have very different political-
economic systems and which are at different levels of economic development. At
least some features of the trade conflict (for example market access, anti-
dumping charges, but also the concurrent increase in enterprise-to-enterprise
cooperation at increasingly equal level) are very reminiscent of those between
Japan and the US or Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.
The Japanese–Chinese economic rivalry also has a regional dimension. The
ASEAN countries want Japan to share their concern about China becoming the
dominant regional economic power which attracts most FDI, particularly after
China’s entry into the WTO.75 Japan is receptive to this concern, not only for
economic reasons (it can not be in Japan’s interest that most of its FDI goes into
China), but also for political-strategic reasons.
This increasingly conflict-prone economic rivalry and competition is
worrying, in our context, for the following reasons. In conjunction with other
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issues, these economic conflicts and rivalry can have an aggravating effect on the
overall relationship at a sensitive moment. This was illustrated in 2001 by the
simultaneous occurrence of Japan’s imposition of extra duty on Chinese agricul-
tural products to protect its own agriculture, the Li Denghui visit to Japan,
acrimonious ODA negotiations and the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime
Minister Koizumi.
This sense of competition and rivalry is also present on the Chinese side,
where it adds to the existing distrust and dislike of Japan. It is nurtured by hurt
pride that the former aggressor is economically more successful and that China is
so dependent on it as an economic partner and model. China never accepted (at
least in its political rhetoric) the ‘flying geese’ model of Japan and Japan’s regional
economic leadership strategy, but in practice China follows Japan’s export-led
model.76 Recently, the Chinese public has also become agitated about suspicions
that Chinese customers are treated as second rate by Japanese companies.77
When China is not satisfied with Japan’s economic activities, one hears that
Tokyo wants to prevent China’s growth and keep it down. The following quote by
Xu Zhixian illustrates this point:
It has deliberately substituted environmental protection for infrastructure
projects in its focus of economic assistance to China and add political condi-
tions to the assistance to prevent rapid Chinese economic growth.78
These economic conflicts and rivalry decrease the conflict-reducing and
confidence-building function of economic enmeshment. Rather than helping to
offset the tensions arising from the political-strategic rivalry, they may further
reinforce them. The partial failure of confidence building is particularly note-
worthy in Japan’s ODA.79 The Chinese public hardly knows about the role of
Japanese ODA in China’s economic development because the leadership has so
far kept this information away from it. The leadership itself views Japanese ODA
as Japan’s moral obligation after China waived reparations in 1972. At the time,
it was meant to strengthen China’s position in Japan, but when China opened
itself to the outside after 1978 the gesture was turned into a tacit understanding
to get ODA.80 This Chinese shift allowed Japan to use ODA as its major tool to
influence China, but today its confidence-building potential has been somewhat
reduced because it leaves Japan vulnerable to Chinese accusations of not giving
enough aid.81 Proper Chinese recognition is also prevented because Chinese
pride has become involved: Chinese officialdom likes to refer to ODA as a ‘joint
economic programme’ (he zuo) or the ‘introduction of foreign capital’, and this is
partly abetted by the Japanese for ODA in general, ‘keizai kyoryoku’ (economic
cooperation), which implies the cooperation of two economic equals.82
Political-strategic rivalry
Japanese–Chinese political-strategic rivalry can be observed at bilateral, regional
and multilateral level, partly reinforced by economic rivalry and competition. It
The dynamics of engagement 151
is nourished by China’s contrasting goal of a ‘multilateral world’, its suspicion of
Japan on its own as well as in tandem with the US, and by certain engagement
policies. The significant improvement of Japan–Taiwan relations in the 1990s is
one important factor for the increase in Chinese distrust of Japan’s true inten-
tions in the region in general.
This rivalry is now openly recognized by many Japanese experts. The China
specialist Mori Kazuko agrees with some US experts that ‘political rivalry’ (kyoso)
will increase. Miyamoto Nobuo, of Nomura Research Council, asserts that
‘Japan and China will not be able to extricate themselves from a relationship of
political and strategic competition for the next 50–100 years’.83 This political-
strategic rivalry is also mentioned by non-Japanese China specialists. Gerald
Segal detected signs of strategic rivalry as early as 1993.84 David Shambaugh
speaks of a strategic rivalry which is now in its incubation.85 Gurtov and Hwang
unambiguously say that Japan is China’s principal rival for regional leadership.86
It is not only a rivalry between Japan and China, but one which involves all
major powers in the region. Japan’s close alliance with the US, and its interest in
keeping the US involved in and committed to Asian security, clashes directly with
China’s hope for a ‘multilateral world’.
This rivalry is on both sides also culturally bound and reinforced. The known
sinologist Eto Shinkichi speaks of Japan’s ‘periphery minority complex’, which is
expressed by a love–hate syndrome: ‘When the Japanese feel that China is weak
and incompetent, they accentuate the hate side of this love–hate complex by
becoming arrogant. When the Japanese feel that China is stronger, they empha-
size the love aspect, becoming rather servile’. 87
On the Chinese side, it is a superiority complex deriving from their civiliza-
tion and cultural pre-eminence before Japan opened itself to the West in the
nineteenth century.88 This superiority complex is not softened, but rather rein-
forced, by China’s concurrent inferiority complex, which results from its failure
during a substantial part of the last 150 years to develop economically and main-
tain its sovereignty.
Competition over Taiwan
In this context, one has also to look at Japan’s approach to and relationship with
Taiwan, which has some elements of competition for security, economic benefits
and the hearts of the Taiwanese. The terms of the establishment of diplomatic
relations in 1972 had allowed Japanese ambiguity over Taiwan’s legal status
(Chapter 1). The strengthening of Japanese–American security cooperation
since 1995–6 had created a rather transparent ambiguity over the inclusion of
Taiwan in this cooperation (Chapter 3). Chinese distrust about Japan’s Taiwan
policies was further aggravated in the 1990s by a growing relationship between
Japan and Taiwan, which is also seriously affecting the efficacy of Tokyo’s
engagement. These Japanese policies were adopted to address US interests in
Taiwan, but also to protect Japanese economic and security interests in the
Taiwan area.
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Before 1972, relations between Japan and Taiwan were carried by trade and
the links between Japan’s conservative ruling party and the Guomindang, but not
so much by people-to-people contacts. This explains to some extent the enthu-
siasm of the Japanese people for normalizing relations with the PRC in 1972.89
Since then, however, the Japanese feeling of affinity with (reciprocated by many
Taiwanese, including the young) and concern for Taiwan has been enhanced by
Taiwan’s democratisation, which started in 1988, the concurrent loss of the
PRC’s democratic credentials after Tiananmen in 1989, Taiwan’s economic
success, the 1995/6 Taiwan crisis, and the astute handling of Japan by former
President Li.90 Taiwan has also benefited from the growing Japanese security
concerns raised by Chinese political and military actions. Trade between Japan
and Taiwan increased from US$1.4 billion in 1972 to US$28 billion in 1992, and
reached US$41 billion in 1999. Between 1987 and 1992, Japan’s trade with
Taiwan was higher than with the PRC.91 In 1998 Japan’s trade with China
amounted to 8.6 per cent of its total trade, compared with 6.9 per cent for
Taiwan.92 Japan’s FDI in Taiwan was US$278 million in 1994.93 The figures are
considerable if one takes into account the difference in scale between Taiwan and
the PRC. Moreover, they cannot convey a complete picture because of Japan’s
regional production network, as mentioned before. The number of Japanese visi-
tors to Taiwan reached a height of 920,000 in 1996, decreasing to 830,000 in
1999; while the number of Taiwanese visitors to Japan has increased from 48,000
in 1972 to 840,000 in 1999.94 Although political ties have weakened, there still
exists an active Diet-member network through the Nikka Giin Kondankai
(around 300 members, mostly LDP) and the Nikka Kondankai (around forty
members, mostly from the Minshuto), the latter being established only in May
2000 by Minshuto.95 However, the election of Chen Shuibian as president in
March 2000 has led to a generational change and weakened the long-established
channel between the Guomindang and the LDP. Cultural and academic ties have
continued since 1972 but suffer from administrative and political obstacles due to
the absence of diplomatic ties and political pressure from the PRC.96
At the same time, Japanese media attention towards Taiwan has dramatically
increased. This is to some extent facilitated by the presence of all Japanese media
in Taibei since 1999 when the PRC ended its ban on Sankei Shimbun having a
bureau in Beijing and stopped imposing sanctions on Japanese media establishing
representations in Taiwan. In addition, former President Li used his excellent
knowledge of the Japanese language and his many contacts in Japan, dating back
to his time at Kyoto University, to promote sympathy for Taiwan. Although the
Japanese government did not allow him to visit Japan as president (he was not
allowed to take up a Japanese invitation in 1994 for the Asian Games in
Hiroshima), his book on Taiwan received wide attention in Japan, including a
launch party with prominent figures in Japan’s public life in July 1999.97 After his
retirement, Beijing put pressure on Tokyo not to allow him to accept a Japanese
invitation, but in 2001 the Koizumi government allowed him a visit for medical
purposes, which contributed to a worsening of Japan–PRC relations. Earlier,
President Chen Shuibian had managed somewhat to undercut China’s opposition
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to his visit to Japan as president by sending his wife and family to Japan in July
2000.98 Several Taiwanese cabinet members visited Japan in the 1990s.99 After his
election as governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, a known right-wing politician of
the LDP, irked China’s with his pro-Taiwan statements and activities, which were
criticized by Beijing.100 In this new climate, Diet-members are less inhibited from
having contact with Taiwan. In October 2000 one prominent LDP member and
former education minister, Hatoyama Kunio, went so far as to support Japan’s
recognition of Taiwan as a state and as a member of the UN.101 Japan’s reaction
to Taiwan’s earthquake in 1999 symbolized the new affinity for Taiwan. Japan
was the first country to deliver aid to the earthquake-stricken area, and many
Japanese volunteers went to Taiwan.102 At the time Director-General Norota, of
the Defence Agency, even considered the delivery of aid by the SDF as the MSDF
had just provided similar goods to Turkey after the earthquake near Istanbul.103
Regional competition
The regional level is another arena for Japanese–Chinese rivalry. Regional
competition with China involves Japan not only on the side of the US, but also
on the side of other Asian countries like ASEAN and India, as we saw in the
context of Japan’s power balancing.
Compared to other Asians, Chinese are the most hostile to a Japanese leader-
ship role in Asia. In an opinion poll with business executives and academics in
the Asia-Pacific region (eleven countries, including Taiwan and Hong Kong), it
turned out that 70.2 per cent in all the eleven Asian countries agreed to a leading
Japanese role, but only 16.2 per cent did so in China and 43.2 per cent in South
Korea.104 When Prime Minister Kaifu situated Japanese–Chinese relations in a
wider context in 1992 (sekai no naka no Nihon), this was perceived with suspicion in
China as a Japanese attempt to establish itself as a big political power.105 Rex Li
argues that Tokyo’s Asia strategy causes the greatest concern in China.106
According to Kokubun Ryosei, what upset China so much about the 1996 reaf-
firmation of US–Japan security relations was Beijing’s concern over the
prospects for a higher political profile for Tokyo in the region.107 David
Shambaugh reports on a consensus view at a symposium for leading party and
PLA representatives on the emerging international order and potential threats to
China in the coming years, that Japan would become China’s major rival and
enemy, a view held by 60 per cent of the participants. By way of comparison,
Russia and the US were given this epithet only by 10 per cent and 25 per cent,
respectively. What makes Japan ranking so high is its economic success, the
distrust originating from its negative historical legacy, Japan’s geographic conti-
guity, its growing political assertiveness and regional/global role, and Japan’s
allegedly ‘unclear’ future policy.108
China’s hostility to a Japanese leading role is also demonstrated by Beijing’s
willingness and ability to undermine Japan’s regional ambitions. It partly explains
Beijing’s ambiguous attitude towards Japan’s support for becoming engaged in
regional multilateral fora like ARF, its outright opposition to Japan’s proposal for
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regional anti-piracy cooperation, and its initial opposition to Japan’s proposal for
an Asian Monetary Fund (see Chapter 3). China is also opposed to the inclusion
of Japan in any new Track I multilateral security group in Asia.109 Prime
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro’s visits to the US and Australia in 1997 were inter-
preted as joining the ‘northern anchor’ and the ‘southern anchor’ to pin down
China.110 Chinese scholars admit that their government’s reluctance to respond
to Japanese proposals on confidence-building measures or to get involved in
trilateral or quadrilateral talks at Track I and Track II level is meant to prevent
Japan from playing an expanded regional security role, legitimizing such a role or
putting itself on par with others as a fully fledged power.111 In 1998 China
opposed a US proposal to invite Japan to a conference of nuclear powers in
Geneva to work out a strategy after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.112
Apart from weakening US supremacy, this policy of keeping Japan in a position
of strategic subordination and preventing it from joining the ranks of ‘normal’
nations helps China to realize its ambitions of regional leadership.
Chinese experts accuse Japan of trying to contain China and to keep it down,
using the ‘China threat’ argument.113 One means of China counteracting this is
to impress on Japan that its regional leadership ambitions are dependent on
Beijing’s approval and are heavily compromised by Japan’s inability to own up to
its historical legacy before 1945. From China’s perspective, Japan cannot seek an
expanded regional role and will not be qualified to play a larger role in main-
taining peace and stability in the region as long as it cannot satisfy its neighbours
on its past.114 The ‘history card’ has here a motivational as well as an opera-
tional function. China is even quoted as arguing to other Asian partners that
Japan cannot be a regional leader because it is not Asian, on the grounds that it
stations US troops, conveniently ignoring the fact that other Asian countries like
South Korea do the same.115
As a result of China’s various sensitivities, and its stance against a Japanese
leadership role in particular, most regional leaders are very ambivalent about
policies which may have an impact on China. Dennis Roy noted ASEAN’s
double standard in 1994: ‘A Chinese military buildup, while not welcomed, is
acceptable; a Japanese defense buildup is not. … China thus faces far weaker
political constraints against building a superpower-sized military capability – an
important prerequisite of hegemony – than Japan’.116 When Japan discussed the
revision of the Japan–US guidelines for military cooperation in 1997, there were
many voices coming from ASEAN which warned about negative consequences
for Sino-Japanese relations, including from Singapore. Singapore’s prime
minister, Goh Chok Tong, warned of ‘grave consequences for Sino-Japanese
relations if Japan did not exclude Taiwan from areas which might require it to
provide logistical and non-combatant support for the US’.117
Global-level competition
The same rivalry and opposition can be observed at the international level.
According to China, if Japan wants to become a big political power it will need
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China’s cooperation and support, and this requirement is used as a card to
obtain a China-friendly Japanese foreign and security policy.118 According to
Yang Bojiang, in China’s view Japan seeks the status of a political power by
sending forces overseas, and China is therefore very skeptical about Japan’s
personnel contributions to PKO.119 Beijing does not oppose Japan’s quest for a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council openly, but its attitude towards
Security Council reform in general is lukewarm and it has refused Tokyo’s
repeated request for support of its bid.120 Chinese experts assert that without
China’s support Japan cannot achieve a permanent seat on the Security Council,
linking the lack of support to Japan’s ‘excessive reliance on the US’.121
One example of China’s opposition to being engaged by Japan in multilateral
organizations was the failed attempt by former Prime Minister Obuchi to invite
China to the G-8 Summit in Okinawa in 2000. The issue deserves some atten-
tion because it is indicative of the bilateral rivalry and of China’s ambivalent
attitude towards multilateralism.
Japan’s global leadership would have received a boost from Japan being
instrumental in getting China in the forum, although subsequently its influence
would have become relativized by China. However, China joining the G-8 would
mean a much greater socialization of China than UN Security Council member-
ship can provide, and Japan, as a G-8 member, could have used support of
Chinese G-8 membership to get favours from China in other areas, including
support for its Security Council ambitions. Japan’s failure to include China as a
guest, let alone as a new G-8 member, at the Okinawa Summit was due to
China’s refusal to accept Tokyo’s invitation as well as to opposition from Japan’s
G-8 partners. Members were far from having found a consensus on enlarging
their circle by including a country which was still politically and economically so
far removed from them.
Japanese considerations of bringing China closer to the G-8 process go back
to the beginning of the 1990s.122 The highest-level attempt to get China into the
G-8 process started in October 1997, when Prime Minister Hashimoto proposed
China’s invitation to the 2000 Okinawa Summit to President Clinton, who
rejected it.123 But in the end Japan’s efforts were thwarted by China itself. One
can only speculate about China’s reasons, but they probably included concern
about losing its credentials in the Third World if it was admitted into the rich
man’s club. The G-8 was also out of favour with China because it had supported
the bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. In China’s eyes the G-8 is
without international recognition and also elitist. A Chinese researcher in Beijing
described the Okinawa venue as ‘very delicate’, obviously in view of the likeli-
hood that Chinese participation would be interpreted as Chinese acquiescence to
US bases in Japan and to the security treaty in general.124 There may also be
some historical resonances in view of China’s historical suzerainty over Okinawa,
which was broken by Japan during the Meiji period, as well as the territorial issue
around the Senkaku Islands. But a very important political consideration was
certainly the fact that the invitation came from Japan, whose regional or interna-
tional leadership China does not want to recognize because of its own leadership
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aspirations. Moreover, in view of its own economic weakness, the de facto inferior
role of Russia in the G-8 due to the considerable difference in its economic
strength compared with the rest of the group does not look appealing to a
country which is as conscious of prestige as China.125 The participation of China
also raises problems within the Chinese leadership concerning who would have to
represent China, President Jiang Zemin or Prime Minister Zhu Rongji.126
Despite all the disclaimers about not intending to become a superpower or a
hegemon, it is clear that China wants to become a great power (da guo).127
Gurtov and Hwang dismiss Beijing’s duplicity, writing that China ‘wants to be
treated as a great power, practices international relations like one, and has many
assets of one’.128 Amako Satoshi observes that China expressing the wish to
make foreign intervention impossible means that it wants power commensurate
with the world’s superpower, the US. He quotes President Jiang Zemin as saying
that China wants to be a big country that can exert influence on the world.129
Moreover, not becoming a global superpower despite its phenomenal economic
rise would contradict the validity of China’s historical determinism towards
Japan, in relation to whom it claims that big economic powers inevitably become
big military powers. Ironically these repeated Chinese denials that it intends to
become a superpower seem to be part of the Japanese–Chinese strategic rivalry,
since Japan similarly claims that it does not want to become a big military power
despite already being one.130
Triangular dynamics: challenges arising from the US
context
The most important factor shaping Japan’s engagement, particularly its Realist
elements, is the Japan–US relationship. Japan cannot address the security dimen-
sion of its relationship with China on its own, because the US, with its ambitions
and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific and its comprehensive relationship with
Japan, has a decisive impact in promoting conditions for a peaceful outcome of
China’s rise. In the strengthening of Japanese–US security cooperation since
1995, we have already seen some of the dynamics of this US context, notably
illustrations of Japan’s entrapment/abandonment dilemma. Here I want to
examine other implications of the US context within the Japanese–US,
US–Chinese and Japanese–Chinese relationships. As part of this I want to look
at the dynamics resulting from differences between Japan–China and US–China
relations and how they impact on Japan’s engagement. The question for Japan is
ultimately how to respond to the dynamics resulting from these three relation-
ships, which is crucial not only for managing the Japanese–Chinese security
relationship, but in the end also for the survival of the Japan–US alliance.
Japan–US asymmetries and engagement
Japan–US asymmetries in power, security interests and political systems have
certain implications for the conduct and coordination of engagement towards
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China. They provide China with opportunities partially to offset its disadvantage
as the outsider in the Japan–US–China triangular competition. One Japan–US
asymmetry concerns subtle differences in the perception of China as a security
challenge. Given the power asymmetries of the Japan–US–China triangle, one
would suspect that Japan is more concerned about China as a security threat
than the US. The reality is much more complicated. US analysts generally eval-
uate the issue of China as a military threat from an American perspective,
discussing the point of time in the future when China could challenge US mili-
tary supremacy in Asia or even constitute a direct threat to the US homeland.
Relying mostly on a naval presence for maintaining its military position, and
given the circumstance that China is particularly backward in this arms category,
China’s challenge looks relatively comfortable despite alarmist US media and
public opinion polls, and despite China’s ability to make sustaining US
supremacy more costly and/or difficult (Taiwan!) in the meantime.131 The US
does not face China as a geographical neighbour, which can disrupt Japan’s
peace in many more ways than sending nuclear missiles. This relaxed American
attitude is probably too complacent because it does not sufficiently take into
consideration the practical implications of different evaluations by America’s
alliance partners, on which the naval presence in Asia is partially based. The US
may consider the Chinese navy still far away from becoming a blue-ocean navy,
but for Japanese policy-makers China’s predominantly coastal navy is rather
close to Japanese waters, as we have seen in the context of the disputes over the
Senkaku Islands and the EEZ.132
In fact, as a civilian power which is primarily focused on economic interests –
employing economic tools to protect these interests and playing down military
means while feeling confident about the US security umbrella – there is a greater
immediate concern in the public in Japan about the various implications of
China’s economic growth and how to employ economic enmeshment to deal
with China’s challenges than in the US. As a military superpower with a popula-
tion highly sensitive to military strength and its relative changes, public opinion
polls show greater security concerns in the US about China: in 1998, 77 per cent
of Americans felt China was a threat to US national security, while only 64 per
cent of Japanese believe China posed a threat to their nation’s security.133 The
following quote of an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very revealing
about this Japanese emphasis on economic enmeshment, as well as of the
widespread misperception in Japan of the true complex nature of Japan’s
engagement:
There are differences in approach between the US and Japan with regard to
China policy. When we talk about ‘engagement’, the Japanese emphasis is
closer to the true [sic!] meaning of engagement. If China misbehaves, then
we have no option but containment, but we would like to keep it discreet.134
A further Japan–US difference lies in the expected scope of influence on
China. Despite the strong belief in the Liberal elements of engagement, there is
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a difference between Japan and the US about the possibility of changing China,
for reasons of practical politics as well as differences in power resources. The
Japanese government is less interested in changing China’s domestic politics than
in exerting influence on its conduct of foreign policy. There is a lesser expecta-
tion that Western approaches to political and economic governance are all
applicable to China, at least in the short and medium term. The focus on
economic means to influence rather than change China also contributes to
another Japan–US difference. As Sato Hideo points out:
[T]he more leaders are inclined to believe in the ultimately salutary effect of
economic development on political stability and international convergence,
the more they are willing to take a long-term perspective and gradualist
approach on different Chinese behaviours and violations of international
norms and be more accommodative. This seems to be the case with Japan
and less so with the US.135
Johnstone mentions in this context that Japan tends to pay more attention to its
long-term aims with China than the US, which is guided more by issues like
trade or human rights.136
The greater US expectation of changing China, backed by its comprehensive
power, also creates differences in the use of economic enmeshment. Due to
issues ranging from security and human rights to trade imbalances, even normal
economic interactions between the US and China like trade and investment are
often hostage to domestic US politics and sometimes increase rather than soothe
tensions. Moreover, the US cannot employ bilateral development aid, which is
the most important policy tool for Japan’s engagement strategy towards China.
The US cannot extend bilateral ODA to China because of its domestic laws
banning such assistance to a Communist country.137 In the past this has invited
US accusations of Japan using unfair means to promote its economic interests in
China against the general background of rising Japan–US competition in the
China market.138 Japan–US conflict occurred, for example, in 1979 when there
were some US complaints about Japan’s minimum interest rate for its China
loan programme, although Japan successfully withstood US pressure.139
Christopher Johnstone doubts whether Japan’s ODA provides it with much
commercial advantage because of inefficiencies and political conditions.140
However, Japan–US tensions may rise in future, with the Chinese market
becoming more contested between the two.
US multilateral aid is also curtailed because of Congressional opposition to
China’s human rights record and to any programme involving birth-control
assistance.141 This may not only weaken China’s efforts to cope with its enor-
mous economic, demographic and environmental problems, but also reduce the
West’s effort to integrate China into multilateralism. It also encourages those
Chinese hardliners who believe that US policy is ultimately aimed at keeping
China down and contained, and that Japan is a willing partner in this
endeavour.
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Different emphases on certain regional security issues may also challenge
Japan’s engagement. The main issue is certainly Taiwan, which is the most sensi-
tive bilateral problem China has with both countries. Although Japan and the
US both seem to accept China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, to oppose
Taiwan declaring independence and to insist on a peaceful resolution of the
issue, the commitment to power balancing or even sanctions if China does not
comply with the principle of the non-use of force shows some differences
between Tokyo and Washington. These differences between Japan and the US
are also recognised by Kurt Campbell, who was in charge of the Pentagon’s Asia
policy during most of the Clinton administration.142 We saw in Chapter 3 that
the Japanese government has ultimately decided that the value of strategic ambi-
guity is higher than transparency, which has been one of the justifications
towards the outside for the new guidelines. But from this one cannot assume that
Japan would indeed support US intervention in the Taiwan Strait.143 The guide-
lines do not include an explicit guarantee by Japan to help the US in an
emergency; nor do they guarantee any particular level of support which might
be given. Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi, of Kyoto University, argues that this
ambiguity not only helps Japan towards China, but also allows it some
bargaining power towards the US.144 Japanese domestic support for a Taiwan
not dominated by the PRC or even declaring independence is totally different
from the situation in the US. An outright and unprovoked attack on Taiwan by
the PRC would be more likely to trigger US intervention than a PRC attack as
the result of a Taiwanese move towards openly proclaimed independence. Such
an attack would be more likely to see a certain degree of Japanese cooperation
with US forces. But the Japanese side would always have to weigh its limited
security (and domestic) interests around Taiwan and long-term security interests
in a good relationship with the PRC against any wider implications for the
Japan–US alliance. The military alliance with the US would suffer great, if not
irreparable, damage if Japan refused to allow US troops based in Japan
(including the Yokosuka-based US aircraft carrier) to be deployed if it would not
provide logistical and other support as envisaged under the revised guidelines.
However, there are considerable differences between Japan and the US on the
necessity to counter the use of Chinese force. A senior civilian official at the
Defence Agency therefore told the author that Japan and the US never agree on
Taiwan and the Chinese side should decide themselves.145
Despite the recent warming of Japan–Taiwan relations, there is no Japanese
willingness to sacrifice national security to protect Taiwan against the mainland.
Nakai Yoshifumi points out that Japan’s reaction to Taiwan’s democratization
was rather cautious compared with the US’s warm embrace because for Tokyo it
‘destroyed the congenial spirit of cross-strait communication’.146 He also sees
Japan–US divergences about China’s allegations that conspirators are behind
moves for Taiwanese independence (that is, Japanese ones), the role of Japan
outside its territory (that is, Japanese territorial ambitions for Taiwan) and the
deployment of TMD in Taiwan.147 Japan refused to repeat President Clinton’s
publicly stated ‘Three Nos’ of June 1998 in Shanghai when President Jiang
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Zemin visited Japan in November 1998.148 Under the Taiwan Relations Act the
US is obliged to support Taiwan’s security against China, and it continues to
provide weapons and military advice to the island, thus maintaining a fluctuating
level of tensions with China. Japan fully shares the US policy of insisting on a
peaceful and democratic settlement of Chinese reunification, but is concerned
about possible US attempts to enhance Taiwan’s international status.149 There is
the feeling in the Defence Agency that the US may underestimate the willingness
of Taiwan to compromise with Beijing.150 Concern about the US’s image as a
reliable partner, which seems so often to obsess Washington, in this case weighs
much less in Japan than entrapment into the American use of force over events
in Taiwan.
Another issue where the congruence of Japanese and US interests has to be
carefully watched is the Korean Peninsula. Whatever tool the US chooses to use
in addressing the tensions in that theatre, Japan will always be concerned about
China’s reaction to it, as much as it shares US concerns about North Korean
missiles, nuclear proliferation and destabilizing actions. As in the case of Taiwan,
Japan’s post-war pacifism will also have an impact on any decision to support the
use of US military force. At the moment, the Japan–South Korea–US consulta-
tions on how to meet the North Korean challenge have led to an unprecedented
degree of coordination, but this may change if military action is required, or if it
impacts on the position of China in Northeast Asia. The US will remember that
it made a list of 1,059 logistics requests in anticipation of US military actions to
deal with North Korea’s suspected nuclear-weapons programme, but that Japan’s
government hesitated and was not even willing to impose an embargo on finan-
cial transfers from Japan to North Korea.151 Although the strengthening of
Japan–US military cooperation has brought changes to deal more positively with
such requests (for example revision of the guidelines and ACSA), it is not clear
what the Japanese government might be willing to do in the case of a new crisis
on the Korean Peninsula.
Future developments on the Korean Peninsula may also give rise to differ-
ences between Japan and the US. The tensions created by North Korea have
served Japan and the US well in adjusting the security alliance to the post-Cold
War era. But Japanese–Chinese relations will suffer if the North Korean threat
goes after reunification and the US insists on continuing to station troops in
South Korea. China will perceive such a development as a confirmation that the
main function of the Japan–US alliance is, as it always assumed, the prevention
of Chinese reunification and of containing China in a more direct way. Japanese
Realists, however, seek ‘a united Korea that is friendly to Tokyo and Washington,
that is economically viable and politically open, and that will allow token US
presence to remain’.152
Finally, there are differences in policy-making and political style which
complicate Japan’s China policy. Pursuing engagement, and even more so coor-
dinating this policy with the US, is affected by inconsistencies and changes in
US foreign and security policy in general, including towards China, not only
between different administrations but even within the period of the same
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administration. The unpredictability of US China policy is also increased by the
very success of economic enmeshment, which has made both Japan and the US
competitors in the Chinese market. Cossa and Skanderup argue that US–Japan
economic-policy coordination towards China has been shown to be a pipedream
because of different approaches.153 In the American debate among analysts and
policy-makers not only is the emphasis and the robustness with which some
rather than other goals and elements of engagement are to be pursued unclear
and constantly shifting, but the debate itself is also subject to domestic politics
which often have more to do with scoring points against the executive than with
protecting American national interests on a long-term basis, let alone the inter-
ests of close allies. Edward Luttwak cynically recommends an incoherent China
policy, arguing that it would maintain the acceptability of US predominance
with its allies.154 The increasingly pronounced inclination towards unilateralism
in US foreign policy can only further aggravate the unpredictability of its China
policy.155
Aware of its lesser power, greater geographical closeness to China and
concern about entrapment, reinforced by a general inclination to be less assertive
and confrontational, the Japanese government is much more restrained in any
open criticism of China and often even shows a more deferential attitude
towards China than the US. Whereas Japan officially abstains from referring to
the concept of engagement, the US has no such qualms (see above). The differ-
ence in using the name of the same policy may appear to be merely a semantic
and public relations issue but, given the implications of Japan as a civilian power,
the much greater importance for Japan of China as a direct and powerful neigh-
bour and its restraint in admitting power balancing, the difference may reinforce
an attitude in Japan which in the case of a military crisis could add to a split
between Japan and the US on the use of force against any Chinese aggression,
for example in the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, the restraint of the Japanese
government in expressing its security concerns about China may prompt the
American side to feel that Japan is not that concerned about China, or at least
strengthen those in the US who themselves consider China not (yet) much of a
military challenge from an American perspective.
Japan in the triangular vortex
Japan and most other Asian countries know that good US relations with China
are essential for stability in the region as well as for good relations between them-
selves and China, but at the same time these gains may be offset by the negative
implications of a US–China relationship which is too cosy. In a very simplistic
way, one may say that bad US–China relations make Japan more important as a
security partner for the US, but at the same time this heightens the danger of
becoming entrapped in military power balancing against its most important
neighbour, without a guarantee that the US will not change course later or even
fail in a confrontation with China. US–China relations which go beyond a
certain degree of cosiness (which would be hard to specify beforehand) raise the
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spectre of Japan’s abandonment by the US in the face of regional Chinese hege-
mony, or at least US–China deals to the detriment of Japanese interests. In the
meantime these entrapment/abandonment fears give China’s leaders opportuni-
ties to play one off against the other. Both scenarios implicitly assume China’s
aggressiveness.
Since 1971, when Kissinger went to Beijing to prepare the normalization of
US–China relations without prior consultation with Japan, Japanese experts
have been obsessed by the fear of yet another kind of Nixon shock and the US
agreeing with China to keep a check on Japan’s growing influence in Asia. In
1999 newly declassified US documents disclosed that in 1972 President Nixon
and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai discussed Chinese concerns about Japan
increasing its influence in Taiwan and other Asian countries as a result of US
withdrawal from some parts of Asia (see Chapter 1). Japan was, at the time,
concerned about the US making deals with China which might be detrimental
to Tokyo’s security interests.156 Another idea cherished by some US policy-
makers and experts is the use of China to counterbalance Japan’s rise or to keep
both Asian powers in check. In the past the most prominent proponents of the
view of China as a counterweight to Japan were Nixon and Kissinger.157 In a
press conference in 1990 President Bush seemed to suggest that the US needed
China as a counterweight to the growing power of Japan.158 Although the
majority of US experts are now more concerned about Japan not playing
enough of a regional role, there is even today a lingering ambiguity in some US
quarters about Japan’s power, let alone Japan as an independent big military
power – as was demonstrated as recently as in June 1999 when a memorandum
prepared by the US National Intelligence Council cautioned that Japan is
‘pursuing greater autonomy or independence’.159 Tennichi Takahiko therefore
aptly summarizes the dilemma of Japan’s foreign policy under the
Japanese–American security treaty: ‘Independent diplomacy by Japan might
accelerate US efforts to implement its balancing strategy, while subordinate
diplomacy might lead to another “Nixon shock” ’.160 While the conservative
leadership of Japan, at least, has accepted the Japan containment element of
the Japan–US security alliance (former Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo
jokingly referred to the US in the 1960s as Japan’s watchdog or ‘go banken’),
there is no willingness to let China become an assistant watchdog.161 Kan
Naoto, for example, commented on President Jiang Zemin’s stopover in
Honolulu (where he pointedly visited the war memorial of Japan’s attack
against Pearl Harbour) on a visit to the US in 1998, saying that the US and
China should not contain Japan.162 Such Japanese concerns are at least indi-
rectly fed by reports about US government officials who have tried to reconcile
the Chinese government to the strengthening of the US–Japan military alliance
since 1995 by referring to the Japan-containment element of a strengthened
alliance.163
More concrete are those Japanese concerns about the US moving closer to
China and at the same time away from the Japan–US alliance as the cornerstone
of the US commitment to Asia. Such concerns about US–China relations were
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incited in the 1990s by certain moves and statements of the second Clinton
administration. In October 1996 a senior administration official (assumed to be
then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake) reportedly stated: ‘I see China
more as a natural partner than Japan’.164 Japanese concern was also raised when
in 1996 conflicting US statements were initially issued about whether or not the
security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands (see Chapter 2). US media
comments in 1998 suggested that China could replace Japan as Washington’s
partner of choice in Asia.165 Since President Jiang’s visit to the US in October
1997, the two sides have spoken of their mutual desire ‘to build towards a coop-
erative, strategic partnership for the 21st century’. In May 1999 Secretary
Madeleine Albright spoke of a ‘strategic dialogue’ having begun half a decade
before.166 Some Japanese, as well as Americans, critical of the pro-China incli-
nations of the Clinton administration feel that the US was increasingly viewing
Japan through Chinese lenses, and that there was a kind of US–Chinese bipo-
larity or virtual bipolarity.167
Most critical Japanese comments were instigated when President Clinton
visited China in June 1998 without stopping over in Japan. According to some
reports this was due to Chinese pressure. Nor did the President mention in
China the US–Japan security treaty and its stabilizing function for Asian secu-
rity.168 During the visit the US seemed also to ‘gang up’ on Japan by joining with
China in criticizing Japan’s alleged inactivity towards the Asian economic crisis
or refloating its own economy.169 The negative impression in Japan was also
reinforced by alleged Chinese contributions to Clinton’s presidential re-election
campaign against a background of close relations between the Democratic Party
and the Chinese leadership. Other circumstances which sometimes raise concern
in Japan are the level of military contacts between China and the US, which
during certain recent periods have ranged from military exchanges to sales of
American weapons to China.170 Even after Tiananmen there were reports about
US military technology reaching China directly or indirectly.171 An internal US
Department of Defence document called ‘Game Plan for 1999 US–Sino
Defense Exchanges’ outlined more than eighty activities by the US and PRC
militaries planned for 1999; the plans were interrupted by the accidental
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.172
While the Japanese media was full of speculations about ‘Japan passing’ or
even ‘Japan nothing’ in the wake of Clinton’s diplomatic snub to Tokyo in 1998,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was trying hard to play down the matter. The
Gaimusho spokesman referred to the various summit meetings between the
leaders of the three countries in 1998 and presented Clinton’s China visit as part
of the strengthening trilateral dialogue.173 Sakanaka Tomohisa, then director of
the Research Institute for Peace and Security, said that when Clinton and PRC
President Jiang Zemin agreed to stop targeting missiles at each other, all of Asia
benefited. At the same time he was certain that the US cannot stand in Asia
without the cooperation and presence of Japan.174 But even a pro-American
China expert like Soeya Yoshihide wondered about the long-term effectiveness of
such Japanese restraint as the Gaimusho was showing.175
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Not least because of these events in 1998, public opinion in both countries is
divided about the importance of the other country in relation to China, and
even about the ultimate objective of the Japan–US security treaty. According to
a 1998 poll, more than 60 per cent of the Japanese believe the United States is
more important to Japan than China, whereas only 47 per cent of Americans
say US–Japan relations are more crucial than US–China ties. The survey indi-
cates that 16 per cent of Japanese believe the relationship with China to be
more important than that with the United States. But 37 per cent of Americans
polled view relations with China as more important than those with Japan.176
Two years later, the importance of China has grown further on both the
Japanese and the US side, but even more on the US’s. Asked which country
among the US, Japan and the PRC will be more politically important in the
future, 49 per cent of Japanese respondents said they feel the US will be more
important, while about 31 per cent chose the PRC; 49 per cent of Americans
said they feel the PRC will be more politically important in the future, while 43
per cent favoured Japan. Only in the economic field did 50 per cent of
American respondents feel Japan will be more important, while 43 per cent
chose the PRC.177 A poll of the general US public and of US opinion-makers
commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the importance of Japan,
China and Russia today predictably comes up with a more favourable figure for
Japan (see Table 4.1).
Apart from the special circumstances in 1998 there are several other factors
that account for the rising US rating of China’s importance and for the
perceived rapprochement between the US and China. There is, first of all, a
long American fascination with China, which has been reinforced by China’s
recent rise to become a superpower in the future on the basis of its geography,
demography and economic potential. In addition, China is already now a
nuclear power with 3 million men under arms, permanent membership on the
UN Security Council, and association with a series of issues which raise
regional and international security concerns and which often can only be
addressed with China’s cooperation. In contrast to these factors, Japan is smaller
in terms of demography and geography, it has not managed to translate its
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Table 4.1 A poll on the following question: Thinking of all Asian countries,     
        which country in this region is the most important partner of the US?








Russia   2   3
Source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/survey/survey2000html
economic power into commensurate political and military power (thanks to the
US!), and the recent Asian economic crisis has cast serious doubt about its
future economic potential and its ability to exert economic leadership in Asia.
Its potential for political leadership continues to be hampered by the legacy of
the past.178 In a way the US can take Japan for granted as a loyal ally, whereas
more attention must be paid to China, as the country which challenges the US
regional and global preponderance in a much more tangible and credible way,
while at the same time it has become an indispensable partner on regional and
global issues.
Japan’s continuing economic problems since the beginning of the 1990s have
created the impression that the country is in decline and therefore not that
important for future US calculations.179 Not only did the 1997 Asian crisis affect
China much less than most other Asian countries, but China’s abstention from
devaluating the Yuan gave it a ‘hero’ image in some quarters in the US.180 In
addition, economic enmeshment of China by the US has created strong US
economic interests, which have time and again provided sufficient momentum to
overcome serious political differences but which have also led to what has been
criticized as ‘a new moral equivalence among trading states’.181
The regular downturns in US–China relations (for example after the 1989
Tiananmen-related sanctions or after the 1995 granting of a US visa to
President Li Denghui and the April 1996 Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Declaration)
also create a momentum of apparent US appeasement: after a downturn the US
administration feels it has to be more generous to China in order to repair rela-
tions with a country which it considers so important for its national interest. This
was certainly the case in the second Clinton administration, and it found expres-
sion in the pro-China moves in 1998 mentioned above.182 Some US experts even
blame China’s skilful manipulation of the US for neither Tokyo nor Washington
having followed up aggressively on the momentum created by the 1996 Joint
Declaration because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigora-
tion of the bilateral security relationship.183 Zhang and Montaperto even
speculate that China’s warning may have prevented the US and Japan from
forming an explicit and permanent anti-China alliance.184 It is interesting to
observe that at the autumn 1997 US–China Summit in Washington more than
seventy specific agreements covering a wide range of bilateral issues were
produced, including policies involving third countries (for example nuclear
proliferation in South Asia, the Asian financial crisis). This compares with thirty-
three projects at the Obuchi–Jiang Summit in Tokyo in November 1998.185
China is not only skilfully exploiting these US circumstances, but considers
the US as its most important counterpart. The reasons are economic, military
and political. China perceives the US as the country which is on more of an
equal footing with itself than Japan, or at least China wishes that to become
the case. Confident about their growing political, economic and military
strength, many Chinese seem to have the impression that US–China relations
will surpass the importance of US–Japan relations, or that they have already
done so.186 In the meantime, China also encourages those in Japan who
166 The dynamics of engagement
consider Japanese–Chinese relations to be as important as Japanese–US rela-
tions.187 At the same time, China is not averse to giving Japan the impression
of wanting to gang up with Tokyo against Washington if a good opportunity
presents itself. It has shown considerable understanding for Japan’s earlier frus-
tration over US complaints about trade disputes with Japan. Funabashi refers
to some Chinese attempts to appeal to Japan’s nationalism because of US bases
on its territory.188
In view of the analysis of China’s policies so far, including that in previous
chapters, China’s triangular tactics may be summarized in the following way:
• to ‘befriend the distant states as well as associate with the near one’;189
• to exploit the differences between Japan and the US to gain points and to
weaken the Japan–US alliance;190
• to exploit the weaknesses of the Japanese position (entrapment/abandon-
ment dilemma, Japan’s historical legacy, Japan’s economic difficulties while
China is growing fast);191
• to emphasize the importance of China for Japan to legitimize its regional
and global ambitions (for example its quest for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council);192
• to maintain a US-first diplomacy despite a series of bilateral disputes over
Taiwan, human rights, Chinese trade surpluses, espionage scandals, etc., but
never to allow either relationship (China–US; China–Japan) to deteriorate
too much;
• to reinforce the US inclination towards ‘bipolarity’ and try to replace Japan
as the more important Asian partner of the US;
• to reinforce US suspicion about Japan’s ‘true’ intentions for the future and
cultivate the hope of those Americans who consider China to be useful as a
counterweight to Japan;193
• to delegitimize Japan’s security concerns about China.
China’s decreasing acceptance of the Japan–US alliance
China’s shifting position on the Japan–US alliance and the concurrent delegit-
imization of Japan’s security concerns deserve some further analysis because
they are so fundamental to the viability of Japan’s engagement towards China.
We saw in Chapter 3 that the Taiwan issue, in both the revised guidelines and
Japan’s TMD participation, has been the most public issue in China’s criticism.
This is reflected in a marked decrease in the acceptance of the new
Japanese–US security relationship and Japan’s increased regional role. While the
Chinese statements to be presented in what follows were obviously aimed at
preventing the full development of a closer Japan–US military alliance, they
have also led to a greater Japanese–Chinese confrontation over the future of the
Japan–US alliance.
With the start of the Japanese work on the revision of the guidelines shortly
after the Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Declaration, the tone of China’s criticism
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became harsher.194 Zhao Jieqi, the deputy director of the Institute of Japanese
Studies (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), alleges that the ‘nature and func-
tion’ of the bilateral security treaty would be changed from ‘coping with threats’
to ‘containing regional conflicts’ and it would become a kind of Asian NATO
under US guidance.195 This concern is also linked to Chinese concern raised by
NATO’s eastward expansion.196 Moreover, the role of Japan in the alliance
would change from defending its own territory (the concept of defensive defence)
to providing logistic support to a much wider area and a greater number of
contingencies.197 Zhao Jieqi therefore concludes that Japan’s role is changing
from being a ‘shield’ to that of becoming an ‘auxiliary spear’ of the US.198
Japan was also accused of helping the US to maintain its domination of the
world and run against the post-Cold War tendency towards a multipolar
world.199 On the basis of this interpretation of the 1996 Joint Declaration and
the ensuing legislation to implement the new guidelines, China has been
accusing Japan and the US of continuing the Cold War in Asia and containing
China by extending the security treaty beyond the scope of the two countries to
target third countries, that is China.200 Going against the ‘tide of history’ in an
age of growing multipolarity and multilateralism, the Japan–US security treaty is
referred to as a relic of the Cold War.201 In the declaration of the Chinese
Foreign Ministry of 18 April 1996, just after the Hashimoto–Clinton Joint
Declaration, the Chinese side warns that the Japan–US security treaty should
not go beyond the bilateral framework, otherwise it would cause trouble in the
region.202 One of the generic statements used by the Chinese side to express its
concern was the stated hope that the Japan–US security treaty would not
become ‘inconsistent’ with the ‘sound development of relations between Japan
and China’.203 The Chinese criticism skilfully played the dynamics of triangular
relations by focusing on Japan rather than the US. While Wang Jisi asserts that
the major Chinese target is still the US as the militarily stronger one, the
Japanese side perceived the criticism as being more directed against them than
against the US. Some speculated that this was due to China valuing
Chinese–American relations more highly, while others interpreted it as China’s
tactic to drive a wedge between Japan and the US and to weaken Japan’s willing-
ness to enact the new guidelines.204 Michael Yahuda of the London School of
Politics and Economics (LSE) suspects that it is a general Chinese tactic because
Southeast Asians have also observed that Chinese pressure about American
alliances is directed towards them rather than the US.205 In the case of the
application of the guidelines to Taiwan, it is sometimes argued that the Chinese
side has stronger emotional and practical reasons to oppose Japan rather than
the US.206 The cultivated official Japanese ambiguity about the legal status of
Taiwan (see Chapter 1) is seen by some Chinese as of greater concern than the
US position, which is much clearer because of the existence of the Taiwan
Relations Act and official statements.207
In 1999 the Chinese press used an official Japanese statement on the possi-
bility of a pre-emptive attack to warn further against any move by Japan to
become more offensively oriented. In March 1999 Norota Hosei, then director
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of the Defence Agency, declared in a Diet interpellation that the Japanese
Constitution allowed Japan to attack other countries first in the case of an immi-
nent and unlawful attack.208 This interpretation of the Constitution by the
government is not new. Norota’s remark was made in the context of the missile
threat from North Korea. The China Daily reported that the South Korean
minister of national defence, Chun Yong-taek, warned against such a strike
without prior consultation with Seoul and the Renmin Ribao criticized Norota.209
In the summer of the same year it became known that after the Nodong launch
in 1993 the ASDF had studied the possibility of an attack, assuming that it
would be done without US support.210
But the Chinese reactions after the Hashimoto–Clinton Joint Declaration also
show a growing inability or willingness, at least among China’s leaders and offi-
cials, to understand Japanese security concerns within the Japan–US–China
triangular context.211
Thomas Christensen writes that the Chinese tend not to recognize that
particular Chinese actions or weapons developments may influence Japanese
defence policies. Instead, such concerns are dismissed as ‘excuses’ by Japan’s
hawks to justify the country’s military build-up.212 Looking, for example, at
China’s argument against Japan’s involvement in TMD – that Japan is allied
with a nuclear power – it is obvious that Japan as a separate state is not given the
legitimacy of having its own security concerns. A Japanese diplomat told the
author that China cannot understand Japan’s concern, understand various view-
points, or put itself into the position of another country.213
Japan’s record of aggression, and/or its allegedly unrepentant attitude
towards this legacy, is also used to delegitimize Japanese security concerns
towards China. Sha Zukang, director of the Bureau for Arms Control and
Disarmament in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in July 2000 dismissed Japanese
concerns about Chinese missiles as unjustified by pointing out that Japan had
killed 30 million Chinese.214 Michael Yahuda of the LSE therefore remarked:
China’s concern to elicit an appropriate apology for wartime aggression and
atrocities does not absolve its leaders from recognizing that Japan may have
legitimate security needs. Unfortunately there is no sign of any such
acknowledgment.215
China’s difficulty in understanding Japanese concerns about China’s security
policies is also cultivated by the constant propaganda that China has only
benevolent intentions and is still so backward that no Chinese security policy
can possibly be considered as offensive by other countries. The media and offi-
cial declarations incant that China will never be a superpower, never seek
hegemony, and will always be a force for peace and stability. Basically there is
the self-satisfied feeling that China was badly done to in the past and therefore
cannot do bad forever thereafter. Japan was one of the main culprits and is now
allied to the US, which wants to maintain its predominance in Asia by keeping
China down.
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As a result, China’s previous – albeit grudging and ambivalent – support for the
Japan–US security treaty has considerably eroded. Chinese academics and deci-
sion-makers are unwilling to accept that Japan is allowed by the US to play a
bigger security role in Asia.216 They suspect that this increased role may ultimately
allow, or necessarily lead, Japan to free itself from US control and embark on a
new military role in East Asia. The Japan–US alliance is now seen less as a cap on
the bottle than an eggshell for the development of a strong military power.217 In
1997 Chinese officials started openly to express the view that the continuation of
the US presence in Asia would not help regional stability.218 Questions are being
asked among Chinese specialists about whether security treaties can really exist
without a declared enemy, particularly in the post-Cold War era.219
Japanese deference and restraint
Finally, we have to reconsider the value of Japan’s restraint or deference for its
engagement policy towards China. Japan’s restraint in exercising its considerable
power in conflicts of interest with China is a strikingly prominent feature of
Japan’s engagement policy which is difficult to explain purely in terms of Realism
or Liberalism. In the previous chapters we have seen several examples of Japan
reacting to China in a way which may be called deference or restraint although it
had the upper hand in terms of power and/or resisting would not have involved
much political cost. While there is already a strategic Japanese–Chinese rivalry,
Japan seems often to be waging this rivalry in a very restrained way, whereas
China maximizes its relatively inferior power resources. But, despite these power
asymmetries in Japan’s favour, deference has been particularly obvious and
enduring. Of course, any economically, politically or militarily strong state
encounters limits to its ability to deploy economic, political or military power.
The amount of power necessary to achieve the intended goal may surpass the
available power resource, or there may be insufficient domestic support (for
example competing demands, fear of counterproductive results, low level of
interest, etc.). However, there are cases in Japan’s China policy which are beyond
obvious or straightforward calculations of resources and interests and which are
better explained from a Constructivist perspective.
To start with, the Japanese government officially declines to refer to its China
policy as ‘engagement’ (kanyo), and instead refers to the normative goals of its
China policy and to the Liberal-institutional policy tools to achieve them.220
This is all the more interesting as the US administration under Clinton always
referred to ‘engagement’ and one would normally expect Japan to do the same.
Obviously, the closest Japan–US cooperation is in the area of military power
balancing, which is exactly the area which Japan would not like to emphasize
publicly. The close association of engagement with US policy, notably under the
Clinton administration, would only reinforce China’s tendency to consider Japan
not as an independent actor but as an integral part of US China policy. The
association of engagement with military power and thus the Japanese–American
security alliance might evoke China’s latent concerns about Japanese militarism
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and US hegemony, eclipsing the intentions of the Liberal elements of engage-
ment. The abstention from using the term ‘engagement’ is even adhered to in
joint Japan–US statements which refer to China, such as the Hashimoto–Clinton
Joint Declaration of April 1997. The declaration simply expresses the expecta-
tion that China will perform a constructive role (kensetsuteki yakuwari o hatasu) in
international and regional politics. In the previously mentioned LDP’s first draft
for a long-range foreign policy, ‘Japan’s Strategy towards the Asia-Pacific Region’
in 1997, the word ‘engagement’ appears only in the English translation, whereas
the Japanese text speaks of cooperation (kyoryoku).221
There is a long list of other examples of deference and restraint shown in offi-
cial (but also private) contacts with China222. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
with its China expertise, has been the most responsive to Chinese sensitivities
among the government agencies. This ranges from using geographical names
acceptable to China, to ‘taking into consideration relations with China’ when
refusing non-profit organization (NPO) status to Falungong’s representatives in
Tokyo or not allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Japan.223 In the security field we
have seen above how much ‘understanding’ Japan showed for China’s concern
after the NATO bombing in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. In the territorial
conflict about the Senkaku Islands, the Japanese government has refused oil-
exploration licenses to Japanese companies in Japan’s EEZ.
As we saw in Chapter 1, there are many sources for deference apart from the
history legacy which are either China-specific (for example cultural affinity,
cultural debt, war guilt) or not (for example a general tendency of conflict avoid-
ance), and which often reinforce each other (war guilt, pacifism, sympathy of the
Japanese Left for Chinese Communism). Again, China has been very astute in
exploiting these features for its benefit.224 As a specialist of Chinese history,
Yokoyama Hiroshi also refers to China’s demand for ‘kowtow diplomacy’ (dogeza
gaiko) from Japan, which reinforces Japan’s deferential inclinations.225 Finally,
Japan, as an Northeast Asian society, is deeply influenced by the notion of hier-
archy, and China was traditionally the leading political and cultural state.226
As a result of China’s assertive diplomacy and security policy, an increasing
number of Japanese opinion leaders, diplomats and politicians are questioning
whether Japan’s deference is (still) appropriate. The question is not raised neces-
sarily for reasons of nationalism and Japan’s increased self-confidence – although
that plays a role to some degree – but because it is seen as ultimately ineffective
in managing relations with China, inviting misunderstandings and provoking
China to put more pressure on Japan. Thomas Christensen even warns that
accommodating behaviour towards China (which he observes with the Clinton
administration) can provoke Chinese ‘hypernationalism’.227 There is a realiza-
tion that conflicts can no longer be solved by avoiding clarity and not making
clear Japan’s interest.228 Ozawa Ichiro recommends in one of his five guidelines
for Japan’s diplomacy that his country makes clear its diplomatic aims and
strategy for the twenty-first century with regard to China.229 In Chapter 2 I
mentioned the generational change among politicians which resulted in a much
more critical attitude towards China. Moreover, the rising widespread concern
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about China in Japan has shown that the traditional accommodative, cautious or
even deferential attitude in the face of China’s assertive security policy has bred
so much resentment in Japan that a negative backlash has been caused which
generates pressure for a radical shift. This resentment has been vented some-
times with unexpected force: for example, an LDP panel delayed consent to a
loan to China in August 2000, and Finance Minister Shiokawa Masajuro burst
out in July 2001 with the opinion that Japanese aid should be used more effec-
tively and that huge amounts of aid should not be granted to countries that
possess nuclear arms and are building up their military capabilities. A senior
member of the LDP Foreign Affairs Department with personal connections to
China was quoted as saying that the delay of the loan in August 2000 was an
‘epoch-making event: ‘It is no longer acceptable to adopt diplomatic approaches
that curry favour with China just for the sake of keeping friendly ties.’230 The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has come under particular criticism, with even the
China-friendly Nonaka Hiromu saying that ‘[t]he ministry has yet to get rid itself
of the diplomacy of humiliation’.231
There is also the wish to have a ‘normal’ relationship with China, which was,
for example, expressed by the LDP Dietman Hayashi Yoshiro, chairman of the
Japan–China Dietmen’s Friendship League, who said in 1999 that there would
be no equality if China is always right and that the bilateral relationship could
only be a normal one if both tell each other what must be said.232
Even China’s leaders realize the backlash from pushing Japan too hard into a
corner (notably over the past), particularly after the visit of President Jiang
Zemin to Japan in November 1998. Thereafter, China became more concilia-
tory. The Chinese realize that causing official Japan to hold back on stating its
opinion also distorts their own insights into the domestic forces which shape
Japanese attitudes towards China.
Moreover, Japanese deference risks reinforcing Chinese distrust of Japan. In
view of China’s own Realist approach to international relations, Japanese defer-
ence only enhances their suspicions of Japan, which are in any case aroused
because of their historical determinism (economic superpowers becoming mili-
tary superpowers; Japan is bound to become a militarist power again because of
its flawed attitude towards its past). If Japan shows so much deference despite its
great economic and military power, it may be hiding something or playing for
time until the US allows it to become a militarist power again.
In conclusion, deference is one of the main features of Japan’s China policy;
it initially had a positive effect on Japanese–Chinese relations in general and on
the security relationship in particular by smoothing off the Realist edges of
engagement, but it has become a negative factor against the background of
China’s developments since the 1990s.
Conclusions
We have seen that the general debate about the merits of engagement between
the Realists and the Liberals is still open, and that both sides can provide good
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reasons for being right in the absence of a final outcome where China has
become either an aggressive or a well-integrated power. Analysing the negative
dynamics arising from the complex nature of engagement, notably within the
Japan–US and the triangular frameworks, we have seen many counterproductive
results of engagement which endanger the very tools and objectives of the
various elements of engagement. The growing competition and rivalry between
Japan and China is partly an outcome of engagement policies, and partly arises
independently of them. Particularly worrying for Japan’s Realist engagement
policies is China’s gradual distancing from its previous implicit and sometimes
even explicit acceptance of the Japanese–US security alliance as the ‘lesser’ evil.
The analysis of this array of dynamics evolving from the interactions among
Japan’s engagement policies, China’s policies and the regional/international
environment does not, however, lead to any conclusions on whether engagement
in future is misguided or impossible.
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If Japan and China cooperate, they can support half the Heavens.1
Deng Xiaoping
I am more pessimistic about the future of US–China relations than I have been
for several decades.2
William Perry, former US Secretary of Defence, in 2001
The 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century have witnessed a
marked deterioration in Japanese perceptions of China because of the latter’s
security policies and other developments negatively affecting Japan’s security
interests. This deterioration has been reinforced and facilitated by domestic
changes in Japan and rising uncertainties in the international environment. As a
result, Japan started to voice its dissatisfaction with China’s military moderniza-
tion, rising military budget, non-transparency of military modernization, nuclear
weapons tests and China’s greater assertive territorial claims. Facilitated by
worrying developments on the Korean Peninsula and the need to adapt the
Japan–US security alliance to the post-Cold War era, towards the middle of the
1990s the Japanese government started to put greater emphasis on military
power balancing of China when it revised its National Defence Programme
Outline in 1995, and since 1996 it has taken measures to strengthen the alliance
with the US. In addition, it started to support multilateral security approaches in
Asia, embarked on political power balancing in Asia and used its economic aid
in a more focused way to influence China’s policies towards Japan.
To analyse these Japanese reactions in an appropriate framework I have
referred to an understanding of engagement which reflects more realistically its
true complex nature: economic and political enmeshment (providing China with
economic and political incentives to integrate into the regional/international
political and economic system) and political and military power balancing (polit-
ical front-building, SDF and the Japan–US security alliance). The latter is meant
to support the former by deterring China from going against internationally
recognized norms (for example the use of force), and at the same time is to
provide an insurance in case of the failure of economic and political enmesh-
ment. By conceptualizing engagement thus, from a Realist, Liberalist and
Conclusions
Constructivist perspective it is possible to appreciate the existence of coercion
and force, which is so often ignored in analysing and evaluating engagement.
Given the political system of the major powers which profess to engage China,
engagement is simply not possible without China having to take account of the
presence of their military deterrent. Through its own military force, as well as by
supporting US forces in and around the country, Japan has maintained a deter-
rent which has also always had a deterrent function against China. One can
therefore reject the assertion that Japan has accepted ‘all the assumptions of
realism but applied them purely in the economic realm’.3 This comprehensive
understanding of engagement, and taking into consideration the historical deter-
minism and Realist thinking of China’s leaders and foreign and security experts,
allows us to take better account of China’s perception of engagement, which is
essential to gauging the efficacy of this policy. In addition, by using Realist,
Liberal and Constructivist approaches I discussed critically the assumptions of
the various elements of engagement and dissected the diverse dynamics created
by this policy.
On the basis of this analysis, is it possible to judge Japan’s engagement policy
a success in ensuring its security interests vis-à-vis China? Is this policy sustain-
able? What are the costs?
A first caveat is that Japan’s engagement policy cannot be considered in isola-
tion because other major powers are pursuing similar policies, and the US is the
most important among them. The US is not only pursuing a very similar
engagement policy, but it is also an enabling as well as conditioning factor for
Japan’s own policy. So far, engagement has been successful because peace has
been preserved between Japan and China, the domestic stability of China has
been maintained, and China has become integrated into the global economy to
an extent which in some respects is more far-reaching than has Japan, and this
seems not to be reversible without very high costs being incurred by the Chinese
political and economic system. However, while engagement can be credited – to
some unquantifiable extent – with having prompted China to move in the
intended direction and has been helpful in setting a welcome process in motion,
none of the major security issues described in Chapter 2 (except for the morato-
rium on nuclear tests) has been solved: China’s military modernization is still
benefiting from annual budgetary increases of over 10 per cent, the trans-
parency of its security policy has hardly improved despite token gestures by
China, the territorial disputes still exist, China’s naval incursions into Japan’s
EEZ continue despite a promise of prior notification, and China has still not
renounced the use of force to solve the Taiwan issue and the territorial claims in
the South China Sea. Concerning non-traditional security challenges there is
also no change, although a dialogue and even some cooperation have started on
transboundary pollution and crime. Moreover, due to China’s growing economy
these non-traditional security challenges are bound to increase. It is therefore still
possible that in the future some elements of engagement may be considered
responsible if China diverts significantly from accepted norms of international
behaviour.
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The same differentiation between starting a desired process and achieving
success has to be made when evaluating political enmeshment: the bilateral rela-
tionship between Japan and China has become much more substantial; the
economic relationship has achieved wide-ranging interdependence, which
dampens political disputes; there are now more fora between the two countries
at Track I, II and III levels, etc. But trust has not yet been established for old as
well as new reasons: Japan’s historical legacy (in combination with China’s
historical determinism and instrumentalization of the ‘history card’) and
Chinese vehement opposition to the strengthened Japan–US military alliance, as
well as rising strategic rivalry. China is only a reluctant and reserved participant
in multilateralism. But this does not mean that the process cannot be successful,
only that more effort may be needed on all sides.
Particular attention has therefore to be paid to the centrifugal dynamics
which the process of engagement is engendering due to its complexity, inherent
contradictions, ambiguities and triangular aspects. The major source of negative
dynamics derives from trying to equilibrate military and political power
balancing, and economic enticement/confidence building and restraint vis-à-vis a
Chinese leadership which is still steeped in Realist thinking and historic deter-
minism, and has major revisionist goals in terms of its international status and
the integrity of its national territory. The danger always exists that engagement
reinforces (at least for tactical purposes) the conviction that international rela-
tions is a zero-sum game and requires greater Chinese economic and military
power.
Another major source of negative dynamics threatening to undermine
engagement (but at the same time the source of hope for a peaceful and pros-
perous China) is China’s rapid economic growth as a developing country of
tremendous demographic and geographic dimensions. According to Realism,
but also empirical evidence, China’s economic growth is allowing China to
modernize its military potential and to pursue its revisionist goals with greater
vigour. The international environment (notably US positions, supported or not
by Japan) and the achievement of balanced political and economic development
in China (on which Japan has a considerable impact) will decide in the end
whether Liberalism and the ‘democratic peace theory’ is right, or whether
Realism is.
China’s economic growth potentially carries the seeds of its own destruction
in terms of ecological unsustainability, political unsustainability (the creation of
social imbalances and dislocation) and economic unsustainability (for example
the collapse of the underlying economic model of export-led and FDI-driven
development due to an international recession). Some of these negative
dynamics are partially already in existence and affect Japan to some extent by
way of transboundary pollution, illegal immigration, transboundary crime and
economic losses. But while Japanese experts do not rule out China’s economic
failure and perceive such an outcome as very serious for Japan’s security and
welfare, they are also concerned about China’s economic success challenging its
identity as a civilian power and as the world’s second-biggest economy.
176 Conclusions
Both the Realist and the Liberal elements of engagement contribute to yet
another negative dynamic, which is the increasing strategic/political and
economic rivalry between Japan and China. Military and political power
balancing, notably the strengthening of Japan–US military cooperation, with its
perceived impact on Taiwan, will reinforce China’s military and political
assertiveness and Realist thinking. For the Chinese leadership the Taiwan issue
has become so sensitive that it cannot afford to be seen to be soft on it.4 While
the increasing integration of China into regional and global institutions can be
partly attributed to Japan’s political enmeshment policies, we have also seen that
it leads to competition and rivalry in the UN (for example, China opposes
Japan’s quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat), as well as to China
working against cooperative security proposals within regional fora. Increasing
trade frictions are relevant in our context, since they can contribute to a general
atmosphere which may facilitate the violent eruption of security disputes. Closer
economic relations and the growth of mutual interdependence are bound to lead
to frictions, particularly between countries with different political-economic
systems, different levels of economic development and different sized economies.
Moreover, given China’s size, but also Japan’s current economic difficulties,
which are leading to ODA cuts and Japan’s lesser importance as an economic
partner for China (if not possibly to a regional economic meltdown), Beijing’s
economic success will increasingly reduce Tokyo’s ability to influence its giant
neighbour politically.
While Japan’s restraint and deference towards China have for a long time
been a means of soothing the contradictions of engagement, reducing conflicts
of interests and offsetting the strength of Beijing’s ‘history card’, they are now
increasingly perceived as outdated, ineffective and even as becoming counterpro-
ductive. The restraint and deference shown by Japan’s leaders in the face of
China’s assertive security policy have bred resentment in Japan, and a negative
backlash has been caused which generates pressure for radical shifts. Moreover,
Japanese deference has bred Chinese distrust of Japan’s true intentions because
of China’s own Realist approach to international relations. The resulting drive in
Japan to have a ‘normal’ relationship with China by communicating more
clearly and openly would be a positive outcome of this negative dynamic (but
not necessarily always and/or in the immediate future). China seems to under-
stand the negative dynamics of Japanese restraint and deference, and may
refrain from further fomenting this negative backlash.
Finally, the comprehensive relationship with the US creates some negative
dynamics. We have seen that the different mix of engagement policy tools, different
perceptions of China and other asymmetries sometimes generate centrifugal
dynamics which not only impact negatively on Tokyo’s engagement, but ultimately
also on the future shape and even survival of the Japan–US military alliance. The
crucial issue is Taiwan, but a military move by China in the disputed EEZ of the
East China Sea or even against the Senkaku Islands could become a severe test of
the military alliance. Apart from the Taiwan issue, it is Japan–US TMD coopera-
tion which vividly illustrates the negative dynamics of the strengthened alliance.
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The triangular Japan–US–China framework is, moreover, creating centrifugal
dynamics which Japan finds it difficult to deal with, while China, despite its disad-
vantaged position as the ‘outsider’, skilfully plays on them.
In sum, when considering the sustainability and costs of Japan’s engagement
one has to weigh the strength of the positive process towards China becoming a
stakeholder in regional and global peace and stability, and adopting the norms of
democratic countries, against the strength of the negative dynamics generated by
even the successes of engagement, let alone by its complexities and ambiguities.
Challenges
There are therefore several interrelated challenges to the sustainability of
engagement. The most important challenge is the unresolved issue of Taiwan,
which may reach a dangerous point in the near future because of strengthened
US support for Taiwan under the Bush administration, which encourages a
growing momentum in Taiwan towards independence, while China is facing a
change in leadership in 2002 and sees its options to achieve national reunifica-
tion running out. Since the integration of Hong Kong into the PRC and the new
developments in the PRC–Taiwan relationship, Chinese determination and will-
ingness to use force if needed seems to have become a greater possibility for
many Japanese. Japan would prefer the status quo, but the issue is whether this is
realistic in the light of the changes in Taiwan started under former President Li
Denghui to assert the island’s independence.5 Tanaka Akihiko points out that
China is a status-quo power, but that the domestic developments in Taiwan are
increasingly challenging China. These developments, rather than the military
balance, are for him the issue which may trigger China’s use of force.6 There are
speculations in Japan that the domestic timetable of Chinese leadership elec-
tions, the ongoing military preparations, China’s accession to the WTO
(engaging the Western world in China to an extent that sanctions in the case of a
military solution to reunification become difficult to support), and even China’s
attempts to improve relations with Japan after 1998 are all preparations to solve
the Taiwan issue by force if peaceful means fail.7
Closely related is the growing US unilateralism, which is certain to encourage
Chinese leaders and foreign-policy experts in their belief that might is right and
that China therefore has to continue to enhance its military capabilities. Betts
and Christensen remind us of frequent US interventions in its own hemisphere,
which most Americans consider ‘legitimate, defensive, altruistic and humane’,
and warn that ‘if China acts with the same degree of caution and responsibility
in its region in this century as the United States did in its neighbourhood in the
past century, Asia is in for big trouble’.8 Casting doubt on the ‘democratic peace’
theory, Paul Wolfowitz mentions the US as one example of a democracy
‘behaving with bellicose aggressiveness’, and warns about a more democratic
China reflecting popular nationalist pressures.9 In addition to serving as a nega-
tive model for great-power behaviour, US unilateralism is weakening
multilateralism at a critical time when political and economic enmeshment poli-
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cies are trying to involve China in global and regional regimes.10 One of the
most important issues is the fate of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which
is linked to China’s core security interests: Taiwan and the survival of its nuclear
deterrent. But even without US unilateralism, rising tensions in the US–Chinese
relationship since 2001 and the Bush administration weakening international
regimes, we face a major challenge to economic multilateralism since China
finally joined the WTO in 2001. In addition, multilateralism is the only way to
make the US accept the ultimately inevitable abandonment of its determination
to be the dominant Asian power. As long as the US does not accept this aban-
donment, there can be no way of accommodating China as a new regional
power and of avoiding some of the negative dynamics of engagement.
Finally, there is the sheer complexity and ambiguity of engagement, which is
difficult for one country to manage but in effect requires various degrees of
cooperation and cooperation with other countries. Even within Japan, engage-
ment has to cater to the explicit and implicit goals of a rather disparate group of
overlapping policy constituencies. To name just a few: one that wants security for
Japan, one that wants to maintain the Japan–US comprehensive relationship,
one that wants to maintain Japan’s military establishment in the post-Cold War
era, and one that wants to benefit commercially from the economic aspects of
engagement.
At this critical juncture, Japan finds itself politically, economically and socially
weakened. With its consumer-oriented and rapidly aging society, Japan’s vigour
and adaptability will be increasingly challenged by China, which has a much
larger population strata of young and dynamic people who also find it easier
than their Japanese counterparts to become internationally effective. Okamoto
Yukio laments that China’s young people, educated in the US and Europe in the
post-Cultural Revolution era, are quite capable of coming up with new ideas,
whereas Japan is now beginning to fall behind in terms of its ability to take on
new challenges.11 Japan’s decade-old economic crisis has finally started to bite
seriously, absorbing the attention of the whole political system and diminishing
Japan’s ability to employ its most powerful and US-independent policy tool –
that is, economic enmeshment. The realignment of the political power configu-
ration which started in 1993 is not yet concluded and still absorbs an inordinate
amount of Japan’s politicians’ time, reinforcing rather than reducing the
parochial nature of Japanese foreign and security policy. At such a time it is even
more difficult for the political leadership to gather the strength and courage to
deal positively with one of the greatest millstones and exploitable vulnerabilities
of Japan’s foreign and security policy towards China, the historical legacy. In
addition, the bureaucracy, which traditionally ran the political day-to-day work
rather autonomously, has also been weakened by frequent political changes and
corruption scandals. The China School in the Gaimusho is forced to adopt a
firmer position towards China to maintain its credibility, and it is not inconceiv-
able that China’s policies and attitude towards Japan may turn the China School
against China in the same way as happened with the Soviet Union and the
Gaimusho’s old Soviet School. The Gaimusho overall is weakened by scandals
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and by the bruising experience with the former foreign minister Tanaka Makiko,
who turned out to be more divisive than she was reform oriented. This and the
reduction in ODA (administered to a large part by the Gaimusho) effectively
removes the major force in Japanese foreign and security policy to stem the tide
of increasingly relying on military and political power balancing. These develop-
ments also reduce Japan’s ability to assume a long-term perspective in pursuing
engagement, while the short-term effects of economic reform are likely to
increase social unrest and political repression. Japan’s long-term perspective
would be particularly needed if China’s WTO membership, as often predicted,
leads to serious sectoral and social problems in the short term.
Scenarios
I suggest four possible scenarios for the future of Japanese–Chinese relations :
• Japan managing to skilfully equilibrate the diverse elements of engagement;
• Japan accepting China’s predominance in Asia and making itself accepted
by scaling down the military alliance with the US (bandwagoning);
• Japan further integrating itself into the Japan–US military alliance and
strengthening political and military power balancing against China;
• Japan developing its own autonomous military power and trying to assume
a posture of neutrality and a role as mediator among the powers in
Northeast Asia.
Which of these four scenarios is more likely depends mainly on the development
of China–US relations and China’s ability to promote balanced political and
economic development. However, the last scenario seems to be the least likely:
first, given Japan’s nature as a post-industrial consumer society, its lack of polit-
ical leadership, its historical legacy, its enmeshment in international
interdependencies (economically, politically, culturally), its deepening economic
crisis and its record of aligning with the strongest power during the last 150
years, there does not seem to be much room for it to become a neutral and
autonomous military power which would be accepted by either China or the US.
The idea of Japan as a mediator or bridge between East and West has always
had some residual resonance in Japan, and it has also been proposed by some
Japanese.12 There have been a few Japanese attempts at actively mediating
conflict between the US and China, but without success.13 Tennichi Takahiko
dismisses the idea of Japan as a mediator because Japan is merely a messenger
between China and the US in the absence of it being able to articulate an
agenda, having a universally applicable culture, etc.14 Japan lost a great deal of
time in establishing an impressive longstanding record of ability and sincerity
(for example in coming to terms with its past) while its economic power was at its
peak and that of China much lower. There is therefore now not much likelihood
of China accepting such a Japanese role: while China may welcome any
Japanese move which could weaken the US or US–Japan relations, it would be
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reluctant to give Japan the opportunity to expand its regional or global role by
playing a mediating role between Beijing and Washington.
The first scenario is the most optimistic. Twomey assumes such an outcome
and speaks of Japan’s ‘circumscribed balancing defined by a propensity to avoid
strong countervailing alliances, to ignore an opponent’s growth in peripheral
geographic areas and issue areas, and to avoid offensive strategies’.15 However,
he does not appreciate sufficiently the implicit need to make very difficult deci-
sions concerning the negative dynamics and challenges described above, which
would require strong and wise Japanese political leadership, a situation which is
not evident at the moment. Such a scenario would depend even more on China
managing to find the right balance between its political and economic develop-
ment, on Western engagement policy being calibrated in the right way, on China
moderating its nationalism and revisionism, on the successful handling of
possible instabilities in the region by all concerned parties, and on the US being
willing to cede considerable political, military and economic power to China.
Despite the enormous assumptions underlying it, this outcome cannot be totally
excluded, even if there may be many difficulties and conflicts in the interim. The
strongest force behind it is China’s growing involvement in the world economy
and the increasing number of stakeholders in China’s middle class, as well as
business sectors outside China (notably in the US). If the Taiwan issue could be
resolved in an way that is acceptable to China as well as the US, the chances of
this scenario would increase significantly. But as Aaron Friedberg warns, one
cannot place too much faith in the collective human capacity to learn correctly
from history.16
The second scenario, bandwagoning, has considerable plausibility on the
assumption that US importance for Japan weakens (either because of US with-
drawal from its security commitments, economic decline, or even linking up with
China in bipolarity), that China’s political and economic rise continues, and that
the rest of Asia gradually accepts China’s hegemony. As Pyle observed, Japan
has historically tended to ally itself with the strong ascendant dominant power
and adjusted its policies to this power.17
The first possibility, US withdrawal from its security commitments, could
occur as the result of a catalytic event (for example the failure of US military
intervention in the Taiwan Strait, or US frustration with Japan over not suffi-
ciently supporting such an intervention or one on the Korean Peninsula).
Another reason may be imperial fatigue: China’s current military potential has
already started to make US predominance in Asia more difficult and costly, and
this development is bound to continue if the US simply wants to maintain the
current power status quo. The current campaign against terrorism in the wake of
the terrorist attacks in the US absorbs many political, economic and military
resources, and China can be a very useful ally in view of its own problems with
Muslim irredentism. It would be foolish for the US to compare China with the
former Soviet Union, and to argue therefore that the West only has to be tough
and risk an arms race on the assumption that China will in the end fail like the
Soviet Union. China’s economic foundation is much stronger and more
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promising despite all the risks. Moreover, 1.3 billion Chinese failing is an even
more daunting prospect than 285 million Soviets failing.
The possibility of the East and Southeast Asian states bandwagoning with
China seems to be supported by the prediction of many observers, even if such
warnings are often only intended to encourage the US to exert countervailing
pressure to prevent such a development. Samuel Huntington expects China to
become the regional hegemon, with Asian states knowing how to adapt to it
without sacrificing too much national independence. According to him, the
Asian states have to choose between ‘power balanced at the price of conflict’ and
‘peace secured at the price of hegemony’.18 Denny Roy speaks of the prevalence
of appeasement by the Southeast Asian states because they assume that nothing
can be done or strong policies only would make China angry.19 Murai Tomohide
thinks that the countries in Southeast Asia would bend towards China if Beijing
used military pressure.20
There is also some reserved and conditional acceptance of bandwagoning
with China among the Japanese. Tennichi Takahiko considers it acceptable for
Japan to consider a Pax Sinica if China becomes a democratic country and
pursues free trade while the US loses its power.21 Inoguchi Takashi does not
exclude the possibility that the US may leave regional security in Asia to a demo-
cratic China, and that Japan would then have no reason not to follow its
historical inclination to join the regionally preponderant state.22
The most likely scenario for the time being is the third one, which is encour-
aged and supported by concern about developments in China and in
US–Chinese relations, as well as by Japanese political and economic weaknesses.
It would depend on the successful management of the most dangerous negative
dynamics arising from engagement. But this scenario is not likely to last long,
either because China’s successful economic and political development makes
Japan’s reliance on US protection and on US regional hegemony unnecessary or
unacceptable to China or even to Japan (a democratic China is likely to be as
nationalistic as the US today), or because Japan feels forced into bandwagoning
with China due to a rise in intolerable military tensions between the US and
China.
Policy recommendations
Nothing is historically predetermined and any prediction is impossible in view of
the inability to quantify the various dynamics precisely and to simulate their
interplay at a given moment in the future. There are ways for Japan to make
positive contributions to promote the more peaceful scenarios. The responsibility
of the bilateral security relationship lies, of course not only with Japan, but also
with China and the US, but Japan should choose those areas where it has the
greatest means and can have the greatest impact.
First, Japan should strive to prevent Japanese–Chinese economic rivalry from
poisoning an already difficult bilateral relationship. Trade disputes are a natural
but only a transitional and partial phenomenon, as we have also witnessed
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between Japan and the US, as well as Japan and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.
At the same time, we now see an increasing number of various kinds of
Japanese–Chinese enterprise cooperation which make the bilateral economic
relationship more equal and interdependent. Japan will have to ask itself
whether its economic well-being is at risk because policies pursued to achieve
China’s economic development may harm the regional and global economic
framework, or whether China’s economic development will lead to Japan having
to defend more strongly – or even abandon – its present economic power status
and concede an increasing number of commercial sectors to China. For the
former, Japan may find (even if not a perfect and notably timely) recourse in the
international trade regime (for example WTO’s dispute-settlement system).
Beijing will ultimately realise that contravening international economic norms
and standards is against its own long-term interests. Losing its status to China
may hurt Japan’s national identity as the world’s second-biggest capitalist
economy, but it is a development which Japan just has to accept as an
inescapable historical development, and one which it has inflicted on others
before. It should see this challenge as a means and an additional motivation to
restructure its economy and its social organization. Chinese immigration should
be directed in such a way that it enhances mutual understanding while helping
Japan to restructure and revitalize its economy. It would be better for Japan and
China to consider economic competition as a means of developing their own
individual strengths and becoming stronger in the process overall, though not
necessarily in each economic sector, rather than view this competition as a zero-
sum game. Finally, cooperation with the European Union would strengthen
Japan’s efforts to integrate China in a more binding way into international
economic (but also political) organizations and arrangements.
Second, Japan should try more seriously to diffuse the territorial dispute over
the Senkaku Islands and the EEZ in the East China Sea, and to prevent it from
becoming a flashpoint or a convenient tool for China to exert pressure on Japan.
Simply continuing the game of each side not recognizing the EEZ border of the
other side is no longer helpful, and Japanese companies are losing out. Tokyo
should propose joint exploration of the energy resources in the area and shelve
the sovereignty issue, so that Chinese as well as Japanese oil and gas companies
benefit from the contested area, and such cooperation could help with confi-
dence building. Such a proposal should be made as early as possible, before
Chinese companies no longer have any interest in Japanese exploration and
pipeline technology. Once joint exploration and production have begun, the
territorial issue will be less urgent and both governments will be more able to
reduce the influence of their respective nationalists.
Third, Japan has to recognize more squarely its past aggression against Asia,
particularly against China and Korea. This is not about demanding continuous
apologies, but in the first instance about avoiding actions – like official govern-
ment visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and allowing revisionist textbooks – which
give the impression that Japan does not admit its responsibility for having caused
tremendous harm to many Asians. Without such honesty, Japan will not gain full
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credibility and trust from its Asian neighbours, and this will allow China to
continue to play the ‘history card’ in order to divert attention from its unfriendly
security policies and will prevent the trust-building function of political and
economic enmeshment.
Fourth, Japan has to communicate more openly and clearly with China, and
encourage the latter to do the same by its own example as well as by exhortation.
For this to be possible, all Japanese players will first have to understand, prioritize
and discuss among themselves and with other concerned countries what Japan’s
security interests are and what repercussions they have at the bilateral, regional
and global levels. The Japanese have to help themselves and their Chinese coun-
terparts to understand that in an ever closer relationship between two very
different countries differences of interest are natural and legitimate, but that they
cannot be aggregated by silence, deference, emotional outbursts, incantations of
general principles or accusations about past aggression. Deeper and more mean-
ingful exchanges (at all levels, official as well as private) are, however, only a first
step towards addressing differences of interest, mutual ignorance and misunder-
standings.
Finally, Japan has to recognize that, due to the mounting negative dynamics
arising from the Japan–US security alliance, it cannot simply continue to
strengthen military cooperation with the US. Apart from the resulting strains on
Japan’s domestic security consensus and the costs to its national sovereignty
(particularly in the case of TMD cooperation, but also in maintaining the
current strength of US forces in Okinawa), deepening Japan–US security coop-
eration will increasingly appear as containment of China, which cannot help to
integrate China into the concert of East Asian powers. Just ‘explaining’ to China
the inoffensive intentions of the new guidelines and their non-geographic
meaning is not convincing and contradicts Japan’s insistence on Chinese trans-
parency in its security policy.23
In the case of TMD, the Japanese will have to decide soon whether they want
to deploy or not, or whether China has been sufficiently restrained by regional
arms-control measures.24 TMD may offer incentives to discuss a range of arms-
control and confidence-building measures to which China may react positively,
particularly if China’s main concern about Taiwan could be ruled out by Japan
and the US.25 Japan should clarify what the purpose of TMD will be after the
North Korean missile threat has gone, and what the connectivity between TMD
and US plans for NMD are.26 TMD is only part of the increasingly confronta-
tional China policy (other examples are weakening the ambiguity about the US
defending Taiwan or publicly calling China a strategic competitor) under the
new Bush administration and Japan will have to work harder on its military ally
to stem this tide in its own interest. Japan has to explain to the US that it cannot
tolerate the same degree of confrontation with China which the US can afford
as a distant and solitary superpower.
The most important task for Japan is to help to open up the rigid bilateral
alliance system in Northeast Asia. Funabashi Yoichi commented that ‘[I]n the
post-Cold War years, the biggest challenge for alliances is whether or not they
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can get Russia and China into the international community as full members’.27
In view of the inevitable challenge to the current security architecture after the
reunification of the Korean Peninsula, Mochizuki and O’Hanlon argue that
Japan will not be comfortable with an alliance designed primarily to deter China
once the Korea problem is solved.28 The alternative is for Japan to clearly and
meaningfully discuss these problems with the US through an enhanced and much
broader security dialogue, to use regional cooperative security approaches in
order to integrate China into the work of maintaining regional stability, and to
prompt the US to be more positively involved in helping China to cope with its
serious economic and ecological problems. A precondition for this is US willing-
ness to gradually abandon its desire to be the predominant force in Asia and to
broaden rather than limit its array of policy tools, notably in the multilateral
arena. The best hope for Japan is a growing American involvement in regional
cooperative security efforts as a constructive participant who is different because
it has more to contribute than the others, not because it is an offputting hegemon.
Japan has therefore to work towards a regional security system which includes
China from the start and which takes care of some core Chinese security inter-
ests towards Japan as well as towards the region as a whole.29 There is interest in
China in such a regional security system (even in one proposed by the US!), as
the following remarkable quote of the Chinese vice-premier, Qian Qichen,
seems to show:
China attaches great importance to the positive role played by the United
States in resolving regional problems. China hopes that the United States
establishes a new basic concept of security centring on mutual confidence,
mutual interests, equality and cooperation to maintain regional peace and
stability.30
Such a security system would eventually have to take over important functions of
the two Northeast Asian security alliances which the US has with Japan and
Korea (for example the ‘cap in the bottle’ function). It would also have to allow
the establishment of a post-Korean reunification security arrangement.
However, Japan, Korea and the US cannot simply merge the two alliances. A
first step might be the creation of an East Asian equivalent of ‘Partnership for
Peace’, as has been developed in Western Europe.31 Former Secretary of
Defence William Perry supports such a system:
I don’t think we can create in East Asia a regional security organisation like
NATO, but we can hope for a setup like Europe’s ‘Partnership for Peace’. As
Secretary of Defense I wanted to establish such a setup in Asia , but it ended
in failure [fushubi ni owatta] … China’s participation in any such setup is
indispensable.32
There have been several Japanese proposals in these directions, but more
radical approaches are needed. Sato Hideo suggests the establishment of a
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Pacific security community to help maintain a ‘healthy tension between Realist
and Liberal approaches in the China policies of Tokyo and Washington’.33
Hashimoto Kohei, a security specialist at the PHP Research Institute, suggested
an Asian security framework which would, for example, address China’s
concerns about energy supply and the security of sea lanes of communication
(SLOC).34 Michishita Narushige proposed separate consultative and cooperative
security links between China and the Japan–US alliance and China and the
South Korea–US alliance, similar to the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint
Council.35 Nakasone Yasuhiro spoke of the need to have next to the Japan–US
security system an Asian security dialogue organization that includes China.36
The leader of the Democratic Party, Hatoyama Yukio, proposed an Asia-Pacific
multilateral security system.37
For Japan to play a constructive role in integrating China into the regional
security environment and thus to protect its security interest, such ideas would
have to be pursued more vigorously and imaginatively. The foundations of the
various elements of engagement towards China and their impact on all involved
players are constantly shifting and therefore demand adaptation if engagement
is not to degenerate into containment with mere decorative enmeshment poli-
cies. Only by involving China in the construction of a new regional security
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